Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO1404
2005-06-16 13:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

WELCOME TO ECUADOR, GENERAL CRADDOCK

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001404 

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR COMMANDER BANTZ J. CRADDOCK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: WELCOME TO ECUADOR, GENERAL CRADDOCK

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001404

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM FOR COMMANDER BANTZ J. CRADDOCK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO
SUBJECT: WELCOME TO ECUADOR, GENERAL CRADDOCK

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (U) On behalf of Mission Ecuador, General, please accept
a warm welcome on your second visit to this fascinating South
American nation. Regrettably, your tight schedule forced an
agenda trimming -- we initially had you traversing Ecuador's
border with Colombia -- but we'll file that itinerary for
future visits. Into your 23 hours in-country June 20-21 we
have packed a Country Team briefing, calls on the Ecuadorian
minister of defense and high command, brief press
availability (we can discuss themes in person),a visit to
police headquarters, and a stop at the Cooperative Security
Location (CSL) in coastal city Manta. There, you will tour
CSL facilities, attend an operational briefing, and call on
the Ecuadorian base commander, with whom we enjoy excellent
relations. We look forward to your arrival.

--------------
A coup by any other name...
--------------


2. (SBU) You come during a (typically) tumultuous time, the
Quito "street" having deposed former President Lucio
Gutierrez April 20 and whisking then-VP Alfredo Palacio into
power. Space limitations prevent me from fully accounting
Gutierrez's downfall; citing just three components, I'd
highlight the mostly-white Quito and Guayaquil elites'
unacceptance of the mestizo Gutierrez, the ex-leader's
inability to define his policies and find a political base,
and his tacit approval of the Supreme Court president's
decision that allowed a hated, exiled former president to
return to Ecuador. This last action sent middle-class
Quitenos into the street, demanding "que se vayan todos"
("all must go") and adopting as their nom de guerre
"forajidos" (bandits). Protests grew in size and scope after
Gutierrez declared a local state of emergency April 15; five

days later, security forces executed their rescue plan, a
helicopter plucking the fleeing leader off the palace roof.


3. (C) We since have learned that not only the forajidos
sought Gutierrez's head; conspirators were everywhere. On
the coast, Social Christian henchman and puppeteer Leon
Febres-Cordero had pressured the then-high command to
"withdraw its support" for the president. Current Minister
of Government Mauricio Gandara admitted similar actions in
recent comments to the press. Palacio confidant and later
Vice-minister of Government Juan Guzman egged on forajidos in
the streets, promising the vice president believed in their
cause. Our friends in Caracas too played a role, which we
can discuss further in person. And Palacio himself upheld
the Ecuadorian tradition of VPs scheming against their
bosses. While the media, elites, the administration and its
allies continue to trumpet their "selfless democratic actions
against a brutal dictator," Gutierrez's departure appears
more and more a coup, albeit non-traditional in
implementation.

--------------
New boss blazes new trail
--------------


4. (C) In word if not always in deed, Gutierrez remained a
U.S. ally until his departure. Deserving particular praise
were his economic team, who oversaw hemisphere-leading growth
and shrinking inflation, and his national security
leadership, who orchestrated a tripling in Ecuador's northern
border force posture. Palacio, however, has striven to
differentiate himself from predecessor Gutierrez, whom many
here deemed a U.S. apologist and kowtower. "I am Ecuador's
last, best hope," he boasted upon taking office.


5. (C) A physician long drawn to the left, Palacio promised
a kinder, gentler administration. Security forces would no
longer conduct crowd control with tear gas, for example,
hitherto the Ecuadorian SOP. Bowing to the forajidos, he
promised more direct democracy, featuring referenda on key
issues, administration jobs for youth, and even
constitutional changes. The CSL agreement would remain in
force, proof Ecuador respected its international commitments,
but the agreement would be enforced to the letter. Palacio's
early nominations worry us. Gandara, perhaps the president's
closest advisor, delights in U.S.-bashing, whatever the
issue. Foreign Minister Antonio Parra makes nice in person,
but tired national sovereignty ideology dominates his
discourse as well. And two Gutierrez retreads -- former
Colonels Jorge Brito and Patricio Acosta, both wedded to
Bolivarian ideals -- have enjoyed palace access.


6. (C) Most troublesome is Finance Minister Rafael Correa.
Despite a U.S. education (U. of Illinois),the youthful,
charismatic minister offers 1970s-era economic policies,
replete with "pay down the social debt, damn the foreign
debt" sloganeering. His keynote action -- "restructuring"
oil revenues from debt reduction to government spending
increases, in hopes of reactivating Ecuador's productive
sectors -- invites profligacy and has scared off many
investors. He also aims to gain more state control over
Ecuador's rich, but underexploited (especially by state-owned
PetroEcuador) oil fields. Correa's early IMF-bashing
rhetoric won him few friends in international financial
institution (IFI) circles. Palacio's discontent and some
public backlash have resulted in Correa toning down the
rhetoric somewhat, but we surmise he has not changed his
strongly-held views.
--------------
Hold on power tenuous
--------------


7. (C) Ecuador's next presidential elections occur in
October 2006. Frankly, I'd be surprised if the president
survives that long. Adoring the office's trappings but not
its responsibilities, the non-politician Palacio lacks
fortitude (his wife told me that "Freddy" had been crazy to
take the job). He also lacks party brethren, allies in
Congress, and is beholden to powerbrokers like Febres-Cordero
and the ID's Rodrigo Borja. Forajido discontent with the
pace of reforms is great. Three Cabinet-level officials
already have departed amidst scandal, testament Palacio's
government is no cleaner than the last. Financial experts
tell us budget gap looms in autumn. And former President
Gutierrez renounced his asylee status in Brazil and, from the
United States, is lobbing coup/conspiracy charges against his
former running mate.

--------------
Military becoming whipping-boys
--------------


8. (C) "Icy" describes Palacio's dealings with Ecuador's
high command. Bad relations commenced April 20 after the
president took the oath of office in Quito think-tank
CIESPAL, where Congress had relocated due to street protests
at its regular site. A crowd of protesters stormed CIESPAL,
beating fleeing deputies and putting the president's life in
danger for four hours. Media immediately claimed the armed
forces were lax in rescuing their commander-in-chief, owing
to the existence of angry pro-Lucio factions. Whether true
or not, Palacio responded immediately, sacking the joint
forces commander and service chiefs. Weeks later, rumors
surfaced that an April 22 meeting of Quito-vicinity brigade
commanders was actually a coup-plotting session. Despite
Minister of Defense Solon Espinosa absolving the
participants, Palacio remains uncomfortable with the high
command (and has twice replaced his Army commander).


9. (C) Neither are Ecuador's elites pleased by the
military's alleged "involvement" in civilian affairs. Media
have demanded, and Congress might take on, a revision to
Ecuador's constitution, whose Article 182 gives the armed
forces responsibility for ensuring judicial order.
Commentators also lambaste the military's commercial
interests -- from ammunition production to hotel ownership --
codified in Ecuador's "White Book" mission statement. Last,
Ecuador's Navy has been bludgeoned lately over accusations it
turned a blind eye toward U.S. naval forces' sinking of
Ecuador-flagged fishing and cargo vessels (involved in
migrant and drug smuggling, I might add). The last issue is
bound to come up in Manta; I'll brief you further upon
arrival.

--------------
Front-line focus still sound
--------------


10. (C) Palacio, Gandara and Parra are no friends of
Colombia, representing instead Ecuador's isolationist, "its
not our problem" wing. The government minister has proven
particularly critical of Plan Colombia and USG efforts to
assist Ecuador's northern neighbor in defeating the
narcoterrorist threat, and advocates reducing GoE frontier
troop levels. Parra has re-assumed former FM Nina Pacari's
campaign to demand the GoC end aerial coca eradication near
the Ecuadorian border. In this environment, one would expect
a tactical about-face in the north.


11. (C) Thankfully, policy changes have yet to reach
front-line security forces. A recent Embassy officer visit
to Tulcan, deep in the mountains four miles from Colombia,
showed counter-narcotics police determined to increase
interdictions. The provincial prefect (U.S.
governor-equivalent) lauded the assignment of 400 additional
troops to Tulcan's resident Army battalion. And the
commander revealed that many of his newest soldiers were
already in the field on training exercises. The
Embassy-funded and supported Ecuadorian Quick Reaction Force
(QRF) in Sucumbios province should become operational this
year, with QRFs planned for other localities. USG elements
are conducting intel operations training in Esmeraldas, two
hours south of the frontier, and an U.S. Army PsyOps team
will conduct a northern border assessment June 20-24.
Finally, a Special Forces team is in-country, conducting C-N
operations joint training (with an unspoken Colombian
narcoterrorist nexus).

--------------
Changes to the Way Ahead
--------------


12. (C) Containing Colombian spillover will remain a Top-5
Embassy priority and the focus of our security assistance
program. But while serious security interlocutors comprehend
the threats Ecuador faces from Colombia, many, especially in
media (and now in government) do not. They instead espouse a
return to "neutrality," arguing that Plan Colombia and USG
assistance exacerbate what is fundamentally a political
problem. U.S. military aid therefore is viewed with
suspicion, an effort to drag Ecuador into Colombia's
conflict. Any description of Colombia's as a "regional"
conflict will spawn lengthy tremors, for example. Our
response is to focus Embassy PR efforts on Southcom's
"softer" aid, to include Medical Readiness Training Exercises
(MEDRETEs) and Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)
projects. Defense Minister Espinosa was to accompany me on a
recent MEDRETE visit but had to cancel; his air force
commander became a true believer, however, after seeing the
goodwill his and our forces created. Concurrently, we
continue traditional security cooperation efforts designed in
part to protect Ecuadorian sovereignty from organized
crime/narcoterrorist infringement.

--------------
And how you might help
--------------


13. (C) Your calls on Espinosa and the high command
represent great opportunities to push various USG messages,
from "stay the course on Colombia" to "remain outside (or
above) the political fray." Southcom's experiences with
media management should be of unique interest to Ecuadorian
military leadership under a heavier than usual microscope.
Similarly, any thoughts on reinventing the armed forces
should be welcome, since Ecuador, with USG support (via the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies),is knee-deep in the
process.


14. (C) Last, I suggest words of praise in your meeting with
Manta Airbase commander Colonel Leonidas Enriquez. Under his
and his predecessor's stewardship, coordination between CSL
and Ecuadorian forces in Manta has improved dramatically.
Issues of PR concern, such as the AWACS deployment, became
non-stories due greatly to Enriquez's seriousness and mission
dedication.
Kenney