DEMINING: POLITICAL PROBLEMS THREATEN OPERATIONAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000120

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/AND, WHA/PPC, PM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KHDP PHUM MASS MOPS MARR EC PE
SUBJECT: DEMINING: POLITICAL PROBLEMS THREATEN OPERATIONAL
SUCCESSES

REF: 04 QUITO 2324


1. SUMMARY: Humanitarian demining (HD) continues apace in
Ecuador, although political difficulties - both bilateral and
multilateral - threaten future effectiveness. 2004 successes
include the conclusion of mine clearance operations in El
Oro, near-completion in Loja, and termination of mine impact
studies in Morona-Santiago. International monitors have
deployed in HD workzones to ensure top quality performance.
And the contemplated FY2005 NADR appropriation should allow
demining to continue uninterrupted until December 2005, if
not longer.


2. Expected European Union HD funding has yet to
materialize, however, owing partly to the EU's demand that
Ecuador and Peru improve coordination to reduce costs. And
with both sides bickering over an El Oro commemorative event,
Peru's allegedly insufficient deminer deployments, and even
the location of the pre-1998 frontier, better cooperation
appears miles away. END SUMMARY.

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A Year of Successes
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3. Guillermo Leal, head of the OAS's HD mission in Ecuador,
provided Poloff January 11 a readout of current demining
activities and future plans. He called 2004 generally
successful, HD-wise. Mine clearance operations had ended in
coastal El Oro province and residents were slowly returning
to remediated land. To the south and east, mine removal
activities had concluded in all by seven demarcated fields in
Loja province, in Ecuador's southern highlands. Those
minefields' difficult terrain -- mainly rocky riverbeds with
high metallic content -- made discriminating between mines
and the surrounding soil difficult. Leal claimed HD experts
and manufacturers' representatives would visit Ecuador in
April to evaluate state-of-the-art mine detection equipment
not currently in the GoE inventory.


4. Fifty Ecuadorian Army sappers had deployed to Amazon
province Morona-Santiago, Leal revealed. In December, they
had completed a provincial mine impact study, the first phase
in remediation (a technical study, mine clearance, and
quality assurance would follow). The Army team had
discovered and begun demarcating 53 mined areas on Ecuador's
side of the frontier; they estimated an equal number existed
in neighboring Peruvian territory. Near-term funding for the
complex, tedious jungle operations appeared secure, with word
of an estimated $260k FY2005 appropriation of State
Department Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and
Related Activities (NADR) monies.

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With Failure in the Future?
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5. Leal worried that European Union support, upon which out
year (2006-2009) HD operations depended, looked iffy at best.
Since minefields lay along the Peru-Ecuador border, EU
appropriators argued against funding separate demining
programs, as the OAS had. Instead, they were demanding joint
operations wherever possible. Leal had urged the GoE to
coordinate its EU "sales pitch" with GoP counterparts; he was
skeptical of his own success, however. (Southcom staff claim
that Leal's OAS superiors in Washington are more optimistic
that EU funding will come on-line, once the two institutions
resolve "procedural issues.")


6. Nor was Leal optimistic the two countries' authorities
could resolve a tiff in El Oro. For political reasons, both
Ecuador and Peru wanted a public ceremony to commemorate HD's
completion on the coast, Leal explained. Yet as long as Peru
refused to allow OAS quality assurance teams to verify the
Peruvian Army's earlier remediation, Ecuador was leery of
declaring the province mine-free (the OAS's monitors now
number eight and hail from Brazil, Chile, and Central
America). The GoE had similar reservations regarding
Peruvian sappers' work in the highlands, in Peruvian
territory bordering Loja. But Ecuador was most perturbed by
Peru's lack of commitment to clearing mines in the eastern
jungle. Leal asserted it made little sense for Ecuadorian
soldiers to devote time, money and lives to HD operations on
the frontier while Peru left its side seeded and dangerous.
That said, the GoE was committed to continuing HD operations
in Morona-Santiago.


7. Numerous factors contributed to the GoP's poor demining
record in Peru, Leal added. The Peruvian Army was perhaps in
worse financial straits than Ecuador's, for one, and faced
greater security threats from insurgent groups. And the
logistics of supporting a company of deminers, difficult in
Ecuador, were nearly insurmountable in Peru, where supply
lines were many times longer. Politics too played a part, as
Ecuadorian forces, especially at the brigade and battalion
levels, continued to suspect Peruvian counterparts'
intentions. They regularly interceded with HQ to prevent GoP
units from re-supplying via Ecuadorian territory, for example.


8. Relations were little better between GoE and GoP
diplomats, Leal lamented. At a recent meeting of the
bilateral frontier commission, the countries' representatives
had wasted hours arguing a technicality: if the mines that
Ecuadorian forces sowed before the 1995 hostilities, now
clearly in Peruvian territory (as a result of the 1998 peace
accord that marked the frontier),originally lay on
Ecuadorian land. What mattered was remediation, not winning
moot debates, Leal reasoned.


9. Another bilateral battle loomed. As part of the
continuing USG commitment to HD operations in the Andes (and
to promoting multilateral cooperation region-wide),U.S.
military experts planned to train GoE and GoP deminers in
Morona-Santiago in July. Leal was confident he could
convince Ecuador's Foreign Ministry to approve the presence
of the Peruvians. The Army was a different matter.
Believing his influence in that institution lacking, he
floated a possible strategy: that U.S. Embassy Milgroups in
Quito and Lima lobby their respective host-nation militaries
to achieve approval for the joint event.


10. COMMENT: The Embassy appreciates Department support of
humanitarian demining in Ecuador and neighboring Peru.
Realizing that competing demands, especially from central and
southeast Asia, make funding HD operations here a hard sell,
we favor any initiative -- Southcom's combined training being
one -- designed with effectiveness AND cost savings in mind.
Leal's plan to secure bilateral buy-in by engaging the Quito
and Lima Milgroups seems reasonable and worth exploring. As
such, he, Embassy officers, and a Southcom representative
will discuss the details on January 24. END COMMENT.
Chacon