WHO WILL LEAD ECUADOR'S CONGRESS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000020

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: WHO WILL LEAD ECUADOR'S CONGRESS?


Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b)


1. (U) SUMMARY: January 5 marks the mid-point of the
congressional term in Ecuador; on that date, legislators will
elect a president, two vice presidents, and the membership of
18 committees to lead Congress until January 2007. The
presidential race, pitting opposition (ID) and pro-government
(PRE) parties, promises to be close, controversial, and quite
possibly chaotic. Both organizations claim entitlement to
the legislature's highest position, yet appear to lack the
votes necessary to invest respective candidates. As such,
small parties and independent deputies are likely to play a
deciding role in the vote. Neither party's nominee
consistently has staked pro- or anti-U.S. positions; USG
interests are best served by the candidate most dedicated to
tackling Congress's ample agenda. END SUMMARY.

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Constitutional Questions Muddy Internal Elections
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2. (U) Ecuador's constitution awards the presidency of
Congress during the first half of the term to the party "with
the greatest legislative representation;" the first
vice-presidency belongs to the second-ranking organization
(with minority parties owning the second VP slot). At the
two-year mark, the parties swap positions, the second-ranking
organization inheriting Congress's top job. The Social
Christian Party (PSC) won 26 of the legislature's 100 seats
in Ecuador's October 2002 elections, easily surpassing the ID
(16) and PRE (15) totals. For reasons still unclear, in the
elections' aftermath PSC leader and Congressional Deputy Leon
Febres-Cordero refused the leadership position entitled to
his party.


3. (U) The presidency thus fell to the second-most voted
party, apparently the ID. PRE leaders protested, pointing
out that two of the ID's deputies won office in alliances
with other parties and should not count toward the ID's
total. The PRE's 15 were "pure PRE," however, entitling the
Coast-based, populist party of former President Abdala
Bucaram to the presidency. In response to pleas from both
groups, Ecuador's Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) considered
the matter in late 2002, but issued an inconclusive finding.
The controversy diminished only after Congress itself passed
a resolution proclaiming the ID Ecuador's second political
force and allowing Deputy Guillermo Landazuri to assume the
presidency.

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Gutierrez Comeback, Alliance Threaten Continued ID Reign
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4. (U) Until barely two months ago, few believed the PRE
could challenge the ID for Congressional leadership.
Bucaram's forces enjoyed few legislative allies apart from
President Lucio Gutierrez's Patriotic Society Party, and the
president, facing ID- and PSC-supported impeachment charges,
was fighting for his political life. Removal proceedings
faltered November 9, however, and Gutierrez, with PRE
backing, counterattacked. Via resolutions passed by a slight
majority in Congress, the president and allies in the
legislature purged Ecuador's highest courts of most PSC
influence. They have now turned sights on Congress, with PRE
leaders demanding the top legislative job for 2005-2007.


5. (SBU) They continue to trumpet the "pure vs. alliance"
argument to justify the party's standing as Ecuador's
second-ranking political party. In addition, PRE bosses
claim that two defections have reduced the ID's total deputy
count to 14, removing any claim by the latter to the
presidency. Ecuador's imprecise constitution and a
characteristic of the Spanish language -- heavy use of the
subjunctive -- lend weight to second point, since Article 129
states that "for the second two years, the president and vice
president will be elected from the parties and movements that
have obtained (hayan obtenido) the second and first
majorities, respectively."


6. (U) From self-imposed exile in Panama, Bucaram December
27 announced that Deputy Omar Quintana should take Congress's
reins at the January 5 election. Quintana, a Guayaquil
businessman and the brother-in-law of PRIAN party founder and
presidential candidate Alvaro Noboa, enjoys full PRE, PRIAN
and PSP support. However, smaller parties that pepper the
current majority in Congress, namely the far-left Socialists
and MPD, have withheld backing. MPD officials announced
December 30 they favor a different PRE candidate, Marco
Proano, for the post.


7. (U) Dissension appeared to plague ID ranks as well.
Rather than one, ID leadership December 29 presented four
"pre-candidates" for the presidency of Congress: Carlos
Gonzalez, Wilfrido Lucero, Jorge Sanchez, and Andres Paez.
Guayaquil daily El Universo claimed January 4 that ID
leadership, in a three-hour meeting, chose Lucero, a veteran
legislator and member of the International Relations
committee. Lucero's staff later confirmed the El Universo
account.

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All Signs Point to Confusion
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8. (U) Pablo Santillan, for 11 years a Congressional staffer
and currently director of legislative services, provided
Poloff December 30 his analysis of the PRE-ID dispute and a
possible scenario of January 5 events. Blame for the impasse
lay with the TSE for not issuing a definitive ruling naming
the PRE or ID Ecuador's second party for the full 2003-2007
term. The legislature's subsequent, pro-ID resolution was
politically motivated and thus open to challenge from
Congress itself, Santillan reasoned. And the PRE might have
votes to do it.


9. (U) He foresaw lame-duck Congressional President
Landazuri opening the legislative session by referring to the
earlier resolution favoring the ID. Landazuri would announce
the ID's candidate and open the floor to debate. Santillan
doubted sufficient support existed, however. Instead,
Landazuri would have to accept the PRE demand to open
discussion on Omar Quintana. Quintana had support from the
PRE, PRIAN, PSP and many independents, and the MPD likely
would support him after its political wish list was met. It
still did not sum to 51, Santillan feared, meaning lengthy,
loud, and messy negotiation would follow. PSC Deputy Carlos
Torres predicted a similar scenario in a December 29
conversation with Poloff.

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Interested Parties Speak Out
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10. (SBU) PRE Deputy Ernesto Valle provided us the party
line December 29. The PRE's right to the legislative
presidency lay in Article 129 of the constitution, Valle
argued. His party was determined not to allow the ID to
steal it again. Omar Quintana enjoyed the support of both
Bucaram and grassroots PRE leaders, and pressure from allied
parties, no matter how strong, would not sway PRE leadership.
Valle, too, believed the MPD would come around, after its
leaders obtained PRE promises for a stronger MPD presence in
the Legislative and Codification Commission, a body that
backstopped Congress when it was out of session. The
Socialists were demanding control over Ecuador's Social
Security program (IESS),a harder demand to meet, he
believed, but not impossible.


11. (U) Edy Suarez, an aide to Socialist legislator Segundo
Serrano, informed Poloff December 30 that his party had yet
to determine how to cast its votes. It did not see itself as
a government ally nor opponent, and would consider both the
ID and PRE candidates. A fellow minority party, the MPD had
done well to link its vote to promises to share political
riches; the Socialists might do the same. Surprisingly,
Suarez considered his party ideologically closer to the
populist PRE than the left-center ID, hinting that, if forced
to choose, the Socialists would support Quintana.


12. (SBU) Electing a PRE deputy president of Congress was
unconstitutional, ID pre-candidate Andres Paez told Poloff
December 30, himself citing Article 129 and the legislature's
earlier resolution favoring his party. Worse, it represented
an additional step toward a Gutierrez "dictatorship," as
dangerous as December's judicial purge. The ID had but 42
secure votes and securing nine more looked difficult, Paez
added.

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COMMENT:
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13. (C) Ecuador's rapidly shifting alliances and general
political cannibalism make us expect a messy and
unpredictable legislative battle January 5. The most likely
outcome, a PRE victory, would represent a further step in
Gutierrez's remarkable and rapid comeback, reinforcing his
flanks against future Congressional attempts to remove him.
It might also raise concern and protest, however, amongst
opposition groups perceiving a dangerous concentration of
government powers.


14. (C) The legislature faces a daunting agenda in 2005.
Many projects involve U.S. interests, from ratifying the
Andean Free Trade Agreement (if signed) to approving
bilaterally beneficial civil aviation, anti-TIP, and
anti-money laundering legislation. We stand to benefit
should a workaholic, issues-focused legislator win the
presidency. Neither Lucero nor Quintana are standouts in
this regard, however. END COMMENT.
KENNEY