STAFFDEL SEES CN, CT GAPS IN ECUADOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001645

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2015
TAGS: SNAR PTER MASS PGOV PREL EC CO
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL SEES CN, CT GAPS IN ECUADOR

Classified By: CDA KEVIN HERBERT, REASONS 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Use of Ecuadorian territory by narcotics
and alien smugglers dominated discussions during Staffdel
Walker, which visited Ecuador July 4-9. A DEA briefing
revealed that agency,s eavesdropping weaknesses, exacerbated
by Ecuadorian cellular carriers migration from analog to
digital technologies. DEA also lamented Ecuadorian state oil
company PetroEcuador's neglect and/or outright collusion in
petroleum ether trafficking. A subsequent visit to an
Ecuadorian counter-narcotics (CN) checkpoint uncovered a
motivated police force. Unfortunately, they appeared unable
to identify opium latex, whose trafficking from Peru through
Ecuador, en route to Colombia, is reportedly on the rise.
Our Congressional visitors pledged to explore options to help
resolve these CN deficiencies.


2. (C) Migrant (or alien) smuggling also took center-stage,
with Defense and Homeland Security attaches informing the
Staffdel that Ecuador led the world in sending seaborne
migrants to the United States. All agreed terrorists could
easily exploit the Ecuador-Guatemala-Mexico-USA route, since
USG maritime assets in the eastern Pacific concentrated
primarily on intercepting narcotics smugglers. To provide
greater and better-focused resources to reduce the migrant
flow, our visitors expressed interest in revising a pending
authorization bill to request a cost-benefit analysis of
current USG interdiction efforts. END SUMMARY.

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A Busy Week in Quito
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3. (U) Staffdel Walker, led by House International Relations
Committee Professional Staff Member Mark Walker, visited
Quito and its environs July 4-9. Their first two days
focused on "softer" USG assistance to Ecuador -- support for
rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, political
decentralization, and aid to the indigenous -- and on calls
on GoE and Ecuadorian Congress officials. Subsequent
sessions delved into security matters, focused mainly on
narcotics and aien smuggling in Ecuador.

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Staffing, Technology Woes Don't Help
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4. (C) Increasing amounts of cocaine and heroin traversed
Ecuadorian territory, DEA agents asserted. About half of the
former was Europe-bound, nearly all Colombia-produced,
Ecuador-routed heroin quenched the eastern United States
market. Refuting the Staffdel's Colombian and Peruvian
contacts' allegations, DEA staff claimed Ecuadorian police
and military were not ignoring narcotics trafficking. USG
vetted units, in particular, had enjoyed some interdiction
success, although numbers were down in 2005. Part of the
blame lay in DEA's own staffing woes -- medical emergencies
and tour curtailments left the agency bereft of agents
necessary to prod Ecuadorian police into action.


5. (S) Signal intelligence quality/quantity too had
diminished, responsible for perhaps half the drop in
seizures. Agents explained that Ecuadorian cellular
telephone, until recently analog, had migrated to digital
platforms, mainly GSM. Existing interception equipment had
proven useless against state-of-the-art, encrypted messaging.
While high-tech eavesdropping tools were available, USG
export controls prohibited their acquisition for the
Ecuadorian police. Similar technology, produced in Israel
and Poland, would work, but USG procurement regs appeared to
rule out that option. With the current government accusing
the former of utilizing military and police intelligence
assets for political spying, the future of police phone
tapping was in doubt.

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Nor Does Company Collusion
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6. (C) DEA staff also raised precursor chemical smuggling.
Vast quantities of petroleum ether, aka "white gas," fed
cocaine processing laboratories in southern Colombia; most
came from PetroEcuador pipelines. The quantities involved,
plus the expertise and labor necessary to tap and transfer
the volatile chemical, seemed to indicate the company,s
neglect, if not outright collusion. Recent DEA-funded
operations, conducted mainly by the Ecuadorian Army, had
interdicted thousands of gallons of white gas, yet the trade
continued.

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Our Guests Pitch In
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7. (S) Staff members agreed that combating Ecuador's drug
problem required a robust DEA presence; a half-staff team
practically presented traffickers a green light. While not
empowered to add agents, lead staffer John Mackey offered to
investigate increased TDY support from DEA offices in Bogota
and Lima. Mackey and colleague Nick Coleman were troubled by
the "cellular gap." Export control and procurement
regulations were vital, but must also be attentive to allied
nations, needs. Avoiding offer of immediate solutions, they
nonetheless promised to investigate the feasibility of
securing up-to-date interception technology.


8. (C) Efforts to counter the precursor trade were bound to
fail without PetroEcuador cooperation, Mackey reasoned. If
neglect/collusion by its executives and labor leaders was
such public knowledge, he continued, did it not amount to
tacit assistance to drug traffickers? He posed the idea of a
harshly worded letter, authored by U.S. Congress committee
chairmen, threatening PetroEcuador with sanctions under the
Controlled Substances Act. Embassy officers agreed the
letter could spur positive movement on petroleum ether, but
expressed concern it might provoke negative side-effects for
PetroEcuador such as further legal action against U.S. oil
company Occidental Petroleum (Oxy).

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On The Road
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9. (C) Emboffs accompanied Mackey and Walker to Baeza, two
hours east of Quito. There, at the convergence of major
north-south and east-west highways, Southcom dollars had
funded construction of a police checkpoint, while Narcotics
Affairs Section (NAS) funding had refurbished it. It
currently houses a specialized, mobile CN force, the GEMA.
Ably commanded by Col. Fabian Solano, GEMA forces, numbering
160, fan out to various checkpoints nationwide, based on
expected trafficking patterns. Troops appeared motivated and
skilled, checking a large bus and its 30-odd occupants in
barely five minutes.


10. (C) In his command brief, Solano highlighted drug and
precursor flows linking Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. He also
noted recent discoveries of small-scale coca plantations in
Sucumbios and Esmeraldas province. Mackey questioned the
Colonel on opium latex, which he had heard was flowing from
production sites in northern Peru, through Ecuador, en route
to refining labs in southern Colombia. Solano replied he
could remember no latex interdictions, doubted his men could
identify it, and asserted his canines were trained only in
cocaine detection.


11. (C) Colombian CN police were among the world,s best,
Mackey responded. They were also capable of training
friendly forces. Would Ecuador accept a Colombian contingent
providing instruction in opium latex detection, he asked?
Solano welcomed the idea, and offered to bring the entire
GEMA force to Baeza to take part. Mackey also offered
support in ramping up a "1-800 program" to attract snitches.
Such initiatives had generated excellent leads in neighboring
nations, he revealed. Again, Solano responded positively.

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Migrant Smuggling An Equivalent Problem
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12. (SBU) No nation sends more migrants by sea to the United
States than Ecuador, DAO and DHS attaches explained to the
staffdel. The total flow, conservatively estimated at 30-42
K/year per year, exceeds the total number of Haitian,
Dominican, and Cuban migrants. Yet USG maritime assets in
the eastern Pacific, working under the Joint Inter-Agency
Task Force-South (JIATF-S) umbrella, focus on narcotics, not
alien smuggling. Most migrant interdictions are
happenstance, or the product of trafficker vessels, SOSes.
And they've brought the Embassy black eyes of late, boat
owners and migrants alike telling tall tales of mistreatment.


13. (C) In contrast, the COAC, the Ecuadorian National
Police's anti-migrant smuggling unit, has proven effective
and cheap. Established three years ago with special NAS
funding, COAC elements nabbed five of the NSC,s top-ten
Ecuadorian migrant smugglers in 2003, all on a budget of
$225,000. That money had evaporated, however, and neither
NAS nor DHS has been able to replenish this year's coffers.
NAS has obtained modest funding for next fiscal year, but
seeks to establish steady, long-term funding for the unit.


14. (C) Such migrant flows presented catastrophic risks to
national security, Mackey assesed. Owing to security
improvements at legal ports of entry, the next 9/11 bombers
would not pass through JFK, but rather south Texas, New
Mexico or Arizona. U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets were
both tasked and better suited to drug interdiction; migrant
work was both time-consuming and costly (a recent
repatriation of 90-odd Ecuadorians from Guatemala cost the
USG $43,000 in airfare). Mackey therefore considered
continued funding for the COAC imperative, and began drafting
a proposed amendment to the pending State authorization bill,
tasking the Secretary with preparing a cost/benefit analysis
on current USG anti-migrant smuggling operations in Ecuador
and the eastern Pacific.

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COMMENT:
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15. (C) USG security assistance to Ecuador, which enjoyed a
bump-up in recent years, has begun to drop. The GoE's
unwillingness to sign an Article 98 agreement merits blame as
well, of course. Yet drastic cutbacks threaten U.S. CN
interests in the Andes could even harm our efforts in
Colombia. Staffdel Walker seemed attuned to the "balloon
effect," in which Colombian Army success in Putumayo and
Narino could drive the FARC south into Ecuador. END COMMENT.
HERBERT