Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO1635
2005-07-12 22:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

BORDER SECURITY DOMINATES PALACIO-URIBE DISCUSSION

Tags:  PREL PGOV SNAR PTER EC CO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001635 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY DOMINATES PALACIO-URIBE DISCUSSION

REF: QUITO 1534

Classified By: CDA Kevin Herbert, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001635

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY DOMINATES PALACIO-URIBE DISCUSSION

REF: QUITO 1534

Classified By: CDA Kevin Herbert, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Amidst a perception of frayed bilateral
relations -- due mainly to GoE leaders' anti-Colombia
outbursts -- Presidents Alfredo Palacio and Alvaro Uribe
briefly met July 7 in Costa Rica. Media here claimed the
session was substance-lite and lasted only fifteen minutes;
an MFA contact confirmed that account. Colombia's charge
d'affaires in Quito offered a differing version of the San
Jose summit, however, revealing the presidents' conversation
included visas, trade issues, coca eradication, and the
FARC's recent attacks near the frontier. Regardless of
substance, the fact Palacio kept the date, combined with
reduced rhetoric of late, makes us hopeful that bilateral
dialogue is ongoing. We are not so optimistic regarding a
July 25 meeting of foreign ministers, unfortunately. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Numerous factors and actors deserve blame for the
recent downturn in Ecuador-Colombia relations. Three weeks
ago, Government Minister Mauricio Gandara, Ecuador's
preeminent Plan Colombia-basher, floated the idea of
demanding visas of Colombians, a measure aimed at reducing
growing insecurity and criminality along Ecuador's northern
frontier. In response to claims that a recent FARC attack in
Putumayo originated in Ecuador, FM Parra dragged out a tired
refrain -- the GoE would not involve itself in the Colombian
conflict -- but enfuriated the neighboring nation in claiming
Ecuador was "neutral" between the GoC and FARC, the latter
"enjoying some legitimacy" in its anti-government efforts.
Local media initially supported the Palacio team's
get-tough-with-Colombia policy statement.


3. (U) Great anticipation therefore accompanied the run-up
to the summit of banana producing countries held in Costa
Rica July 7. Press speculated that Palacio would focus on
the planks of his Colombia "policy:" insistence that Bogota
halt coca eradication near the border, provide assistance to
help attend to Colombia's displaced in Ecuador, and augment
its military and police forces in Narino and Putumayo

departments. Uribe would demand a return to Ecuador's
earlier, "submissive" posture, commentators ventured.


4. (U) July 8 coverage of the gathering was surprisingly
sparse. Ecuador's largest-circulation newspaper,
Guayaquil-based El Universo, asserted the presidents avoided
in-depth interchange, although their conversation was
"positive, cordial and constructive." Other outlets focused
on the meeting lasting only fifteen minutes. In public
comments, Parra revealed the leaders discussed coca
eradication, Palacio maintaining a firm position: until
scientific studies proved irrefutably that glyphosate posed
no danger to humans, Colombia should halt spraying within ten
miles of Ecuadorian territory. Gandara's visa proposal never
came up, the FM claimed.


5. (C) In a meeting with Poloffs July 12, MFA Subsecretary
for Bilateral Affairs Susana Alvear noted the July 7
gathering was positive but brief -- FMs Barco and Parra would
tackle substantive issues at their July 25 ministerial in
Quito. Colombian Embassy Charge d'Affaires Salvador Escobar
offered a different take July 11, however, arguing the
Uribe-Palacio pull-aside was meatier than the press (or
Alvear) portrayed. Four pillars dominated the presidential
discussion: visas, fumigation, terrorism/border security,
and bilateral trade.


6. (C) Uribe insisted a visa regime ran counter to Andean
Community of Nations (CAN) precepts and would have no effect
on narcoterrorist and/or criminal incursions, Escobar
revealed, owing to a plethora of clandestine border
crossings. On aerial eradication, his president was
steadfast: every inch of Colombian territory was fair game
for spraying. Escobar had little detail on the trade
discussion, offering only that a deal looked possible to
release a northbound shipment of rice, currently
"quarantined" in Ecuadorian border town Tulcan.


7. (C) Terrorism and frontier security had dominated the
quarter-hour, however. Palacio was reluctant to sign off on
a summit declaration condemning that day's London bombings,
Escobar claimed, and acquiesced only after Uribe pressured.
The Colombian next raised the July 25 FARC attacks in
Putumayo, focusing on the confrontation in Puerto Asis (Ref
A). That municipality's mayor's allegation the attack had
originated in Ecuador was correct, Uribe argued. He provided
Palacio a Colombian Army intelligence report to back the
assertion.


8. (C) Editorializing, Escobar believed the GoE had
manufactured recent bilateral saddle burrs. The reason? To
galvanize public opinion behind the new administration by
alleging perilous external threats. Such bluster also helped
divert the public's attention from a so-far dubious domestic
record, the Colombian charge added. GoC leaders, especially
FM Barco, shared his views and were prepared to endure
anti-Plan Colombia words as long as Ecuador's counter-terror
stance remained firm.


8. (C) COMMENT: While we doubt the left-leaning Palacio
will ever consider close Ecuador-Colombia ties politically
beneficial, we are optimistic that bilateral relations have
hit bottom (with the Parra/Gandara comments) and begun to
improve. Palacio could have dodged the Uribe meeting or
worse, "declared victory" to a home media warm to such
bravado. He did not. Rather, his team was muted and
positive in its public commentary. Further, in a meeting
with Codel Thomas (Ref B),Palacio walked back Parra,s
"neutrality" nonsense )- Colombia's was not a civil war, he
asserted, but a conflict between narcoterrorism and a
democratically elected, allied government. Last, we have no
indication Ecuador's police and military contingent along the
frontier, buttressed in recent years, might soon downsize.
Like Escobar and (purportedly) Barco, therefore, we should
steel ourselves to obstinate GoE talk, as long as there's no
accompanying walk, away from the border. END COMMENT
HERBERT