CZECHS DISAPPOINTED WITH EU CUBA NEGOTIATIONS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 000869

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU EZ EUN
SUBJECT: CZECHS DISAPPOINTED WITH EU CUBA NEGOTIATIONS;
WILL PUSH FOR LIMITS ON HIGH LEVEL VISITS

REF: A. BRUSSELS 2165


B. BRUSSELS 2146

C. PRAGUE 833

D. PRAGUE 832

E. PRAGUE 814

Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. (C) The Czechs are very disappointed with their inability
to win support for tougher EU measures towards Cuba. MFA
Cuba Desk officer Petr Mikyska confirmed assessments provided
to USEU by Solana's office (ref A) from this week's COLAT and
PSC meetings. Mikyska said that, despite their optimism last
week (refs B and C) following bilateral discussions with the
Spanish and the expulsion from Cuba of European MPs and
reporters, the Czechs were isolated at the June 6 COLAT
meeting.


2. (C) The Czechs were seeking approval for action in three
areas: reinstating the 2003 measure of inviting dissidents
to national days, limits on high level visits to Cuba, and
approval for EU funding to support Cuban dissidents. On
national days, Mikyska said the Czechs were prepared to
accept a statement that EU Members States were free to invite
dissidents to their receptions. The COLAT passed the issue
to the PSC, which on June 7 sent the question back to the
COLAT for further discussion, meaning that the issue will not
be addressed in the conclusions of the June 13 GAERC (Mikyska
added that the Czechs will invite dissidents to their October
national day reception, regardless of the state of EU
deliberations on the question).


3. (C) The Czechs are still fighting for their proposal to
limit the level of official Member State visits to Cuba. The
Czechs propose that the EU authorize Foreign Ministers to
travel, but that no other ministers be allowed to make
official visits (i.e., only sub-cabinet officials from other
ministries). This would facilitate the engagement called for
in the 1996 Common Position, and permit FMs to lend support
to the opposition movement, but limit the level of
recognition afforded Castro. Mikyska said no other country,
including Poland, supports the Czech proposal. The PSC will
consider it at a meeting June 9, but Mikyska does not expect
approval. He believes this is the one issue FM Svoboda will
take a stand on at next week's GAERC.


4. (C) Mikyska said EU Mission chiefs in Havana proposed EU
funding for a variety of projects, including academic,
athletic, cultural and "support for dissidents." The latter
was challenged by many at the COLAT, with the Czechs actively
supporting. Mikyska said the COLAT has asked Commission
lawyers for a ruling on whether this is possible. He added
that the Czechs have no specific ideas on how such funding
would be used, but rather would defer to staff in Havana.


5. (C) Mikyska reviewed orally the text of the Presidency's
draft Council declaration on Cuba, which tracks with ref B
(it repeats the call for the Cuba to release political
prisoners and improve civil liberties, and also condemns the
expulsion of European observers to last month's opposition
meeting). The only open questions, according to the Czechs,
are whether the statement that the June 2003 measures remain
suspended will be modified by their proposed limitation on
high level visits, and the date of the next review. The
Czechs want a review after six months, rather than in June

2006. Mikyska said there was no discussion at the COLAT of
what stands behind the pledge to deepen the structured
dialogue with the peaceful opposition; these details will be
worked out by Havana heads of missions.


6. (C) Mikyska said the Czechs see the likely outcome of this
review as a victory for Castro. Going forward they will
continue efforts to make the EU structured dialogue with the
opposition effective, they will seek approval for EU funding,
and will engage in the next review of the EU policy. But the
Czechs have low expectations for any positive change as a
result of EU engagement in Cuba; they are not optimistic that
the UK Presidency will make it a priority to reinstate any of
the 2003 measures. The Czech focus will increasingly be on
the sort of bilateral efforts -- official and private --
already underway (refs C and D).
CABANISS