EXPELLED CZECH POLITICIAN SAYS CUBA UNDERESTIMATED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000814

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM EZ CU EUN
SUBJECT: EXPELLED CZECH POLITICIAN SAYS CUBA UNDERESTIMATED
EUROPEAN REACTION

REF: HAVANA 10180

Classified By: Political Officer Kim Krhounek for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. (C) Summary. On May 25, we met with Czech Senator Karel
Schwarzenberg, who was one of the European politicians
deported from Cuba during last week's opposition gathering in
Havana (see reftel). Schwarzenberg who did have an
opportunity to meet with some dissidents prior to his
expulsion, stressed the importance of building up Cuban civil
society through making Spanish-language publications on the
Central European transformation experience available, and
putting continued pressure on Castro to release jailed
dissidents who are living in very severe conditions in Cuban
jails. He also strongly advocated inviting dissidents to
national day receptions and other diplomatic events as one
means of providing them "protection." While he regretted his
expulsion from Cuba, he also believes that the Castro regime
underestimated the impact of the expulsions in Europe; in
particular the extensive, negative press coverage in Paris,
Madrid, Germany and Poland. End summary.


3. (C) Senator Schwarzenberg -- who travelled to Havana on a
tourist passport -- was able to spend a few days in Cuba
before he was unceremoniously escorted from his hotel back to
the airport. His personal views are that Castro ordered the
deportations of European politicians for his own propaganda
purposes; namely to show that foreign emissaries have no role
to play in Cuban politics. (By the same token, Schwarzenberg
believes Castro let the dissident gathering proceed to be
able to claim that civic groups can meet peacefully.) While
Castro may have succeeded in this limited goal, Schwarzenberg
claims that the Cuban government vastly underestimated
European reaction. The Czech Ambassador to Paris organized a
packed news conference on Schwarzenberg's arrival back on the
continent, and other deported politicians held similar press
events in Madrid and Germany. According to Schwarzenberg,
these events generated "more than 80 pages of critical
comments," becoming a "bigger than expected echo" that the
Cuban government probably did not intend.


4. (C) While in Cuba, Schwarzenberg had some important
meetings with Cuban dissidents, including at a reception
hosted by the Norwegian Ambassador, confirming his belief
that it is important to include dissidents in national day
receptions and other diplomatic events. Schwarzenberg
believes the link to the diplomatic community makes
dissidents better known, thereby providing them "some
protection, weak as it is." When dissidents are known and
welcome visitors at diplomatic events, the embassies are
better informed of events on the ground and quicker to react
to arbitrary imprisonments and other oppressive acts. Such
connections are invaluable in keeping pressure on Cuban
officials to provide better treatment of prisoners and warn
them that the international community is watching. In
general, Schwarzenberg decried the conditions in Cuban jails,
comparing them to Czechoslovak jails of the 1950's where
severe conditions lead to serious health risks. He declared
all imprisoned dissidents to be "in serious danger" and
expressed hope that the EU would continue to press for their
release before granting any further benefits to the Castro
regime. He expressed support for Czech diplomacy within the
EU, and optimism that recent events on the island would
translate into a more robust EU stance against the Castro
regime.


5. (C) Schwarzenberg also cited the necessity to build up
Cuban civil society. Again comparing the situation there to
the Czechoslovak experience, he noted that there are very few
"samizdat" publications in Cuba, compared with Czechslovakia
in the 1970's and 1980's. (Samizdat were independent
underground publications of Czech articles and news that were
often published abroad and re-imported and distributed within
the country by members of the dissident movement). Further,
he believes that too few Cubans speak or understand foreign
languages, limiting their exposure to helpful advice from
abroad. He recommended translating into Spanish a number of
Central European publications that dealt with their own
experiences transforming their country into democracies with
free market economies. Schwarzenberg noted that many of the
more moderate Cuban dissident groups are emphasizing a
long-term strategy to build up civil society institutions
over time, so that they are prepared when Castro finally dies
(Schwarzenberg thought this would come in about ten years).
Schwarzenberg agreed with this approach, although he thought
the European countries should do more to treat Castro as a
"rambling old man with no new ideas" as a way to further
marginalize his power. (Septel discusses current GOCR
efforts to support Cuban civil society.)


6. (C) Comment. It appears that the Castro regime has
underestimated the accord within the EU concerning equal
treatment to all member states. While the Cuban government
may have been able to treat pesky politicians from the Czech
Republic and Poland as individual irritants in the past, such
targeted behavior now that these countries are full voting
members of the European Union has much more serious
repercussions. For the Czechs and other EU members promoting
a tougher EU common position these deportations were
well-timed, as Czech MFA Cuba specialists headed to Brussels
this week for working-level meetings on the June review of
the EU's Cuba policy. We expect to have a full readout of
those meetings next week. End comment.
CABANISS