CZECH PLANS TO REMAIN THE GADFLY IN THE EU'S CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000174

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2015
TAGS: PREL EZ CU EUN
SUBJECT: CZECH PLANS TO REMAIN THE GADFLY IN THE EU'S CUBA
POLICY


Classified By: Political Officer, Kimberly C. Krhounek for reasons 1.4(
b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. While the Czechs eventually agreed with the
EU's proposal to lift the restrictive measures against Cuba
at last week's GAERC meeting, they are continuing to fight
for EU approval of a detailed plan for structured dialogue
with dissidents and hope to establish criteria to use as a
benchmark when the policy comes up for review in six months.
Petr Mikyska, who handles EU-Cuban issues at the MFA,
provided a complete readout of the steps leading to the EU
decision, discussed points which the Czechs want to be
factored into the "review" of the new policy in six months,
and requested further information sharing between our
Interest Section and the Czech Embassy in Cuba (as their
small embassy occasionally reports significant developments
to the MFA too late to be effective). As a reward for their
efforts, the Czechs fully expect the Cuban government to
attempt to "re-freeze" relations with their embassy, but
believe that on this point at least, the EU will stand firm.
End summary.

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THE COCKTAIL WARS
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2. (C) According to Mikyska, the Czech MFA determined as
early as last September that there was no EU support for
maintaining the June measures, so it devoted its efforts to
achieving textual changes, such as strengthening the section
on interaction with the dissidents and eliminating any
reference to whom the EU countries could invite to their
national days. Mikyska conceded that while the issue of
invitations for national day receptions was "collateral" to
the real debate, he stressed that there is a historical
precedent in the Czech Republic of western embassies inviting
dissidents to their receptions during the Communist era.
While there was no mention of EU invitations to dissidents in
the final GAERC Council conclusion, Mikyska admitted that,
despite FM Svoboda's claims to the contrary, the restriction
on invitations to the diplomatic corps and EU nationals is
indeed part of the EU negotiated policy. Luckily for the
Czechs, it is technically only in effect for the six months
of this new policy, so may not affect the CR's national day,
which falls in October.

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THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS OF THE STRUCTURED DIALOGUE
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3. (C) The Czechs believe that the GAERC conclusion's
requirement for more intense dialogue with dissidents needs a
specific plan of action, beyond the specified requirement
that high-level visitors must raise human rights and the
position of dissidents with GOC officials. While the Czechs
believe that there is an "implicit" requirement for EU
embassies in Havana to conduct regular outreach to satisfy
the requirement for the EU's "regular and enhanced" meetings
with dissidents, they want a list of specific actions to
guide all EU embassies. To ensure that all member states
also engage with peaceful opposition members, the Czechs have
proposed a detailed scheme that is now under discussion
within the EU working groups (it was to be discussed today,
but that meeting has now been postponed until next week).
The Czech scheme focuses on two levels of meetings: those
with Heads of Mission, and those at working level with
embassy representatives who are part of the EU's Working
Group on Human Rights. The Czechs propose that Heads of
Mission meet a minimum of four times a year with rotating
groups of dissidents who represent different opposition
groups. Working level meetings would take place monthly, to
ensure a minimum of 16 meetings a year. Mikyska said that
most elements of the Czech proposal have the tacit support of
the Netherlands, Germany, Poland and Finland, but the
frequency of the required meetings remains in dispute. The
Dutch and Spanish prefer to have discussion with dissidents
only at the Troika.

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LET THE CUBANS BE THE BAD GUYS
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4. (C) Mikyska said that the Cuban government was already
doing itself a disservice by claiming that the conditions
attached to lifting the restrictive measures were
"unacceptable." With a laugh he said that if the Czechs
couldn't stop the Spanish at the EU working level, they would
sit back and give the Cuban government itself a chance to do
so. The Czechs believe there is a strong likelihood that the
Cuban government will again try to "re-freeze" relations with
them, and other troublesome embassies like Poland and the
delegation of the European Commission. The EC is already in
a dispute with the GOC over Cuban attempts to wrest control
over the management of EU funds, a non-starter for the EC
which is concerned about the rampant corruption in Cuba.
Mikyska said any attempt to refreeze relations with a select
few would be met by the same demonstration of unity that
occurred in December when Cuba attempted only a partial
restoration of relations with EU countries. On that issue at
least, he affirmed that the EU remains "pretty strong" and
has reaffirmed this position both internally and with the
Cuban government.

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THE REVIEW PROCESS
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5. (C) While Mikyska said no formal criteria had been worked
out for the review of the EU's Cuba policy which is to take
place in six months, the Czechs are developing their own
criteria that they will be monitoring and plan to use in the
review negotiations. These criteria include:

a) The release of dissidents;
b) The treatment of embassies and status of diplomatic
relations across the EU;
c) Steps towards political and economic transformation;
d) The Cuban government's attitude towards the UNHCR and
Special Rapporteur; and
e) The total lack of any movement on issues of importance to
the EU.

The Czechs firmly expect to see "a lack of progress" in the
next six months, although Mikyska conceded that the GOC would
likely release a few token dissidents in June, to curry favor
prior to the formal review. That said, even without tangible
progress, the Czechs believe that it will be "very hard" to
re-impose restrictive measures, especially as Spain is likely
to argue that there will not have been sufficient time for
the measures to take effect. Throughout the EU
deliberations, Mikyska claimed that the Spanish were in close
contact with the Cubans, leaking information to the press
about a consensus decision before it had been reached and
remaining "difficult" today.

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CZECHS REMAIN OUTSPOKEN
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6. (C) The MFA has strong support within the Czech Republic
for its firm stance. Former President Vaclav Havel, himself
a former dissident and internationally recognized human
rights figure, published a strongly worded opinion in papers
throughout Europe condemning the EU's "betrayal" of Cuba's
dissidents. Citing the importance that simple acts such as
access to foreign officials have to dissidents, he called for
the EU to end its reliance on the worst political tradition
of "appeasement of evil" in allowing the Cuban government to
dictate to the diplomatic community who they may invite to
official receptions. Mikyska also noted that within the
Czech MFA, the new EU policy is known as the new "appeasement
policy." Member of European Parliament Jana Hybaskova
agreed, but blamed the individual member states (including
the Czechs) for allowing such a policy to go forward. "It is
easy to blame the EU," she said, "But who is the EU? The
individual member states, that is who."

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COMMENT AND APPEAL FOR HELP
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7. (C) Mikyska concluded with an appeal for assistance from
USINT Havana to help keep the Czech embassy there informed of
events on the ground. With only one Czech employee in
addition to the HOM, their small embassy frequently struggles
to stay up to speed on fast-beaking developments. This was
critical to MFA efforts in one instance last December when
the Czech Charge d'Affairs informed the MFA of the arrest of
an additional 21 dissidents last year, but it was too late
for the Czechs to use it in the EU negotiations. In
addition, the Czechs have few contacts with Cubans in the
provinces, and would appreciate being included in any
meetings with people who operate outside of Havana.
CABANISS