Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO1534
2005-06-29 15:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

FARC ATTACKS FURTHER ALIENATE QUITO, BOGOTA

Tags:  PREL MOPS MARR SNAR PTER EC CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001534 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: FARC ATTACKS FURTHER ALIENATE QUITO, BOGOTA

REF: A. QUITO 1478

B. QUITO 1480

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001534

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2015
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: FARC ATTACKS FURTHER ALIENATE QUITO, BOGOTA

REF: A. QUITO 1478

B. QUITO 1480

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: News of the FARC's lethal attacks in
southern Putumayo June 25 spawned a counterproductive but
oh-so-Ecuadorian response from politicians in Quito. Rather
than condemning the narcoterrorists and acknowledging that
border security requires bilateral cooperation, Palacio
administration officials blamed Plan Patriota for endangering
Ecuadorian lives. High-level GoE officials threaten to
impose a visa regime on Colombian nationals, reacting to
allegations that one FARC offensive originated in Ecuador.
Their policies earned kudos from media and elites, grateful
Palacio's team has refocused on protecting Ecuadorian
sovereignty (physical security be damned). On the ground,
the GoE military reacted reasonably to the upswing in
violence, dispatching troops to block FARC retreats south;
their willingness to engage the enemy is untested, however.
A short-term outcome from the Putumayo clashes is that
Ecuador-Colombia relations, backsliding since Palacio assumed
power, likely will worsen. Post's action plan to reverse the
trend depends heavily on improving bilateral communications,
military and civilian. END SUMMARY.

--------------
FARC Not a Spent Force
--------------


2. (C) Embassy Bogota counterparts reveal the FARC's 48th
and 32nd Fronts initiated 12 simultaneous attacks in Putumayo
June 25 near the frontier hamlet of Teteye. Twenty-one
Colombian troops perished in action, the highest single-day
death toll recorded during the Uribe administration.
Ecuadorian press reported the firefights June 26, offering
basic facts (gleaned from Colombian media) but little
commentary. The tone changed the following day, however,
with reporting turning almost pro-FARC. "Things got worse,"
Quito's El Comercio wrote, quoting a community leader in San
Miguel, "when Colombian aircraft entered Ecuadorian territory
in order to attack the guerrillas from an improved position."

Another local official told media that Colombian refugees
were pouring over the frontier, an assertion that Embassy
contacts within the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) refuted.

--------------
Anti-Colombia Sentiment Strong Here
--------------


3. (SBU) The timing could not have been worse. Last week
saw Quito's pre-eminent sovereignty protectors -- Minister of
Government Mauricio Gandara and Foreign Minister Antonio
Parra -- engaged in serious Colombia bashing. The mercurial
and staunchly anti-Plan Colombia Gandara argued that, in the
north, Ecuador bordered not Colombia but the FARC. GoC
forces were rare sights along the frontier, leaving its care
solely to the Ecuadorian military. At the same time he
disparaged Colombian neglect, he rejected suggestions for
greater bilateral cooperation. "It is impossible to share
all information," Gandara claimed, referring to a proposed
info-sharing agreement between national police forces. And
cross-border operations, with or without permission, were
verboten; there would be no more Simon Trinidad-like captures.


4. (SBU) Parra's commentary hewed closely to Gandara's in
its anti-Colombia bent. Between assuring Ecuador the GoE
would never sign Article 98 and insisting Ecuador's relations
with Venezuela remained top-notch, the Foreign Ministry
managed to bash GoC aerial coca eradication, Colombia's
growing bilateral trade surplus, and increasing southbound
refugee flows. Ecuador no longer would be a weak negotiating
partner to its northern neighbor, Parra concluded.

--------------
Attacks Fan Flames Further
--------------


5. (SBU) The Putumayo offensive and President Uribe
reportedly stating the FARC had abused the territory of a
neighboring, friendly nation in staging it, spurred even
stronger GoE diatribe. Gandara's office June 27 issued a
press bulletin in which Ecuador lamented the growing numbers
of Colombians entering Ecuador, fleeing FARC-GoC
confrontations. Referring subsequently to a Colombian
mayor's claim that some rebels retreated to Ecuador after
concluding their operations, the missive noted the GoE had
not discarded implementing a visa requirement for Colombian
nationals. Media here, generally nationalistic and rarely
thinking long-term, praised the visa initiative, although
they did give coverage to Colombian Foreign Minister Carolina
Barco blasting it.


6. (C) Ecuadorian military reacted swiftly to the rumored
FARC incursion. Joint Forces chief Admiral Manuel Zapater
overflew the border June 27, focusing on zones of reported
conflict. Media report greater patrolling in central
Sucumbios province. Ecuadorian military contacts claim the
24th Special Forces battalion is elaborating a plan to block
FARC elements from crossing south into Ecuador as they
retreat from a GoC counter-attack. And we understand that
brigade commanders in the north have requested Quito approval
to re-initiate across-the-board military contacts with
Colombian counterparts.

--------------
Improvement Seems a Way Off
--------------


7. (C) While we applaud the military's initiative, we wonder
if much is just for show. Despite active patrolling, for
example, we are unaware of any armed confrontations between
GoE forces and FARC since mid-2002, if not earlier.
Ecuadorian military have uncovered numerous narcoterrorist
camps in recent years, but all were vacated, some only hours
before (cooking fires still warm, rice in pots, etc.),
pointing to tipoffs. The high command likely would undergo
withering Congressional and media criticism were Ecuadorian
forces to take casualties, prompting a re-look at their
border force posture. Similarly, their desires for bilateral
meetings at the brigade, HQ, and ministerial levels, while
praiseworthy, likely won't fly in the Gandara/Parra-dominated
political environment. We therefore believe that
Colombia-Ecuador relations will worsen before they improve,
if left alone...

--------------
Getting Them Back to the Table
--------------


8. (C) Ecuador President Alfredo Palacio inherited the
office after Quito protesters -- the famed "forajidos" --
deposed predecessor Lucio Gutierrez. While the
then-president's "dictatorial" domestic decisions fueled
their ire, left-leaning opportunists capitalized, planting
anti-U.S., anti-Colombia planks into the "street's" platform.
Palacio thus was obliged to alter GoE foreign policy,
breaking the mythical Washington-Bogota-Quito axis. While he
has since walked back early, gringo-bashing comments, we
cannot see security cooperation returning to year-ago levels.


9. (C) We cannot remain passive and watch the
Ecuador-Colombia spat escalate into outright hostility,
however (especially since Chavez considers Ecuador a
potential recruit for his Bolivarian army). Loathe to call
our brainstorming an action plan -- the health of EC-CO
relations depends on the countries involved, after all, not
us -- we nevertheless consider the following measures useful
to bridge the growing gap. First, considering productive the
Ecuadorian tactical commanders' request for all-ranks
meetings with Colombian counterparts, DAO and Milgroup
personnel will support the measure wholeheartedly, to include
requesting a concurrent lobbying effort (toward GoC military)
by Embassy Bogota peers.


10. (C) We also will utilize upcoming VIP visits. A slew of
Codels and Staffdels arrive in early July, three visiting
both Ecuador and Colombia. Featuring high in our briefings
will be the decaying EC-CO relationship, and our desires they
raise with their GoE interlocutors the need to reverse the
trend. Last, while we believe the Palacio Administration,
not Uribe's, merits "credit" for the relations hiccup, we
would hope Colombia takes the high ground and reaches out.
We were aghast, for example, when FM Parra informed the
Ambassador last month he had yet to contact Barco. Yet she
had not phoned him either, we surmised. We thus request
Department and Embassy Bogota support in lobbying Colombia to
extend an olive branch (press reported June 29 that Uribe
phoned Palacio June 27; according to a WHA/AND readout of GoC
MOD Uribe's recent meeting with WHA A/S Noriega, it was the
presidents' first conversation).
Kenney