CZECH POSITION ON EU CUBA POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000044

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU EZ EUN
SUBJECT: CZECH POSITION ON EU CUBA POLICY

REF: STATE 4900

Classified By: Polec Counselor Michael Dodman for reason 1.4 b+D


1. (C) Summary: The Czech MFA appreciates reftel effort to
remind European capitals of the real issues at stake in the
EU debate over its common Cuba policy. Czech efforts are
currently focused on establishing a meaningful format for the
structured EU dialogue with the opposition. The Czech
reading of internal EU debate in Havana since the partial
unfreezing of relations is not encouraging: COMs focused
neither on the substance of dialogue with the opposition, nor
the need to rebuff Castro's attempt to split EU member
states. The Czechs expect little progress at tomorrow's
COLAT meeting, but promise to withhold Czech approval at the
GAERC meeting unless the new measures have substance behind
them. End summary.


2. (C) Polec Counselor met with Czech MFA Americas Department
Director Edita Hrda on Jan 10 to deliver reftel points in
advance of the Jan 11 EU COLAT meeting. Hrda welcomed the
specific proposals in the U.S. paper and was especially in
favor of the suggestion to invite U.S. and other missions in
Havana to work with the EU. She appreciated that the U.S.
paper was being delivered to all member states. Hrda said
she had low expectations for the upcoming COLAT meeting,
which she will send her deputy to attend. She expressed
great frustration with both the form and substance of the
internal EU debate, including:

-- Luxembourg has limited ability to moderate the debate.
The Presidency's Cuba expert is, according to Hrda, an
officer at the Luxembourg embassy in the Hague; Luxembourg
has no mission in Havana, so the Dutch will continue to
represent the Presidency there, preventing the Dutch from
taking a more forceful position in internal debates (although
Hrda also noted in passing that the Czechs no longer consider
the Dutch to be their "partner" on this issue).

-- The first meeting of EU COMs in Havana took place the day
after Castro's partial unfreezing of relations with EU
missions. Hrda termed this meeting a huge disappointment to
the Czechs. She summarized the readout from the Czech
mission: the planned agenda was completely jettisoned; the
Spanish and most other EU members discussed their happiness
with Castro's decision and steps they planned to take to
normalize relations; the Czechs and the Poles expressed
frustration and tried to focus COMs on the mandate (from the
December COLAT meeting) for them to prepare a format for the
new dialogue with dissidents; the Dutch were essentially
silent, except to note the need to force the Cubans to
unfreeze relations with the remaining member states and the
Commission (a point helpfully seconded by Portugal).

-- In the end the Dutch did circulate (but did not discuss) a
draft proposal for the structured dialogue, which Hrda
dismissed as a non-starter. The Dutch proposal calls for
quarterly meetings with COMs from the EU Troika, does not
specify the topics to be discussed nor call for a
sufficiently broad participation from dissidents. Hrda
stated clearly that the Czech government will not authorize
FM Svoboda to support the December COLAT conclusions at the
late-January GAERC meeting unless the Czechs are satisfied
that the new measures are at least as significant as the
previous EU common position.


3. (C) In terms of next steps, the Czechs have prepared their
own draft proposal for the structured dialogue. It calls for:

-- all EU COMs meeting four to six times per year with a
group of five to six opposition leaders (to be selected in
consultation with dissident groups),at EU embassies or
residences, with an agenda covering "political orientation of
different groups; long-term vision of their role in the
transformation; presentation of their opinions on substantial
issues of Cuban political development and points of view on
cooperation with the EU at the present stage, during the
transformation process and after the transition to democracy."

-- monthly meetings of all EU mission political counselors
with a rotating group of up to ten opposition leaders or
relatives of political prisoners, at EU embassies on a
rotating basis, covering "political orientation of different
groups and their activities; information on development in
regions; detailed information on persecution by government
bodies; information on the health conditions of political
prisoners, development of their lawsuits in the period before
judgment."

The GOCR intends to share this proposal with what Hrda termed
the Czechs' "partners" -- specifically the Poles (whom Hrda
singled out as having been increasingly supportive of the
Czech position),Slovaks, Slovenians, and Germans. Hrda
promised to study reftel points to determine which could be
incorporated into the Czech draft.

4. (C) In response to Polec Counselor's question, Hrda said
the MFA is united in its approach to the EU's Cuba policy.
She noted that there had been some concerns from her
colleagues who manage EU affairs on a daily basis that a
Czech position in opposition to that of many larger members
states could hurt Czech interests (she noted specifically
threats Czech diplomats claim to have received from the
Spanish that the CR would "pay a price" for its position) but
said that all the important players on the question (she
listed FM Svoboda, DFM Kolar, MFA Political Director
Schneider and MFA DG for Bilateral Relations Bombasova) were
in favor of the principled approach Hrda continues to
recommend.
HILLAS