EU/TURKEY: CZECHS REMAIN FAVORABLE, BUT NOT FIRM;

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001304

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015
TAGS: PREL TU EZ EUN
SUBJECT: EU/TURKEY: CZECHS REMAIN FAVORABLE, BUT NOT FIRM;
LINKAGE TO CROATIA POSSIBLE

REF: A. PRAGUE 1256

B. PRAGUE 1243

Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Mike Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d.


1. (C) Summary: The Czechs continue to support moving
forward with the Oct 3 negotiations on Turkish accession.
They are engaged in negotiating the EU's counter-declaration,
with the focus not on recognition but the modalities of the
Customs Union, i.e, restrictions at Turkish ports. The
Czechs remain increasingly forward-leaning on Croatian
accession. At this point they do not intend to link the two,
but the Czech assurances are weak enough that support for
such linkage is conceivable down the road. The Turkish
Ambassador visited Ambassador Cabaniss on Sept 7 to complain
that he feared the Czechs were becoming increasingly
supportive of the Austrian position on Turkey. Ambassador
raised Turkey in a meeting with PM Paroubek on Sept 5, and
will continue the discussion at a follow-up meeting on Sept

9. End summary.


2. (C) Numerous discussions over the past week with Czech
officials all indicate that the Czechs support the EU
launching accession talks with Turkey on Oct 3. Current MFA
focus remains (refs) on legal questions stemming from the
Turkish declaration on non-recognition of Cyprus. In terms
of the proposed EU counter-declaration, MFA staff report the
Czechs are not concerned about the specific language related
to recognition, but rather the details involving full
implementation of the Customs Union. MFA Director of the
Balkan Department, Tomas Szunyog, told Pol-Econ Chief that
the Czechs, as new members who continue to see restrictions
on movement of labor, are particularly sensitive to any
limits placed on full implementation of a binding agreement
like the Customs Union, i.e., Turkish refusal to accept
certain Cypriot vessels at the ports. While focused on these
technicalities, none of the staff we have spoken with in the
MFA and Prime Minister's office suggested that they would be
sufficient to block the start of talks next month.


3. (C) Of greater concern, potentially, is Turkish activity
on Croatia. As discussed ref A, PM Paroubek has been
increasingly outspoken that EU talks with Croatia begin
immediately, regardless of the status of war criminals. In a
rare show of agreement, Czech President Klaus, during a visit
to Croatia this week, said the same. MFA officials confirm
that the shift in Czech policy on Croatia is firm. When
asked about a linkage between EU talks with Turkey and
Croatia, Ivan Busniak, Foreign Policy to PM Paroubek,
insisted that Czech policy has not linked the two, but left
this open as a possibility should this become part of a
broader political deal on Turkey among EU leaders.


4. (C) Ambassador raised U.S. support for Turkish accession
during a Sept 5 meeting with PM Paroubek on Katrina relief.
Paroubek was not able to respond during that meeting, but
Ambassador will raise again when the two meet on Sept 9.


5. (C) Turkish Ambassador Duatepe asked to meet with
Ambassador on Sept 7. He said that for the first time in his
two years in Prague he is sensing that Czech support for
accession is weakening, and specifically that the Czechs are
supporting the "Christian Democratic" position on Turkey
typified by Austria. He urged USG to continue to engage with
both PM and FM on the question.


6. (C) Comment: As discussed reftels, we share the Turkish
Ambassador's assessment that FM Svoboda, a Christian
Democrat, has been able to exert greater influence in shaping
the GOCR position on Turkish accession than was the case in
recent years. Still, our discussions over the past month
have tended to increase confidence that the Czechs will
support a clean launch of negotiations next month. That
said, the Czech position is far from firm (certainly not as
robust as their new stance on Croatia),and can be shaped by
outside forces, notably the political debates among European
leaders. The Czechs could well emerge as a strong supporter
of a deal to link Turkish and Croatian accession. We will
continue to engage the Czechs at the highest levels on both
Turkey and Croatia.
CABANISS