Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05QUITO1169
2005-05-18 23:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Quito
Cable title:  

GOVERNMENT CHANGE FURTHER HINDERS ARTICLE 98

Tags:  PREL MASS MARR SNAR PTER EC CO KICC 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001169 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR SNAR PTER EC CO KICC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT CHANGE FURTHER HINDERS ARTICLE 98
CAMPAIGN

REF: QUITO 1018

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001169

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR SNAR PTER EC CO KICC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT CHANGE FURTHER HINDERS ARTICLE 98
CAMPAIGN

REF: QUITO 1018

Classified By: Ambassador Kristie Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: With the rise to power of President Alfredo
Palacio, Article 98's chances in Ecuador sunk from bad to
worse. Palacio's right-hand man, Minister of Government
Mauricio Gandara, laid down an early marker, claiming there
would be "no immunity for U.S. soldiers" during this
government. Facing such opposition, the Embassy considers a
frontal Article 98 assault doomed to fail. Rather, a
"confidence building" strategy seems in order, with early
efforts aimed at promoting USG assistance and shared
interests. Under this scenario, direct Article 98 engagement
would commence in late summer. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Opponents Pepper New Administration
--------------


2. (C) Reftel outlines short-term Embassy challenges with
the fledgling Palacio Administration. Near the top lie
political-military negotiations, Article 98 the toughest nut
of all. Alfredo Palacio took office amidst elites' uproar
that predecessor Lucio Gutierrez had kowtowed to the United
States on security matters; they demanded he change tack and
protect Ecuadorian "sovereignty" In Gandara, Palacio found
the quintessential gringo-basher who rarely has met a U.S.
policy he doesn't oppose. While his formal responsibilities
as minister of government do not include military affairs, he
nonetheless exercises great influence over his cardiologist
boss. We therefore consider Gandara's early, anti-Article 98
remarks Ecuador's current policy.


3. (C) Recent weeks have seen further roadblocks erected, in
the form of strange-but-true Palacio hires. For example, as
national security adviser the president tapped retired
Colonel Jose Brito, a former coup participant and, as a
founder (with Gandara) of the "Monitoring Group over Plan
Colombia," himself a U.S,-basher. Even more bizarre, retired
Colonel Patricio Acosta, whose visa the USG pulled last year

on corruption grounds, is now a trusted Palacio confidant.
Both will oppose Article 98 tooth-and-nail.


4. (C) Our past reporting has highlighted Article 98's
unpopularity here, as well as prior presidents' unwillingness
to expend political capital in its pursuit. Palacio
definitely falls among the unwilling. Many consider him an
interim president; taking on the controversial Article 98
might turn their beliefs into fact. Palacio therefore is
unlikely to lead a top-down effort to spur good-faith
negotiations.


5. (C) In meetings with Embassy officials, Palacio's foreign
minister, Antonio Parra, appeared less ideological and more
approachable than Gandara and company. Our early take? He
merited cultivation. For various reasons -- the corpulent
diplomat's difficult adaptation to 9300-ft elevation Quito
for one -- Parra has spent less time in that capital than a
Cabinet minister should, hampering our efforts to get close.
But we'll need FM support even to get talks restarted.

--------------
Supporting a Soft Sell
--------------


6. (C) Pressing him hard and early on Article 98 seems
counterproductive to our interests, however. We are not yet
convinced Parra enjoys the president's ear, for example.
Were he to introduce the measure to Ecuador's "interagency,"
it undoubtedly would energize Gandara, giving the government
minister the U.S. dogfight he so desires. Ecuadorian elder
statesman Raul Baca, a former government minister himself,
confirmed that our fears had merit, counseling the Ambassador
May 16 we "would be crazy to raise immunity now."


7. (C) It remains difficult to envision the GoE surrendering
a U.S. national to the International Criminal Court anytime
soon. As such, we believe there is time for a more
deliberate, but potentially more successful approach;
confidence-building measures seem in order. Rather than hit
Parra with Article 98, perhaps the hottest bilateral potato
he'll encounter, we favor an early campaign to educate him on
"softer" U.S. assistance and shared interests.


8. (C) In two weeks, Ecuador's defense minister will
accompany the Ambassador to a U.S. Military Medical Readiness
Training Exercise (MEDRETE) in Cotopaxi province; we plan to
extend Parra similar invitations to view USG aid up-close.
Similarly, shared USG-GoE interests abound, the fight against
trafficking in persons (TIP) coming first to mind. As Parra
grows to realize that close U.S. relations benefit Ecuador,
he should become less apt to dismiss Article 98 out-of-hand.
We could see a strong USG pitch coming at UNGA in September,
for example.

--------------
Congress Less the Enemy?
--------------

9. (C) Although we're yet to see a GoE counter-proposal,
much less a signed Article 98 ready for legislative approval,
Ecuador's Congress has long been an impediment to a deal.
Ecuador's recent upheaval might prove beneficial in this
regard, however. Responding to protesters' cries "que todos
se vayan" ("all must go"),eleven deputies have lost their
seats, including Carlos Vallejo, the yankee-hating (despite
his significant business dealings with the U.S.) former head
of the International Affairs committee. Poloff called on
Vallejo's replacement (for the seat, not the committee chair)
May 18 and found him engaging and pro-American. We have
heard rumors that Social Christian Deputy Pascual del Cioppo
might inherit the committee chair; the Guayaquileno in 2004
told us he supported Article 98 in theory.

--------------
A Parting Shot
--------------


10. (C) Article 98 discussions with Ecuador commenced in
July 2002. In the 33 months that followed, with Ecuador
governed by leaders with reasonably pro-U.S. philosophies, we
measured our progress by millimeters, not miles. Palacio and
the ultranationalists in his employ most definitely aren't
allies, and we should expect tough sledding on this
controversial initiative.
KENNEY