Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PRAGUE1657
2005-11-28 15:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS PEKALA'S VISIT TO PRAGUE

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON EZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 001657 

SIPDIS

FOR EUR DAS MARK PEKALA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS PEKALA'S VISIT TO PRAGUE

Classified By: Ambassador William Cabaniss for reasons 1.4 b+d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 001657

SIPDIS

FOR EUR DAS MARK PEKALA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS PEKALA'S VISIT TO PRAGUE

Classified By: Ambassador William Cabaniss for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. (C) Summary: Czechs this month marked the 16th
anniversary of the Velvet Revolution. As you will see during
your visit this week, the country has embraced a
pro-transatlantic foreign policy, with the Czech government
and NGOs playing a significant role in efforts to promote
democratic transformation in Cuba, Belarus, Iraq and
elsewhere. Czech military reform and integration into NATO
is well advanced; the Czechs are still struggling to define
their niche within the EU. Bilateral relations are healthy,
with the question of visa waiver the only contentious issue.
The Czech economy is performing very well, with 5% growth and
strong investment inflows, despite incomplete structural
reforms and persistent corruption. Foreign and economic
policy will both be shaped by decisions made by PM Paroubek,
whose attention is squarely on elections next June; Paroubek
has already redrawn the political landscape by his decision
to openly cooperate with the Communist party. We suggest
your message during your meetings in Prague focus on three
points:
(a) we applaud Czech efforts to foster democratic
transformations in Cuba, Iraq, Belarus the Balkans and
elsewhere; we want to coordinate and support these efforts.
(b) we appreciate Czech support for U.S.-led efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and our continued cooperation in the field
of non-proliferation
(c) we are concerned that a more active Communist role in
foreign policy (e.g., visits by North Korean and Iranian
delegations) shows a puzzling lack of Czech resolve and will
introduce irritants into our bilateral cooperation and reduce
the active and positive role the CR is playing
internationally.

--------------
The "bulldozer" remakes the landscape
--------------


2. (C) Since he took over as prime minister in April, Jiri
Paroubek has repeatedly demonstrated that he deserves his
nickname, the bulldozer. He has single-handedly turned
around the fortunes of his Social Democratic Party (CSSD),
bringing them nearly even with the opposition Civic Democrats
(ODS). By dropping the long-standing taboo against openly

working with the Communist Party (KSCM) at the national
level, Paroubek has dramatically increased his power and
bargaining room: he no longer needs to rely on the one-vote
majority his formal three-party coalition government enjoys,
but instead can fall back on the eleven-vote majority that
CSSD and KSCM together can provide; he can push through
legislation (like the new union-friendly Labor Code) that his
center-right coalition partners oppose but his party's core
voters want; and he can essentially ignore the threat that
the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) will bring down his
government (as it successfully brought down former PM Gross).



3. (C) Opinion polls show that Paroubek's nuanced approach to
the third largest party in Parliament -- he will seek the
votes of the KSCM, as he would from any party, but he refuses
to "formally" cooperate with them (i.e., form an actual
coalition) until they reform (primarily by renouncing the
crimes of the past and accepting the primacy of transatlantic
relations in Czech foreign policy) -- has not cost him any
support. Of note: even a committed anti-communist like
former President Havel has made clear that he is not opposed
to what Paroubek is doing. While the November 17 celebration
of the 16th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution brought
passionate debate about the Communist party and its legacy,
Paroubek clearly feels vindicated in his approach. Last week
brought the first sign that Paroubek may have found the limit
in how far he can push, when he quickly backed down from a
suggestion that the time had come to rescind the Lustration
Law that prevents former secret police officials from filling
public sector positions.

--------------
What the Communists mean for us
--------------


4. (C) Paroubek is described as having a pragmatic, rather
than principled, approach to governance. He, and many other
senior officials, have assured us repeatedly that whatever
political deals Paroubek may cut with KSCM in order to pass
bills on social and economic policy, the CSSD will deal only
with its coalition partners or ODS on foreign and security
policy. However, we have already seen examples of where
Paroubek's cooperation with KSCM had a foreign policy impact.
Specifically, last month a DPRK parliamentary delegation
visited the CR at the invitation of KSCM Chairman Filip; the
delegation visited the Temelin nuclear power plant despite
strong objections from the USG and Czech MFA. This week
Filip is bringing a group of Iranian parliamentarians to
Prague and has tentatively secured a meeting for them with
the First Deputy Foreign Minister (a CSSD appointee). During
a lunch meeting on November 17, Ambassador told Paroubek that
the USG is concerned about the increasing influence of KSCM
on foreign policy, as well as their role in promoting
economic policy measures that will hurt the investment
climate. We need to continue to reinforce this message, so
that the pragmatic prime minister realizes there is a cost to
his political approach.

--------------
A small transatlantic friend
--------------


5. (C) With the notable exception of the KSCM and a few of
the most left-leaning members of CSSD, there is broad
agreement across the Czech political spectrum about the
importance of transatlantic relations. Likewise, with the
notable exception of President Klaus and some (but by no
means all) ODS members, Czechs broadly support the EU. Like
other Central European states, the CR does not believe the
two are incompatible; Czechs appreciate transatlantic ties as
a way to balance their relations with Brussels, as well as
for the values that they respect in U.S. foreign policy. As
a small country, the Czechs are well aware of the need to
prioritize their foreign and security policies, and they have
identified goals that broadly support USG objectives. They
have embraced military reform and specialization within NATO,
distinguishing themselves for their NBC and special forces
capabilities (the latter will be redeployed in Afghanistan
next year). While participating in ESDP (Czechs and Slovaks
recently announced they will form their own battlegroup),
they have made NATO their clear priority. They have
maintained a small but steady presence in Iraq, with nearly
100 military police training Iraq forces near Basra
(extension of the deployment for next year is expected to
pass easily in December, given the support of the opposition
ODS). They give priority focus to the Balkans, where the
Czechs have troops in both Bosnia and Kosovo (in the latter
leading the multinational brigade in the central region).
Government assistance is designed to strengthen civil society
in the Balkans, Iraq, Cuba and other countries in transition.
Unfortunately, their goal of engaging internationally is not
always matched by success in influencing CFSP decisions in
Brussels. We can help by encouraging the Czechs to play
better and smarter in Brussels.

-------------- --------------
Czechs know something about transformational diplomacy
-------------- --------------


6. (C) One legacy of the forty year struggle against
Communist dictatorship, and then of the long tenure of Vaclav
Havel as president, is that support for democracy and freedom
is a core principle of Czech foreign policy. Foreign
Minister Svoboda is an ardent supporter, as is his former
deputy Petr Kolar, who assumes his duties as Czech Ambassador
to the U.S. this week. The two established a "Transformation
Cooperation Unit" within the MFA, that funds programs to
support civil society and democratic opposition in Cuba,
Belarus, Iraq, and the Balkans, with secondary focus on
Moldova and Burma. The MFA cooperates closely in this effort
with Czech NGOs, notably People in Need, the largest Czech
NGO, whose former director, Tomas Pojar, recently replaced
Kolar as Deputy Minister for Bilateral Relations. Beyond
their direct assistance, the Czechs try to use their
diplomacy to influence EU and UN decisions to support reform,
most famously their efforts to maintain an EU common position
that supports Cuban peaceful opposition by inviting
dissidents to national day celebrations. Former President
Havel supports the government effort, through his own work on
Cuba, and through inspirational messages he sends, for
example to support protesters during last year's Orange
Revolution. We are coordinating with the Czechs through
USAID (jointly supporting radio broadcasts to Belarus, for
example) and in other ways, but can always do more. With the
possibility that Czech foreign policy could becoming more
"pragmatic," USG encouragement and support for Czech efforts
can help bolster the position of Svoboda and others.

--------------
Just how pragmatic will it get?
--------------


7. (C) Paroubek wants Czech foreign policy to promote
business interests; there is already an emphasis on
rehabilitating economic ties with Russia and other countries
to the east. But China is Paroubek's current focus. After
leading a large trade delegation to China in the fall,
Paroubek invited Premier Wen Jiabao to visit Prague in early
December. The MFA reports tremendous pressure to finalize a
new economic agreement in advance of the visit, despite
concerns that some of the Chinese demands would run afoul of
EU rules. Many Czechs (not least MFA staff) were surprised
that Paroubek's visit to Beijing included no significant
mention of continued human rights abuses, and this is not
expected to be a prominent topic next month in Prague.


8. (C) Perhaps a stronger test of just how pragmatic Czech
foreign policy will become is the EU arms embargo on China.
According to the MFA, it was only the Czechs and the Danes
that prevented the arms embargo from being lifted earlier
this year; Czech policy has long urged that the embargo
cannot be lifted absent three steps: some human rights
improvement, a secure toolbox, and an effective EU dialogue
with strategic partners, including the U.S. MFA staff have
told us that the Czech position would eventually have to
yield to a concerted EU push on this, although with the issue
largely dormant for the bulk of Paroubek's time in office the
policy itself has not been tested. Another test is continued
Czech coordination on broader non-proliferation goals,
notably the VERA-E passive surveillance system. Two years
ago the Czechs pulled the plug on a planned VERA-E sale to
China, at USG request, and they have since cooperated with us
to prevent sales to countries of concern. We need to show
our appreciation, and to work closely with the Czechs, to
prevent the commercial pull of these sales from outweighing
the non-proliferation concerns.

--------------
Visas and visits
--------------


9. (C) Committed Czech transatlanticists -- lamenting the
inevitable increasing influence of the EU, the general
popular disinterest in international affairs and lack of
first-hand knowledge about the U.S., and the threat posed by
pragmatic policymakers -- are not shy about telling U.S.
officials that tangible signs of U.S. appreciation for Czech
efforts would facilitate their task of keeping Czech foreign
policy consistent. They believe that changing U.S. visa
policy for Czechs is far and away the one area that would
make a positive impact: ideally adding the CR to the visa
waiver program, or at least reducing fees or otherwise making
noticeable "improvements" in the application process.
Happily, officials like FM Svoboda and new Ambassador Kolar
realize that, regardless of the state of Czech preparedness
for visa waiver, Congressional action on this is not in the
cards at this point; they agree that the most important thing
is for the two governments to make progress on the Visa
Roadmap, through the Bilateral Consular Working Group (which
will next meet on December 7). However, most Czechs --
including some MFA staff -- are not as reasonable. After
visas, Kolar and others believe that bilateral visits can
best strengthen the position of FM Svoboda and other
supporters of current foreign policy. The MFA would like
Svoboda to call on Secretary Rice early next year, when he
visits the U.S. to formally open a new Czech Consulate in
Chicago. You can expect to hear about both of these issues
during your visit.
CABANISS