Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PRAGUE1514
2005-10-21 15:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

CZECH ELECTIONS - TOO EARLY AND TOO CLOSE TO CALL,

Tags:  EZ PGOV PREL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 001514 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015
TAGS: EZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: CZECH ELECTIONS - TOO EARLY AND TOO CLOSE TO CALL,
BUT FEW THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS

REF: PRAGUE 1447

Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 001514

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2015
TAGS: EZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: CZECH ELECTIONS - TOO EARLY AND TOO CLOSE TO CALL,
BUT FEW THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS

REF: PRAGUE 1447

Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. SUMMARY. (C) The Czech Republic will hold general
elections next June. This cable summarizes current election
trends and possible outcomes, and assesses impact on US
interests in the Czech Republic. Septels will discuss in
greater detail the positions of individual parties. Under
the proportional representation system, no single party is
likely to win enough votes to form a government. Four
probable post-election scenarios present themselves,
including a center-right coalition with a slender majority, a
grand coalition of the Civic Democrats and the Social
Democrats, a minority Social Democrat government, and the
emergence of a new small party that makes other coalitions
possible. None of the outcomes would produce a stable
government; likewise none is likely to be a remedy to the
corruption that is sure to be a campaign issue. Of concern
is the possible role for the Communist party in a minority
CSSD government, which is the only scenario that could
produce some changes in the Czech Republic,s strongly
transatlantic foreign policy.

CSSD is back
--------------

2. (SBU) Until recently, few observers gave the Czech Social
Democrats (CSSD) any chance of taking a leading role after
the 2006 elections. Under CSSD Prime Ministers Spidla and
Gross, the party,s polling numbers fell sharply, reaching as
low as 11% during the spring 2005 crisis that brought down
Gross. At the same time, support for the main opposition
party (the center-right Civic Democrats, ODS) jumped to
nearly 40%. However, CSSD has rebounded sharply under PM
Paroubek, and the party is now firmly in the running to play
a role in the next government. The latest opinion poll,
released October 19, shows the following levels of support
for the four parties expected to make it into the next
parliament.

Civic Democrats (ODS) 32.3%
Social Democrats(CSSD) 24.5%
Communists (KSCM) 15.5%
Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) 8.4%

3.(C) If these four parties are the only ones that make it
over the 5% hurdle, there are three possible scenarios for

the next government. The first is a coalition between the
two center-right parties, ODS and KDU. In the October 19
poll, under the D'hondt system, ODS and KDU would have 101
seats in a 200 seat legislature, leaving the Social Democrats
and the Communists in opposition with 99 seats. This would be
the best scenario for US business interests and transatlantic
ties. However, an ODS/KDU coalition would present
difficulties, which would be compounded by a very slim
majority. ODS Chairman Mirek Topolanek is not a proven
leader and could have a difficult time working with the
KDU-CSL leader Kalousek, who has been such a difficult
partner for the CSSD.

One Option: The German Solution
--------------

4.(SBU) With CSSD,s popularity continuing to grow, there is
a real possibility that CSSD will be in a position to form
the next government. One scenario would be a grand coalition
with ODS. Although PM Paroubek has clearly stated he does
not favor a grand coalition, most observers discredit the
repeated denials. An ODS-CSSD government would have both
positive and negative consequences. First of all, the
current foreign policy that recognizes NATO as the main
pillar of national defense and promotes strong transatlantic
ties would continue. Such a coalition might also be able to
reach across the political divide and achieve broadly
acceptable compromises on some long standing problems, such
as the need for reforms in health care and pensions. A grand
coalition would also have enough votes to pass constitutional
reforms, requiring 120 of 200 seats. Some analysts have
pointed out, for example, that CSSD and ODS could change the
electoral law in the lower house from one based on
proportional representation, to a majority system to reduce
the role of smaller parties, such as the Communists (in the
Senate where a majority system is used, Communists hold only
2 of the 81 seats). On the down side, it is widely believed
that a grand coalition would also mean more corruption, a
system of dividing the spoils, and a further deterioration in
the public's confidence in government (the last period of
ODS-CSSD cohabitation, when ODS supported a minority CSSD
government under the terms of the 1998 &opposition
agreement,8 was remarkable for its high level of
corruption). Finally, a grand coalition would leave the
Communists as the main opposition party, something the
Communists themselves say would help them in the 2010
elections.

An Alternative: CSSD on its own, with role for KSCM
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) The third scenario, which PM Paroubek says he would
prefer, is a minority CSSD government that draws ad hoc
support from the other three parties, depending on the issue.
This would include occasional support from the Communists
(KSCM),which has raised concerns, in spite of Paroubek's
repeated insistence that he will not form a formal coalition
with KSCM. Although the Communists cooperate with all
parties at the municipal level, where they have hundreds of
mayors and thousands of city councilors, and, in spite of
being an opposition party, have from time to time voted with
the current coalition, open cooperation with the Communists
at the national level would be something new and a step
closer to the relegitimization of the party. This is a
scenario that troubles many, but not all Czechs. Jan Prokes,
a member of the CSSD central committee told the Embassy,
"this is an arrangement we could live with."

6.(C) The Communists are currently only mildly influential at
the national level. In either the first or second scenarios
listed above, the Communists would have no real influence on
national policy. However, a minority CSSD government that
openly deals with the Communists would increase their
influence on certain issues, such as labor, health care,
pensions, rent control, and tuition ) likely with negative
long-term impact on the economy and investment climate. While
CSSD would not give the KSCM a formal role in foreign policy,
it is not hard to imagine that the government would be
inclined to positions that might satisfy the KSCM, including
favoring the United Nations and possibly reducing the Czechs
active role promoting democracy in places like Cuba and
Belarus. While the broad thrust of Czech foreign and
security policy would remain firmly transatlantic, we would
find it more difficult to work with the Czechs on specific US
priority initiatives.

A Final Possibility: A new party?
--------------


7. (SBU) The final scenario is one in which a small party
makes it into parliament for the first time. The most likely
party right now is the Green Party. Although practically
every other country in Europe has Green party members in
parliament, the Czech Republic hasn,t ever had any in its
lower house. In the past, the party was led by well meaning
activists rather than professional politicians. This has
recently changed. The new leader is Martin Bursik, a former
government minister (Minister of Environment in 1997 Tosovsky
Government). He is bringing other politicians and a sense of
professionalism into the party. Political analyst Jiri Pehe
also thinks that many of the youngest voters, who have never
before participated in an election, could vote for the Greens
as a kind of cool thing, a protest against the current
corrupt system. The Greens received 2.4% in the 2004
elections and are now polling slightly over 3%.


8. (U) Priorities for the Green party, according to Petr
Stepanek, who is one of the leaders of the party and has
responsibility for foreign relations, would be strengthening
European integration and fighting corruption. NATO would
remain as the main pillar of Czech security. Stepanek said
the Greens defense and security policy would be similar to
that of CSSD The Greens would also do more to help the
handicapped. If Greens make it into parliament, they couldreplace Freedom Union
(US-DEU, which is nearly certain to
fall short of the 5% needed for entry into the next
parliament) in a center left CSSD-KDU-GREENS coalition. Other
small parties, although currently polling at one percent or
lower, could perform a similar function.


9. (SBU) One threat in terms of a new party is the
Independent Democrats (NezDem) recently formed by MEP
Vladimir Zelezny. The party has taken a very nationalistic
stance, and made imposition of visas for US visitors one of
their central proposals, along with an end to the
&Islamicization of Europe8 One analyst described an
ODS-NezDem or ODS-KDU-NezDem coalition as the worst possible
scenario for the U.S. because it would lead to a government
that was xenophobic, anti EU, and anti foreign investment.


10. COMMENT. (C) The 2006 election campaign is already well
underway. PM Paroubek,s efforts to work with KSCM on
socially popular legislation like the Labor Code (reftel) is
a reflection of his determination to improve CSSD,s election
chances; we fear that his recent statements regarding U.S.
visas are a reflection that he, like Zelezny, sees this as a
way to win votes. In short, pre-election politics will mean
more work defending USG interests. One positive note is that
Paroubek is committed to passage of the 2006 deployment bill,
which includes Czech troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
ODS has likewise pledged support, which should translate into
passage by a comfortable majority.


11. (C) The Czech political spectrum is still unsettled, and
the next eight months will surely see polling preferences
continue to fluctuate in response to scandals and other
developments. However, while the 2006 election may well see
one or more new parties enter parliament, we do not expect a
substantial realignment of the political scene or a
noticeable swing to either left or right. The posturing that
is currently taking place (such as Paroubek,s claims that he
prefers a minority government with KSCM support over a grand
coalition with ODS) will continue but all of this will be set
aside once the election numbers are in and the actual
bargaining begins. The most likely outcome is an essentially
centrist government that continues to broadly support U.S.
foreign policy and other goals; but at the same time a
government that will likely be as unstable and open to
corruption as recent Czech governments have been. Regardless
of the 2006 results, the gradual emergence of the KSCM from
the political wilderness is likely to continue, and this will
surely become more of a factor in the run-up to the 2010
elections.

MUNTER