Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO2235
2005-09-29 21:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR ECUADOR

Tags:  PHUM PREL KDEM EC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 QUITO 002235 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, WHA/PPC AND WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PREL KDEM EC
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR ECUADOR

REF: SECSTATE 169581

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 QUITO 002235

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR G, DRL, S/P, WHA/PPC AND WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PREL KDEM EC
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES FOR ECUADOR

REF: SECSTATE 169581


1. (SBU) Summary: With serious democratic deficiencies
fueling political and economic instability in Ecuador, we
welcome the Department's enhanced emphasis on democracy
promotion and its decision to include Ecuador among countries
to receive priority attention. After engaging all elements
of the country team, as well as key contacts in the donor and
IFI community, the Ecuadorian political class and civil
society, in discussion of the causes and effects of
democratic instability here, we have developed a plan to
augment and focus our democracy support. As Secretary Rice
has stated, building a stable functioning democracy in
Ecuador will take "sustained effort over many years, even
decades, to address successfully." This cable reports on the
shorter-term aspects of our strategy. SepTel will outline
medium and longer-term strategies. Meanwhile, the Ecuadorian
people and government themselves continue to debate possible
democratic reforms, which will affect the parameters for
potential change. End Summary.

--------------
Democracy is Broken Here
--------------


2. (SBU) Not one of the last three democratically elected
presidents of Ecuador successfully served out his term, and
Ecuador has had seven presidents during the past nine years.
The institutional disarray of the executive branch is
replicated in the judicial and legislative sectors. The
country remains without a Supreme Court or Constitutional
Court since April, and permanent replacements for the
Attorney and Controller Generals have not been selected. The
lack of strong nationally based political parties makes for
an Ecuadorian Congress more responsive to regional and
personal interests than any national agenda.


3. (SBU) While the causes of popular discontent and the
composition of the popular forces that provoked the fall of
the last three elected presidents have varied, the result has
been the same: an irregular change of government caused by
popular protests in the capital and a return to the status
quo ante. The danger of democratic backsliding is very real,
whether in the form of a tradition of strongman military or
civilian solution or a more populist "Bolivarian" movement.


4. (SBU) Almost all Latin American countries have achieved

good macroeconomic performances in recent years; however,
some have suffered from acute political fragility, with
elected leaders being forced to resign in several Andean
nations due to protests and unrest. The divergence between
favorable economic development and worrisome political trends
in some parts of Latin America raises the importance of
political stability as a key element of creditworthiness. As
Ecuador's rating declines, its prospects for attracting the
investments necessary for income and employment growth will
also decline, feeding popular discontent.

--------------
Key Areas of Democratic Deficit
--------------


5. (SBU) Ecuador's judiciary suffers from corruption at the
highest levels, undermining the integrity and image of the
whole system. Moreover, Ecuador has been without its top
courts since Congress dissolved the Supreme and
Constitutional Courts on April 27, after the fall of the
Gutierrez government. Fortunately, in the absence of a
Supreme Court and Constitutional Court, the Superior Courts,
Provincial Tribunals, and lower courts have continued to
operate, albeit also subject to corruption. Slow progress is
being made on implementation of an oral accusatorial system
and on adoption of a justice of the peace system, local level
mediators, and public defenders, reforms that would bring
more transparency to the justice process as well as making it
more efficient and accessible at the local level.


6. (SBU) At critical moments of political instability,
politicians and military demonstrate little respect for the
constitution, undermining faith in all democratic
institutions. The standard response here has been to debate
reforms or changes to the constitution (Ecuador has had 18
since independence in 1821),rather than to change the
incentives for undemocratic behavior. President Palacio is
following that tradition by proposing a constitutional
referendum for December 11, 2005. The contents of the
referendum will be determined through negotiation with
Congress, which presents some risk to USG interests.
Fundamental electoral reforms could seriously challenge
election authorities preparing for the 2006 national
election.


7. (SBU) Intense political fragmentation is another
democratic challenge, preventing consensus on the appointment
of key independent authorities (the outgoing Attorney and
Controller Generals have yet to be permanently replaced),and
denying the central government needed security against
capricious impeachment attempts.

--------------
Desired Outcomes Over Next 6-8 Months
--------------


8. (SBU) To strengthen Ecuadorian confidence in democracy
and promote more responsible democratic behavior, the GOE
must make several key reforms in compliance with its
constitution and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

Over the next six to eight months, we hope to see:
-- Independent Supreme and Constitutional courts selected and
properly functioning, after effective international and
national oversight of the selection process;

-- The costs for corrupt behavior by public officials
increase, either by prosecution or resignation in response to
negative public opinion;

-- USG interests in an FTA, the Forward Operating Location at
Manta, and security cooperation protected from inclusion in
any popular referendum;

-- Congress overcome internal differences to appoint new
Attorney and Comptroller Generals, currently only filled on
an interim basis;

-- The Palacio administration not subject to any
unconstitutional challenge;

-- Electoral reforms fully implemented prior to the opening
of the 2006 elections, with a focus on voter education and
campaign financing transparency.

-------------- ---
Mission Strategy to Achieve 6-8 Month Objectives
-------------- ---


9. (SBU) To encourage these outcomes, we have established
mission-wide democracy promotion and elections working groups
to monitor democratic progress and the elections process.
The democracy promotion group will:

-- Leverage OAS technical assistance to the court selection
committee to ensure selection of a qualified Supreme Court,
which will in turn set procedures to select a new
Constitutional Court;

-- Help the GOE design a strategy to lower the risk of
rejection of the new Supreme Court by referendum or other
challenge;

-- Encourage informed debate on electoral and political
reforms being considered for inclusion in the referendum,
while shielding USG security and trade interests from
inclusion;

-- Encourage political party dialogue to reach consensus on
selection of Attorney and Controller Generals;

-- Enhance national political stability by strengthening
local government transparency through USG-funded citizen
oversight efforts and infrastructure development at the
municipal and village level;

-- Apply USG visa ineligibility for corruption against
selected high and mid-level government officials;

-* Promote military respect for civilian authority using all
available resources.


10. (SBU) With major electoral reforms under discussion, some
of which could make implementation of elections more
difficult, and despite legal constraints (Nethercutt
amendment) against support for GOE institutions, the election
working group will:

-- Support free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections
that will be accepted by all sectors of Ecuadorian society.

-- Identify ways the USG can support implementation of key
electoral reforms approved by referendum, possibly including
election by congressional district, institution of political
party primaries, and new campaign financing rules;

-- Increase participation in the 2006 elections by minorities
(indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians);

-- Support voter education and public awareness campaigns,
including debates, domestic election observation efforts and
a quick count.

-- Support citizen oversight of campaign finance disclosure
requirements;

-- Support OAS technical assistance to the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal (TSE);

-- Redouble our public diplomacy efforts, working with the
public sector, civil society and the media, particularly at
the provincial and municipal levels, to engage the Ecuadorian
people during this time of democratic rebuilding.

--------------
Major Needs From the USG
--------------


11. (SBU) High-level dialogue between the GOE and top USG
officials would advance our democracy agenda here. Many
Ecuadorians have internalized their recent record of
democratic shortfalls, and seem resigned to continued
failure. USG motives are deeply suspect in many sectors, yet
most Ecuadorians still look to us to help them solve their
problems. Building on the Secretary's successful UNGA
meeting with President Palacio, visits by other high level
USG officials would highlight our diplomatic and public
diplomacy outreach efforts in support of Ecuadorian
democracy.


12. (SBU) We also recommend increased election support to
the OAS. To signal USG support for rule of law, we request
Department action with interagency players to deport wanted
Ecuadorian criminals from the United States. We strongly
support efforts to seek a waiver to permit IMET programs to
continue despite Article 98 sanctions. Without it, the costs
of losing access to a generation of Ecuadorian military could
be catastrophic for our long-term democracy promotion
efforts. Finally, additional funding for our democracy
promotion efforts is essential. Current AID funding levels
of $7,316,800 in FY 05 for democracy and governance are
inadequate to the dimensions of the problems we face here.

--------------
Major Impediments
--------------


13. (SBU) Nethercutt/Article 98 restrictions that prohibit
support to the GOE greatly hinder USG ability to effect
change. These restrictions have already undercut USG
civilian-military educational exchange programs, putting at
risk our influence over an entire generation of officers.
Nethercutt restrictions also undermine USG democracy building
efforts with local governments and hamper policy reform
efforts with a wide array of Central Government institutions,
including the Electoral Tribunal, other courts, and the Trade
and Environment Ministries. Other important impediments
include lack of consensus here on which reforms will enhance
democracy, and time constraints that reduce GOE ability to
achieve that consensus.

--------------
Countries With Influence
--------------


14. (SBU) Spain is already working to support the political
reform process. Chile is highly regarded as an ally by most
Ecuadorians. Venezuela and Cuba seek to increase their
influence in Ecuador through financial assistance and social
exchanges, respectively. Colombia is a neighboring country
viewed skeptically due to fear of negative consequences from
its civil conflict. We intend to work with Chileans and
Spanish counterparts to leverage our efforts.

--------------
GOE Democracy Promotion Efforts
--------------


15. (SBU) The GOE supports ongoing USG-funded judicial
reform, and is promoting dialogue on a variety of possible
constitutional reforms that would be carried out via public
referendum (tentatively scheduled for December 11, 2005)
including, possibly, ratifying the selection procedures for a
new Supreme Court and creation of a new electoral court,
election by district, creation of a Senate, presidential
impeachment by recall vote, reduction in the period Congress
meets, de-politicization of the electoral tribunal, and
reduction of the one-year delay in consideration of
constitutional changes not deemed by Congress to be of
national urgency.

--------------
Consequences of Pursuing Reform
--------------


16. (SBU) A more aggressive USG reform agenda in the context
of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and orchestrated
with Chile, Spain and the IFIs (CAF, WB, and IDB) would help
limit possible backlash against higher USG visibility.
Working through other like-minded nations and institutions
would help avoid unhelpful skepticism, and potential
political attacks against USG interests during a
pre-electoral year. So far the reception to our efforts to
coordinate with international donors on democracy promotion
has been open and constructive. By speaking from the same
page with other donors and supporting legitimate
pro-democracy civil society organizations, we may be able to
help Ecuador through this transition period toward more
responsible and effective rule of law, governance, and
citizen participation to the benefit of all.
JEWELL