Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO1734
2005-07-22 19:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

MORE FINANCIAL PRESSURE ON ECUADOR

Tags:  ECON EFIN PGOV PREL EC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001734 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: MORE FINANCIAL PRESSURE ON ECUADOR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kevin Herbert Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001734

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2015
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV PREL EC
SUBJECT: MORE FINANCIAL PRESSURE ON ECUADOR

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kevin Herbert Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary. Opting for the path of least resistance,
President Palacio issued a partial veto of the bill to refund
social security (IESS) reserve funds, but proposed to refund
the reserve funds anyway. The major immediate difference
between the congressional bill and the Palacio proposal is
that under his proposal the reserves will be refunded over
six months versus the 0-90 days proposed in the bill. His
attempt to please everyone (business, and even Minister of
Economy Correa, were urging a veto) places additional
pressure on Ecuador,s already strained financing needs.
Palacio has succeeded in temporarily averting strong public
protests, but only by postponing more and greater (especially
financing) pressures in the future. End summary.

Is Everybody Happy?
--------------


2. (SBU) President Alfredo Palacio, in a nationally televised
address to the nation the night of July 21, announced he was
partially vetoing the congressional bill to refund social
security (IESS) reserve funds to contributors. While in the
strictest sense it is a partial veto, Palacio actually
proposed to do exactly what the bill called for, refund IESS
reserve funds to contributors. The major difference between
the congressional bill and Palacio,s proposal is that, under
the latter, reserve withdrawals would be phased in over a
relatively longer 3-6 months instead 0-90 days in the
original bill. Congress has 30 days to override the veto
with 67 out of 100 votes; otherwise, Palacio,s version
becomes law. Palacio called for an extraordinary session of
congress (which is in recess) to convene next week.


3. (C) Retirees, union members and others had threatened to
take to the streets if Palacio vetoed the bill. Seventy-five
of the 100 congressional deputies voted in favor of the bill.
Business leaders and others, including Minister of Economy
Rafael Correa, who understood more of what was at stake for
the country, had urged Palacio to veto the bill. In press
reports July 22, Correa was still calling for a full veto of

the bill. Palacio, perhaps fearing the same fate of his
predecessor Lucio Gutierrez who was ousted last April 20,
elected to try to satisfy everyone, providing both a veto
(partial) and the return of the reserves.


4. (C) To further distract both the Congress and the public,
Palacio threw in several additional proposals. Among them
are economic and political reforms, including proposed
national referendum issues (septel).

More Financial Pressures and Causes for Concern
-------------- --


5. (U) Instead of allowing contributors to immediately
(within 90 days) withdraw their IESS reserve funds, Palacio
proposes to make the funds available to contributors in 3
phases. In the first phase, contributors with $1000 or less
in reserves can withdraw their funds within 90 days of
September 1. Those contributors with $1000-1500 would be
able to make withdrawals in December and January. Those
contributors with over $1500 in social security reserve funds
would have to wait until February 2006 to withdraw the funds.
Palacio claimed that the first phase alone would cover 91%
of those eligible to withdraw funds from the reserve system.


6. (U) Currently, the reserve fund holds $734 million, $384
million of which is invested in government debt. Thus, under
the congressional or Palacio scenario, because both allow the
complete withdrawal of reserves, the GOE could lose up to
$384 million in financing. (It is not clear how many people
would actually elect to withdraw their funds.) However, the
GOE was already considering an increase in IESS holdings of
government debt. The intended increase was to cover the
prospects of low rollovers of previous debt, lower
multilateral disbursements and promised higher capital
spending. Credit Suisse First Boston (CFSB) also notes that
there are short-term liquidity problems. The reserve fund
only has $265 million in cash deposits, which would require
the IESS to liquidate securities holdings to pay back the
full $734 million to contributors. CFSB adds that the GOE,s
liquidity problems will be further challenged by domestic
debt maturities in September ($261 million) and January 2006
($195 million).


7. (U) As part of the social security system reforms, Palacio
proposed that future reserves be divided into two funds, only
one from which the contributor could seek withdrawals. He
said that next week, during his called-for extraordinary
session of Congress, he would send proposals for a series of
reforms, e.g., the restructuring of the social security
system, and the Deposit Guarantee Agency (AGD - roughly
equivalent to the former U.S. Resolution Trust Agency).
According to press reports, within 90 days of the passage of
the new law, the Minister of Economy could acquire an &open
bank8 under the AGD and transfer it to the IESS. The AGD
could use the proceeds to pay off the depositors of failed
banks who have yet to recover their funds from banks taken
over by the state in the 1999-2000 banking crisis.
Palacio,s plan also proposes that the Minister of Economy
would establish another bank for the benefit of IESS
contributors, offering mortgages and loans to contributors.
This proposal calls for much closer examination, given
Minister of Economy Correa,s out-dated statist economic
policies.
Comment
--------------


8. (C) The details of the extensive proposals from Palacio
are still emerging, requiring more review and analysis before
drawing definitive conclusions, which was probably one of
Palacio,s goals in the first place. He has given everyone
almost exactly what was requested, but it is not clear how
(or if) he can pay for it all, both economically and
politically. For now though, he has kept himself in office
and caused enough confusion to send the Congress and public
in enough different directions to prevent them from seizing
any one issue that could unite them against him. Sooner,
rather than later though the financing bill will come due,
which might make Venezuelan assistance overtures more
enticing. Also, much of Palacio,s proposed economic reforms
seem to have come from Correa, which would imply that the
prospects of his imminent departure from the cabinet are much
less likely.


9. (C) By avoiding the hard, but clearly best choice (a full
veto of the IESS bill),Palacio appears to confirm early
impressions of him. He is more interested in keeping himself
in office than taking controversial public stands that are in
Ecuador,s best national interests.
HERBERT