CZECH VIEWS ON DEBATE OVER CHANGES TO EU'S CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000833

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU EZ EUN
SUBJECT: CZECH VIEWS ON DEBATE OVER CHANGES TO EU'S CUBA
POLICY

REF: A. PRAGUE 814


B. BERLIN 1747

Classified By: Political Officer Kimberly C. Krhounek for reasons 1.4(b
) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action message, please see paragraph 8.


2. (C) Summary. The Czechs expect the June review of EU
Cuba policy to result in a number of tougher measures,
although the package will remain less robust than it was
before the current policy was adopted earlier this year. The
expulsion of several European politicians from Cuba, combined
with the lack of any improvement in the plight of imprisoned
dissidents, has strengthened the hand of the Czechs in
internal EU negotiations. Following Czech-Spanish meetings
during the past two weeks at the FM and Political Director
levels, the Czech MFA believes they are close to agreement on
a package that other EU member states can support. The Czech
MFA also believes that it would be "helpful" for the USG to
propose including Cuba in the list of countries in the
declaration on democracy that is being drafted for the June
US-EU summit. End summary.

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RELATIONS AT A NEW LOW
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3. (C) Czech MFA Cuba Desk Officer Petr Mikyska briefed us
June 1 on the status of the review of EU policy towards Cuba.
While the softer EU measures adopted earlier this year had a
few initial benefits, such as the Cuban regime "unfreezing"
relations with all EU member states, the honeymoon period was
short-lived. According to Mikyska, when the UNCHR resolution
on Cuba received EU support, Cuba once again began limiting
contacts with certain "troublesome" embassies, including
those of Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and the
Netherlands. The lack of progress made in human rights,
particularly the failure to obtain the release of jailed
dissidents, is another disappointment. Mikyska also said
that many EU member states were upset that when the Spanish
Minister for Regional Development visited Cuba to sign an air
traffic agreement, she did not meet with any Cuban
dissidents. The Spanish tried to characterize this
Ministerial level visit as a "technical visit," but it
angered a number of other EU member states who felt they were
not adhering to the EU policy and that the Spanish gave Cuba
concessions that it had not earned.


4. (C) For the Czechs, the standoff reached a new low on
April 15, when the Cuban government refused to grant a visa
to FM Svoboda to travel there on an official visit. Svoboda
had planned to meet with both Cuban officials and dissidents,
as authorized by the current EU policy. The Czechs believe
this incident was a "turning point for the EU" as many member
states were "shocked" by the visa denial and all have
expressed support for the Czechs. The European Commission
made a statement and even some of the best "friends of Cuba,"
like Commissioner Louis Michel, agreed that such actions were
unacceptable. Last month's expulsions of German, Czech and
Polish politicians prior to the May 20 opposition gathering
garnered significant negative media coverage across Europe
(reftels) and further undermined EU confidence in the GOC.

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SIX MONTH REVIEW AND NEW POLICY
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5. (C) The Czech MFA believes that all of the above have
strengthened the Czech position on Cuba within the EU and
made the Spanish government more amenable to finding a mutual
compromise. As the two countries represent the main
ideological extremes on Cuba within the EU, the Spanish and
Czechs met at the FM-level in late May in Madrid, and at the
Political Director level in early June in Prague. The Czech
goal is to change the January Council Conclusions and Mikyska
believes that chances are quite good that the Czechs and
Spanish will agree on a new draft policy. The new package
under discussion has four prongs: First and most important
for the Czechs, they expect agreement that individual member
states will be able to decide for themselves whether to
invite Cuban dissidents to national day receptions. For the
Czechs, this would nullify the most distasteful aspect of the
current policy. The new policy would also include
encouragement of cultural cooperation, something that would
allow the Spanish to re-open their Cultural Center in Cuba,
which is priority for them. The two countries are still
arguing over the issue of high-level European visits -- the
Czechs would like to ban such visits, but the Spanish support
them. Mikyska believes that a final agreement will be
reached only with the whole of the EU and that they will
probably reach a compromise to allow "limited" high-level
visits. Finally, the structured dialogue with dissidents
will continue, with the support of most EU countries.


6. (C) Mikyska expects discussions to be concluded shortly,
and expressed hope that "this time the Council Conclusions
will be acceptable to everyone." Time is indeed short as the
next COLAT meeting takes place June 6, followed shortly by
the June 9 meeting of Permanent Representatives and the June
13 GAERC meeting of EU foreign ministers. That said, most of
the Czech's discussions have taken place bilaterally, rather
than in a larger EU context. Mikyska attributes this to the
Luxembourg Presidency, which only sponsored one meeting where
Cuban affairs were discussed, rather than continuous
discussions at the working group level which had been the
case during the Dutch presidency.

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MAY 20 OPPOSITION MEETING
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7. (C) Mikyska believes that the controversy over the May 20
meeting of the opposition was a debacle for the Cuban
government, which had probably hoped to use it as an example
of freedom and human rights in their country. There was
tremendous pressure on the Cuban government to allow some
kind of meeting to take place, but from the beginning they
limited media access and prevented full dissident attendance.
Mikyska is convinced that the GOC hoped that the meeting
could be successfully used by Spain and other sympathetic EU
member states to argue for making the current, more lenient
policy, permanent. While it did succeed in presenting the
Cuban opposition as divided, the international repercussions
of the expulsions were significantly stronger than the GOC
probably intended and gave the Czechs an excellent
opportunity to strengthen their hand within the EU.

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JUNE US-EU SUMMIT
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8. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Mikyska concluded our discussion
with an appeal for the USG to propose including mention of
Cuba in the democracy declaration which is being prepared for
the US-EU summit later this month. The Czech human rights
department would like to see Myanmar, Belarus and Cuba all
mentioned by name, but due to the ongoing sensitive nature of
the Cuban policy evaluation at this time, they do not feel it
is appropriate for them to raise it within the EU and risk
overplaying their hand. As the USG is the host for the
summit, they would like to see us propose text for discussion
that would mention Cuba, so that the European Commission and
Secretariat would have to consider it, and Mikyska promised

SIPDIS
that the GOCR support us.


9. (C) Comment: The Czechs believe that a series of Cuban
government missteps have played into the Czechs' hands at the
perfect time to use them during the six-month review process.
It is equally clear to them that the Cuban government does
not fully comprehend how one bilateral "problem" can
influence the decisions of the entire EU bloc. They will
continue to take advantage of this weakness and Mikyska
declared that they are prepared to invoke the EU solidarity
clause if necessary, to remind Castro that when he deals with
the Czechs, it has repercussions for the entire relationship
with the EU. End comment.
HILLAS