CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY: STILL HERE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 001575

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL EZ
SUBJECT: CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY: STILL HERE AND
INCREASINGLY A PROBLEM

REF: A. PRAGUE 348

B. PRAGUE 1447

C. PRAGUE 1514

Classified By: Political-Economic Chief Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. Summary: (C) Czech Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek has
recently turned to the Communist Party (KSCM) for
parliamentary support on key legislation. This, along with
the speculation that next June's general election might lead
to a minority Social Democrat-led government that relied on
the Communists on a more regular basis, has generated
considerable public debate, with much of this directed at
Paroubek himself. By reaching out to the Communists for ad
hoc support, the Prime Minister is tactically reducing the
leverage of his unsteady coalition partner, the Christian
Democrats, while increasing support for him and his Social
Democrats among left-of-center voters. We see this as a
tactical move consistent with Paroubek's reputation as an
opportunist rather than a fellow traveler; Paroubek's goal in
the longer term appears to be survivial of the CSSD, staking
a position as the best alternative for left-wing voters who
may be increasingly attracted to a KSCM under its new leader.
Regardless of the Prime Minister's intentions, the fact is
that the Communist Party remains a player on the Czech
political scene, and is likely to be a greater force on the
national level looking ahead to both the 2006 and 2010
elections. Whether formal or informal, a KSCM role in a
future government would have negative consequences for the
US. The Ambassador will raise our concerns with the Prime
Minister during an upcoming lunch. End summary.

OUT OF THE POLITICAL WILDERNESS, ONE STEP AT A TIME


2. (C) The KSCM, or Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia,
hasn't undergone the type of reforms that most of its Eastern
European counterparts did in the post Soviet era. There are
still, for example, many elements in the party that show no
regrets about the past. The long-time Chairman of the party,
Miroslav Grebenicek, stepped down in September and was
replaced October 1 by his deputy, Vojtech Filip, who is also
one of five vice-chairs of parliament's lower house. Many
see the Grebenicek resignation, after more than 12 years at
the party's helm, as one element in the party's efforts at
gradual legitimization. This process includes the more open
cooperation recently seen at the national level (refs B & C,
and below),and the possibility of some informal role in the
government that is formed after next June's general elections
(ref C and below),as well as readiness to be a formal part
of the government elected in 2010. Poloff met recently with
Jiri Dolejs, one of the Communist Party Deputy Chairs and
generally considered among the most moderate of party
leaders. Dolejs stated that the party wasn't expecting to
have a chance to enter the government until 2010. But, he
said, "the party has to be ready in case of quicker
developments." Grebenicek,s resignation, though significant,
should not, however, be seen as unexpected shift in the
party's direction. At the party's national conference last
May, Grebenicek had won a narrow victory over Filip and was
given the chairmanship position on condition that he would
eventually step down in favor of Filip.


3. (C) On most policy issues, Filip is unlikely to deviate
from positions held by Grebenicek. Dolejs confirmed this for
Poloff on October 6. Filip, for example, believes that border
guards who shot Czechs trying to escape to the west were, in
his words, "heroes." But Filip is younger, smarter, and more
personable than Grebenicek, and his rhetoric is less harsh.
Filip, who is a lawyer, uses more nuanced language that hints
at, but doesn't deliver, compromises. For example, during the
January debate on extending the deployment of Czech troops
training police in Iraq, Grebenicek harshly complained that
the UN had not approved the invasion and that the WMD
arguments used to justify the war were ungrounded. Filip, on
the other hand, said that if the Czechs want to train Iraqis,
they could consider doing so in the Czech Republic, and added
that the government's position on Iraq was not mirrored in
public opinion polls. In the end, both voted against the
extension, as did all KSCM deputies.


4. (C) We cannot yet rule out policy shifts under Filip, of
course. One observer recently suggested to us that Filip
could be preparing to rename the party, dropping the word
"Communist," which would certainly lead to a shift in public
perception, if not actual policies. Even absent a shift in
policy, we do not underestimate the importance of Filip's
more congenial personality. Public opinion polls conducted
since Filip took over show an increase in KSCM support, with
party approval ratings up one or two percentage points
(depending on the poll) to around 15%.

KSCM ACTIVE AT LOCAL LEVEL; PRESENCE FELT NATIONALLY, DESPITE
"BOHUMIN"


5. (C) The KSCM currently has approximately 94,000 members,
compared to 1.4 million party members in 1989. The average
age of party members is 68 and a decline in numbers is
inevitable as the old guard dies out; some think it will
level off at about 50,000. (But this decline should be seen
in context: the ruling Social Democrats has only 16,000
formal members and ODS 24,000.) Much of the Czech political
mainstream hoped that the KSCM would disappear if the party
was isolated during the 1990s. From CSSD's perspective,
their attempt at isolation was defined in the so-called
"Bohumin Resolution," approved at a CSSD party congress in
the town of Bohumin in 1995; that resolution actually
confirmed a resolution passed at a CSSD congress in 1993 in
the town of Hradec Kralove. The 1993 resolution stated "CSSD
rejects extremist parties on both the left and the right.
Our experience with 40 years of communist rule leads us to
the decision not to cooperate with KSCM and not to form any
coalition with that party...We will actively ward off any
attempts to restore a totalitarian communist regime in this
country, therefore, any type of cooperation with KSCM is out
of consideration." This has kept the Communists out of
cabinet positions. But it has not prevented parliamentary
cooperation on an ad hoc basis, nor considerable cooperation
at the local level. Three of the country's thirteen largest
cities now have Communist mayors, as do more than 300 smaller
towns. There are more than four thousand city council
members from KSCM, who regularly cooperate with members of
other parties, including CSSD, at the municipal level.


6. (C) The KSCM is the third largest party in the Chamber of
Deputies, with 41 of the 200 seats. Parliament runs software
on its website that allows readers to plot correlations
between the votes of parties. During the most recent
election period, which began in July 2002, the opposition
Communist Party voted more often with the ruling CSSD than it
did with the other opposition party, ODS. The voting
patterns of CSSD and KSCM noticeably converged this summer
when several bills on social issues were considered, while
simultaneously, the patterns of coalition partners Freedom
Union (US-DEU) and Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) voting begin
to diverge from CSSD. Two particular issues have brought
this trend into sharper focus: the new labor bill, and the
idea of a commission to investigate allegations of corruption
in the selloff of shares in the state-run firm Unipetrol. In
both cases, coalition member KDU-CSL took public positions
strongly critical of its coalition partner CSSD, while the
opposition communists provided quiet support (ref B). More
recently, on November 1 KSCM and CSSD voted together to block
an ODS bill to extend by several years the period during
which successful claimants for restitution could have their
property returned to them (as opposed to receiving financial
compensation).


7. (C) While there are no shortage of public and private
efforts to vilify the KSCM -- including frequent attempts to
outlaw the party and a very visible line of T-shirts and
neckties that use a common English vulgarity to express the
wearer's feeling about the KSCM -- there are numerous
examples to the contrary. All Czech media outlets include
leaders of the Communist party in talks shows and newscasts.As the third
largest party in Parliament, KSCM members are
included in all official delegations and hold leadership
positions. And, when necessary, they have been courted by
mainstream parties -- most famously, during the confidential
parliamentary voting to select a president in 2003, KSCM is
widely believed to have provided the numbers necessary to
elect ODS founder Klaus in the third round of voting.

PAROUBEK ENTERS NEW TERRITORY


8. (C) While there is no doubt that the past ten years have
seen considerable erosion from the CSSD pledge at Bohumin
"not to cooperate" with KSCM, PM Paroubek,s readiness to
work with the Communists on bills of importance to the
CSSD,s electorate, and his refusal to rule out informal
cooperation with the party if a minority CSSD government is
formed after the 2006 election, mark a clear break with the
past. Paroubek continues to insist that neither he nor CSSD
are violating the Bohumin decision as he (and, admittedly,
many other observers) interprets it today: CSSD will not
consider any "formal" cooperation with the KSCM, i.e.,
forming a coalition government with the party, until the
Communists have adequately reformed. At a November 3 speech
to the AmCham, Paroubek identified the three conditions for
possible CSSD cooperation with with KSCM (which he insisted
was not likely for another 5-10 years) as (a) renouncing the
crimes that their predecessor party committed during
1948-1989, (b) acceptance of Czech membership in NATO, the
primacy of transatlantic relations in Czech foreign policy,
and the role of the EU, and (c) acceptance of a realistic
economic program, namely the CR's EU convergence program.


9. (C) The question being actively debated here is what a
minority CSSD government -- which Paroubek has said he would
prefer next year over a CSSD-ODS grand coalition (ref C) --
would mean in practice. Paroubek himself does not speak of a
minority government with KSCM support: he complained about a
widely-reported Reuters story on October 26 that implied he
had used this wording (in fact, a careful reading of the
article indicates Paroubek was only repeated his well-known
preference for a minority government over a grand coalition).
But as Reuters staff told us in their defense, they only
drew the logical conclusion that a minority government means
CSSD and KSCM working together on certain issues. In his
AmCham address, Paroubek described his vision of a minority
government as one with about 2/3 of the cabinet seats held by
CSSD members, and 1/3 by "talented experts" -- and he
specifically listed incoming Health Minister David Rath and
former EU Commissioner Pavel Telicka as the sort of experts
he has in mind. During the AmCham address Paroubek pointedly
did not discuss the question of where he would look for
votes, but previously has admitted he would work with all
parties, including KSCM on social issues, and ODS and KDU-CSL
on foreign and security questions. KSCM Vice Chair Dolejs
confirmed this in our recently meeting, stating that "nothing
has been written down, but there is a general agreement" that
a CSSD minority government would consult with KSCM on issues
such as welfare, labor, pensions and health care, where the
views of the two parties often coincide, but that foreign
policy would be left to CSSD, since this is an area in which
the two parties have such opposing views. Dolejs said the
only request the Communists are likely to make in the area of
foreign policy is to give a greater role to the UN.

COMMENT: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR US?


10. (C) In terms of the scenarios following the June 2006
election, it is worth pointing out that the political
landscape could change considerably between now and then, and
CSSD is not assured of being in the position of forming the
next government. Further, as discussed ref C, other
post-election scenarios are possible, and none of the
promises made pre-election will be worth much once the
returns are in and actual negotiations begin on the future
government. Finally, President Klaus, who has made clear
that he is not afraid to press his constitutional authority
when it comes to appointing a government, could prevent a
minority government from forming.


11. (C) That said, Paroubek,s new approach to cooperation
with the KSCM, even if it is based only on political
calculations, already represents a break with the past.
While it may have been inevitable that the party would begin
to play a more open role on the national stage, given the
KSCM,s consistent levels of public support, it is
nonetheless troubling for the U.S. CSSD-KSCM cooperation on
social and economic policies, with the problematic Labor Code
(to be analyzed further septel) being a clear example, will
prevent implementation of structural reforms that are
necessary to boost the CR,s long-term growth prospects. On
foreign policy, we are reasonably confident that for the
remainder of this government's life, the strongly
transatlantic policies represented by FM Svoboda and DefMin
Kuehnl will continue -- although we need to both watch for
possible erosion of support for them within the divided
government and find ways to support them ourselves, like the
recent well-received visit of Kuehnl to Washington.


12. (C) Looking ahead, we are not confident that a
post-election minority CSSD government would prove reliable.
There is no guarantee that, as Paroubek expects, ODS and
KDU-CSL would support CSSD on foreign policy measures; if, as
is likely, CSSD would turn to KSCM for support in the initial
vote of confidence, we can expect that deals would be cut
involving the minority government's foreign policy
priorities. We could see not just greater emphasis on the
UN, but reduced Czech commitment in Iraq, and a significantly
less robust Czech role in promoting democracy in Cuba,
Belarus and North Korea (the recent DPRK delegation visit to
the CR, sponsored by KSCM Chair Filip, provided a vivid
example of the difficulties the GOCR already has dealing with
the KSCM on foreign policy issues).


13. (C) In short, Paroubek,s dalliance with KSCM is already
posing problems, and they could get worse. Our next step is
to make sure Paroubek is aware of the downside. Paroubek,s
decisions are all based on a calculation of costs and
benefits; his performance in office has shown that he is not
guided by the sort of principles that made it easier for us
to work with former Prime Ministers Spidla and Gross (and
that made us more sanguine earlier this year about the impact
that a minority government under Gross might have on U.S.
interests, ref A). Continued strong polling numbers tell
Paroubek that there is not a real downside to his cooperation
with KSCM. In a lunch meeting now scheduled for November 17,
Ambassador Cabaniss will make sure Paroubek is aware of USG
concerns and takes the cost of damage to his and the CR,s
international reputation into consideration.


14. (C) Looking ahead we face two challenges. Longer term,
KSCM is a force to be reckoned with. While demographics may
reduce the party's support, the process of legitimization
will only continue, possibly even accelerating under their
new leader, regardless of whether Paroubek is calling the
shots next year. Second and more immediate, facing elections
and possible KSCM reform efforts (like renaming the party),
CSSD is going to appeal ever more strongly to its core left
wing voters. This will require ever more vigilence to make
certain that the GOCR pursues stable and responsible economic
and foreign policies.
CABANISS