DAS MARK PEKALA FINDS COMMITTED ALLIES IN PRAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PRAGUE 001688

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PASS TO DAS MARK PEKALA, EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM PHUM EUN CU PGOV EZ
SUBJECT: DAS MARK PEKALA FINDS COMMITTED ALLIES IN PRAGUE

REF: PRAGUE 1601

Classified By: Poloff Sarah C. Peck for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) Action requests in paragraphs 25 and 26.


2. (C) Summary. DAS Mark Pekala traveled to Prague November
30-December 1 to meet with Czechs actively working to promote
democracy and human rights in Cuba, Belarus, and elsewhere;
and to discuss Czech policy priorities on neighboring
countries, including Russia and in Eastern Europe, and the
Balkans. The Czechs confirmed their commitment to improved
transatlantic relations, support for the new U.S. focus on
transformational diplomacy, and shared U.S.-Czech policy
goals on countries in the region. Other topics discussed
included Czech views on (1) flaws in EU policy on the
Moldova/Transnistria conflict, (2) PM Jiri Paroubek's
increasingly bold flirtation with the Communists ("playing
with fire"),(3) supporting the opposition in Belarus
(important to legitimize Milinkievich),and (4) the political
cost of the visa waiver impasse (Czechs ask, is there
anything the U.S. can give the Czechs in the short-term?).
End summary.


3. (SBU) During his visit, DAS Pekala met with Martin
Povejsil, MFA Political Director; Jaromir Plisek, MFA
Director General, Territorial Section I (including Russia and
Eastern Europe); Gabriela Dlouha, MFA Coordinator of the
Transition Promotion Unit; Jiri Pehe, political scientist,
consultant to PM Jiri Paroubek, and Director of New York
University in Prague; Helena Bambasova, MFA Director General,
Territorial Section II (including the Americas); Edita Hrda,
MFA Director of the Department of Americas; and others
representing NGOs, think-tanks, business, and educational
institutions (see paragraph 10). DAS Pekala was also
interviewed by CT24, a 24-hour television news channel, and
Mlada Fronta Dnes, a respected center right newspaper. The
subject of DAS Pekala,s meetings included transatlantic
relations, democracy promotion, Russia and Eastern Europe,
Czech internal politics and Communists, visa waiver, and
other issues (including a Czech-proposed meeting between FM
Cyril Svoboda and Secretary Rice in Washington in early
2006).

--------------
Transatlantic Relations
--------------


4. (SBU) DAS Pekala explained that for most of the twentieth
century, U.S.-European relations were focused on Europe
itself. In the twenty-first century, however, the focus has
shifted outward. The organizing principle of the current
transatlantic relationship is transformational diplomacy.
Accordingly, the U.S. is seeking ways to work with its EU
allies to promote democracy and human rights elsewhere. He
asked the Czechs how the U.S. can better coordinate with the
EU to achieve their common goals.


5. (C) Plisek said the Czechs strive for common dialogue
between the U.S. and the EU, and support the new focus on
transformational diplomacy because it is consistent with the
traditional Czech focus on human rights and good governance.
The Czechs recently discussed transatlantic priorities
internally, and concluded that U.S.-EU cooperation would be
more successful if they jointly identified a limited number
of high-priority issues on which to focus. The Czechs have
not concluded their short list of proposed issues, but the
following Czech foreign policy priorities provide a clue:
according to Povejsil, their primary focus is on neighboring
countries in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Balkans.
Additional priorities include Cuba and the Middle East.


6. (C) When asked if the U.S.-EU relationship could be
restructured to facilitate greater involvement of the new
member states in EU policy-making, Povejsil said without
elaboration that discussions between the U.S. and EU should
be "more political." While he repeated his previous
assessment that the smaller and newer member states would be
better served by U.S.-EU dialogues with all 25 members
(rather than in the U.S.-Troika format),he admitted this
presented organizational challenges. Still, he urged the U.S.
to find a way to involve all EU members in policy discussions
because new members find it difficult to introduce topics of
interest into transatlantic discussions. Hrda concurred that
all members should be present at Troika meetings, even if

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they cannot contribute.

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Democracy Promotion
--------------


7. (C) On democracy promotion, Bambasova echoed Povejsil,s
suggestion that the U.S. and the EU should develop a list of
countries on which to focus joint efforts. The Czechs are
still finalizing their list, but Bambasova and Hrda expect
the list will include Afghanistan, Sudan, Haiti, and Moldova,
in addition to Belarus and Cuba. Povejsil also provided
insight on how the Czechs promote their democracy initiatives
within the EU. He said the Czechs typically focus on
coordinating their efforts with older EU members (he
mentioned Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany) because newer
members tend to be weak. He conceded, however, that common
experience makes it easier for new members to work together
on some issues.


8. (C) DCM encouraged Bambasova and Hrda to continue efforts
to engage EU partners on difficult policy issues like Cuba.
He said the Czechs are doing fine on substance, but wondered
whether they would benefit from U.S. assistance on technical
issues or strategic approaches to the EU. Hrda conceded the
Czechs have had technical problems dealing with the EU. DCM
offered any assistance the U.S. can provide along these
lines, whether from Washington, Embassy Prague, or the U.S.
mission to the EU.


9. (C) Plisek mentioned the Czechs have encountered an
unexpected problem when they assist countries like Belarus:
there are no "pools of experts" that can implement plans
proposed by NGOs. He explained that people with transition
experience have moved on to form businesses or take positions
in government and are not available for short-term consulting
assignments in countries that need them.


10. (U) DAS Pekala's meetings were followed by a working
dinner with Czechs actively engaged in democracy promotion.
Guests were Gabriela Dlouha, Czech MFA Transition Promotion
Unit Coordinator; Kristyna Prunerova, People in Need staffer;
Jan Bubenik, former MEP and Cuba activist; Oldrich Cerny,
Executive Director of Forum 2000 (a think-tank),and former
DG of the Czech Foreign Intelligence Service; and Vaclav
Bartuska, professor at New York University in Prague, and
former Director of the Havel Library. The discussion focused
on Czech efforts in Cuba and Belarus (to be transmitted
septel),and efforts to promote ethical business practices in
the Czech Republic.

--------------
Russia and Eastern Europe
--------------


11. (C) Russia remains an important foreign policy priority
for both the GOCR and the EU. Plisek assured DAS Pekala that
the Czechs are not anti-Russian. The Czechs believe a common
EU policy toward Russia is essential because a unified EU
position, coordinated with the U.S. where possible, is the
only thing that Russia takes seriously. On Russia's draft NGO
law, the Czechs share U.S. concerns. Plisek thought that Tony
Blair, in his official capacity as president of EU, should
send a letter to Putin expressing concern and emphasizing
that passage of the law would undermine Russia,s relations
with the EU.


12. (C) Turning to Ukraine, Povejsil cited that country as an
example of successful U.S.-EU cooperation. The Czechs believe
recent events in Ukraine signal expansion of its pro-West
orientation. Czech FM Cyril Svoboda was scheduled to visit
Ukraine December 5, 2005 on a mission to determine how the
Czechs can facilitate further democratic reform.


13. (C) After his visit to Ukraine, FM Svoboda plans to visit
Moldova, where the Czechs are opening a new Embassy. Plisek
said Moldova may have the most western orientation of the
Eastern European countries, but warned that the Transnistria
problem is dangerous. According to Plisek, the EU wants to
avoid confrontation with Russia on the issue. Also, the
Transnistrian President, Igor Smirnov, has created a "modern"
facade that hides human rights abuses. Plisek stated that the
EU approach to Moldova is flawed because it essentially
treats Vladimir Voronin, the duly elected president of the
Moldovan state, and Smirnov, the leader of the Transnistrian

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breakaway "republic," as equals who ought to negotiate a
solution. The GOCR sees one cause of the problem as an
"imbalance of democratic standards" in the two regions, and
will aim its bilateral assistance at improving the level of
democracy and civil society on both sides of the Dniester
River.


14. (C) On Belarus, Povejsil said EU enlargement is the
reason for EU's new focus on Belarus; that is, the new EU
members have raised the profile of this issue within the EU.
Belarus remains a primary focus for Czech democracy promotion
efforts (see reftel). As a result of these efforts, the
Lukashenko regime harasses the Czechs. The Czech Embassy is
under constant surveillance and Czech diplomats have been
expelled. Cooperation with the V4 in Belarus has been useful,
however, as the Czechs now operate assistance efforts out of
the Visegrad House.


15. (C) On the upcoming election in Belarus, Povejsil
predicted the election result is "likely to be the one that
we fear." (Lukashenko claims he will get 74% of the vote.)
Nevertheless, Plisek said the U.S. and the EU could help by
taking steps to legitimize the opposition. Along these lines,
the Czechs were among the first to publicly support Aleksandr
Milinkievich, the commonly elected opposition candidate. Pehe
had just visited opposition leaders in Belarus with former
Ambassador Sasha Vondra and Czech NGO, People in Need. (He
found Milinkievich impressive and focused.) The Czechs urged
the U.S. and the EU to listen to the opposition, and provide
as much requested assistance as possible.


16. (C) Putin will most likely support Lukashenko. Plisek
said the U.S. and the EU must somehow make the case that it
is in Russia's interest to have democratic neighbors. The
Russian presidency of both the G-8 and the Council of Europe
present opportunities to achieve this goal.

--------------
Internal Politics and Communists
--------------


17. (C) During DAS Pekala's visit, an Iranian parliamentary
delegation visited Prague at the invitation of the Communist
party (KSCM). The delegation met with MFA Deputy Minister
Jaroslav Basta December 2, and later, albeit briefly, with PM
Jiri Paroubek at the Parliament. In the subsequent meeting
with Bambasova and Hrda, DAS Pekala and DCM emphasized that
non-proliferation is among the U.S.'s strongest priorities,
and that the United States is concerned by recent visits by
the DPRK and Iran. Bambasova said the MFA was also surprised
by the Iranian visit, and did not support the meetings. She
explained that Paroubek is an opportunist who will do
anything to be re-elected. She concluded that Paroubek is
"playing with fire." (Septel will provide details of the
Iranian visit.)


18. (C) Pehe provided some context on the Communist issue
during his breakfast with DAS Pekala and POLEC Counselor.
Pehe agreed working with KSCM is distasteful and problematic,
not least because of its impact on foreign policy, e.g., the
recent visits of the North Korean and Iranian delegations.
Pehe also agreed close cooperation between Paroubek's Social
Democrats and KSCM could lead to decreased emphasis on
democracy promotion. However, he said the Communists do not
pose a threat to democracy in the Czech Republic (discussed
further in septel). Moreover, Paroubek himself is aware of
the damage to Czech reputation that working openly with
Communists would bring. Therefore, Paroubek says privately
that a CSSD-ODS grand coalition is the most likely result of
the election. That said, Pehe cautioned that Paroubek would
work with Communists as necessary, most importantly to ensure
Klaus is not re-elected as President, and also to keep ODS in
line (as he is doing now to keep a tight leash on KDU). In
any case, Pehe said he is convinced that it is too late to
outlaw KSCM or ignore them. According to Pehe, the greater
concern is rising nationalism in Central Europe, as witnessed
by the recent Polish election and developments in Slovakia
and Hungary.

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Visa Waiver
--------------


19. (C) DAS Pekala raised the visa waiver issue with
Bambasova. He said he understands the issue is emotional and

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political (and significant),but emphasized the U.S. views
the visa issue as primarily one of guaranteeing the security
of U.S. borders. He urged the Czechs to do everything
possible to make coordinated progress on the Visa Waiver Road
Map. Bambasova confirmed that the GOCR is committed to the
Road Map and is working in good faith in the BCWG. She also
said it is obvious the Embassy is taking steps to make the
visa application process more comfortable. However, she
warned that the security issue angle does not play well with
ordinary Czechs, and the visa waiver impasse is being used by
Czech politicians to push their domestic agendas. She asked
whether there is anything that can be offered to the Czech
people in the short-term while the GOCR is pursuing the Road
Map. She also noted that the EU is now involved in the issue.

--------------
Other Issues
--------------


20. (C) Turning to the Balkans, the Czechs confirmed that
promoting stability in the region is an important policy
priority for the Czechs. DAS Pekala said the EU and the U.S.
should closely consult on policy in the region to ensure that
what is done and said is productive. Plisek agreed. He said
the Czechs have previously worked successfully with V4
allies, and are using that model to coordinate efforts in the
Balkans. He noted that the Czechs are disappointed that
distinguished countrymen like Sasha Vondra have not been
selected to serve as special envoys in places like Moldova or
the Balkans. He proposed something like affirmative action
designed to help promote Czechs to positions of leadership in
the EU.


21. (C) On new governments in Germany and Poland, Plisek said
the Czechs are optimistic (and a little curious) about both
countries. He also said that among the larger EU partners,
Germany may be more sensitive to the concerns of Central
Europeans. Accordingly, Germany may be willing to help new
member states coordinate and push their positions in the EU.


22. (C) On military issues, the Czech Parliament will vote in
December on the troop mandates in Iraq and the Balkans.
Plisek expected the mandate for Iraq to pass, but was
concerned the Balkans may not get all the support requested.
On Bosnia specifically, while the request will likely be
approved, Plisek thought it would help if Ambassador Cabaniss
speaks to ODS MP Peter Necas (the shadow Defense Minister).
On the VERA passive surveillance detection system, DAS Pekala
apologized for the U.S. delay, and said the U.S. has
undertaken to do better in the future. Povejsil confirmed the
Czechs cannot wait months for an answer. Finally, on the
China arms embargo, Povejsil said that the Czechs continue to
support the embargo, but they cannot block it alone. DAS
Pekala offered to provide support, such as consultations with
U.S. officials, if that could prove helpful.


23. (C) On the proposed Svoboda meeting with Secretary Rice,
Pekala said he would support such a visit, subject to the
Secretary,s schedule. He thought a principal purpose of the

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meeting, among others, could be to discuss the Czech,s
democracy promotion efforts in Belarus, Cuba and elsewhere.


24. (C) Lastly, on RFE, Bambasova said it is obvious that the
move to the new building will take place much later than
expected. She recommended waiting to make any public
statement about the delay until the building construction
project is well underway. However, she thought the Ambassador
could discuss the delay with the Finance Minister in the
short-term if he desired.


25. (C) Based on DAS Pekala's meetings, the following are
suggestions for further Department consideration: (1) The
Czechs have asked the U.S. to look for ways to include all 25
EU member states in the transatlantic dialogue. They pointed
to efforts at NATO as a successful model; (2) The Czechs have
suggested that Tony Blair write a letter to Putin condemning
the NGO law; and (3) the Czechs have asked whether the U.S.
can offer anything to the Czechs to improve the visa waiver
situation.


26. (C) Comment. The Czech Republic is a small country with a
strong desire to make a difference in places like Cuba,
Belarus, and the Balkans. This desire should be nurtured
because it is entirely consistent with the U.S. focus on
transformational diplomacy. Ways the U.S. can support the

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Czechs include (1) help them improve their strategic approach
in the EU (possibly by helping them align their efforts with
Germany, or providing strategy sessions with U.S. diplomats
(and other partners) at the U.S. mission to the EU),(2)
grant the requested Washington meeting between FM Svoboda and
the Secretary (and have the Secretary encourage the Czechs to
continue democracy promotion efforts),(3) support the
candidacy of the Czech Republic for a seat on the UN
Commission on Human Rights for a three-year term (the
election takes place at the ECOSOC meeting in April 2006. The
four candidates are the Czech Republic, Russia, Lithuania,
and Poland); (4) continue to support the candidacy of
prominent Czechs, such as former Ambassador to the U.S. Sasha
Vondra, for positions of leadership in the EU; and (5)
provide financial support to Czech NGO People in Need, the
Czech MFA,s NGO partner, in Czech democracy promotion
efforts in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.


27. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Mark Pekala.
CABANISS