CZECH ARMS TRANSFERS TO GEORGIA: PRACTICAL STEPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 001349

SIPDIS

EUR/NCE FOR FICHTE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV GG EZ PREL RS
SUBJECT: CZECH ARMS TRANSFERS TO GEORGIA: PRACTICAL STEPS
TO AVOID LICENSING DELAYS AND DENIALS

REF: A. IIR 6 824 0046 05


B. PRAGUE 1004

C. IIR 6 824 0037 05

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

1) (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 8.

2) (C) Summary: In light of both the large volume of Czech
ammunition being transferred to Georgia under USG-directed
programs, and subsequent Russian complaints about these
transfers, the Czech government will be taking a closer look
at future license applications. The Czechs support efforts
to bolster Georgian capabilities, but are concerned about
potential instability in the region as well as the potential
impact on Russian relations with the CR and NATO. The GOCR
believes any public discussion on this matter is unhelpful,
and asked that the United States refrain from raising the
profile of these transfers. The Czechs plan to conduct an
analysis of the appropriateness of arms transfers to Georgia
in the near future. USG information sharing with the Czechs
may be the key to ensuring their continued cooperation. U.S.
Embassy Prague has assisted on these cases in the past. We
believe early information-sharing with the Czechs on USG
plans to procure Czech arms for transfer to Georgia may
reduce the risk of Czech delays or license refusals in the
future. Contact information for Embassy Prague on this issue
is provided in para 8. End summary.

3) (C) ADCM and Pol-Mil Off September 14 discussed U.S.
transfers of Czech arms/ammunition to Georgia with Acting
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Povejsil and CFSP
Director Petr Kaiser. The discussion stemmed from GOCR
concerns over possible transfers as part of EUCOM's ongoing
Sustainment and Stabilization Operations Program. Povejsil
noted the Russian MFA's 13 Sept public objection to such
transfers which received widespread press coverage, but
stressed that GOCR concerns stemmed primarily from their own
requirement to assess the impact of arms exports. Commenting
on the Russian protests (first voiced in diplomatic channels
in June, ref B),Povejsil said Tbilisi-Washington-Prague
information exchange could be a "useful forum" to approach
the challenges presented by Moscow's protests. He believed
earlier notification of U.S. plans to procure Czech arms for
Georgia would help both Prague and Washington manage the
delicate political environment surrounding the issue.

4) (C) Povejsil said he was determined that all Czech arms
exports strictly follow the rules of the Czech licensing
system. The MFA's role, he said, is to advise on the foreign
policy implications of potential transfers, with the Ministry
of Industry and Trade actually issuing the license. To that
end, the MFA plans to undertake an analysis of the
implications of transfers of Czech arms to Georgia in the
context of overall stability in the Caucasus, as well as the
Czech-Russian relationship and also the EU-Russia and
NATO-Russia relationships. Povejsil insisted that the Czechs
fully supported the interests of the democratically-elected
Georgian government in building a more capable military.
However, the Czech MFA would also have to ensure that Czech
arms being sent to Georgia would not increase regional or
internal instability. Future export license requests would
have to be accompanied by detailed information on the
destination, storage, and intended purpose of the material.
Any requests to procure ammunition merely to build Georgian
ammunition reserves would not meet this threshold.

5) (C) Moving to the Czech internal situation, Povejsil said
publicity about Czech arms exports to Georgia would be
harmful to the process. The average Czech could wonder why
Czech arms should be sent to an unstable area. Povejsil
observed that unhelpful public complaints from Russia on the
issue had not/not been preceded by consultations at the
working level (i.e., no diplomatic exchanges since ref B). He
did not believe this to be a coincidence, but did not
elaborate on possible GOR motivation. Povejsil asked that the
United States refrain from raising the public profile of the
transfers.

6) (C) Kaiser, who heads the MFA's arms-licensing unit,
reiterated that early warning of U.S. intentions to procure
Czech arms for Georgia would help avoid problems. He also
believed that exchange of specific information on the needs
of the Georgian military could facilitate better Czech
decisions on arms exports and alleviate Czech concerns about
possible destabilizing influences of Czech arms in Georgia.

7) (C) Comment: The Czechs, while committed to ensuring a
responsible arms export licensing process, have their own
financial motivations for sending arms to Georgia, even if it
means risking Russian disapproval. We know that a Czech
company applied for a license for a major sale of arms to
Georgia earlier this year (REF A). However, the GOCR remains
cautious, and working-level staffers have begun to predict
that licensing for USG transfers of arms to Georgia including
those under SSOP, might not be approved, even in the case of
applications currently at the MFA. If the U.S. is to continue
to assist in the development of Georgia's military
capabilities over Russian objections there are two immediate
steps we can take to make this process easier vis a vis the
Czechs: 1) Tell the Czechs earlier in the planning process.
2) Try to avoid a public debate with Russia on the issue. As
we have done in the past, Embassy Prague is working on
addressing Czech concerns about SSOP transfers to Georgia
that are already in the Czech licensing application process.
The volume of Russian complaints has now risen to a point
where the Czechs are concerned about Czech-Russian and
Czech-NATO relations. Post looks forward to working with
Embassy Tbilisi and EUCOM as the Czechs review their policy
on arms-transfers to Georgia. Effective information sharing
on our objectives in the region may be the key to ensuring
continued cooperation from the GOCR.

8) (C) Often Embassy Prague's first notification of a U.S.
procurement of Czech arms comes from the Czech MFA when they
have problems with a deal. This is also the case for
transfers that do not involve Georgia. Embassy Prague would
like to help ensure USG procurements of Czech military items
are not refused by the Czech Government. Our ability to help
depends on being made aware of planned transfers. Once the
normal U.S. approval process for procurements is completed
and implementation is being planned, implementers are welcome
to send information to Pol-Mil Officer Brian Greaney, either
classified e-mail: GreaneyBE@State.sgov.gov, unclassified
e-mail: GreaneyBE@State.gov, or fax number ( 420) 257 532

717. We will use this information to help address MFA
concerns about each transfer. In order to overcome the MFA's
standard questions, such information should include full
itemization of the material to be procured, the purpose for
which the material is being procured, details of secure
storage for the items in the destination countries, and
copies of any applicable LOAs and End User Certificates. This
will be necessary even if the USG has hired a private
contractor to procure the items on its behalf. Failure to
provide this information in advance will usually result in
licensing delays within the GOCR as they query Embassy
Prague. GOCR refusal of licenses is a definite possibility in
some politically sensitive cases. We would like to help avoid
that outcome. End comment
CABANISS