CZECHS ON GYMNICH/TURKEY/CROATIA: NOT YET FIRMLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 001256

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2015
TAGS: PREL TU HR EZ EUN
SUBJECT: CZECHS ON GYMNICH/TURKEY/CROATIA: NOT YET FIRMLY
ON BOARD

REF: A. STATE 153187


B. PRAGUE 1245

C. PRAGUE 1243

Classified By: Pol-Econ Counselor Michael Dodman for reasons 1.4 b+d


1. (C) Summary: The Czechs continue to deliberate their
position on Turkish EU accession and to send mixed signals.
Visiting Turkish MFA officials last week heard what they
wanted to hear: the GOCR supports the Oct 3 starting date
and will not impose new conditions. But during an Aug 29
speech outlining foreign policy priorities, PM Paroubek did
not say a word about Turkey, although he spoke firmly in
favor of moving ahead with Croatian accession. FM Svoboda is
sympathetic to Angela Merkel's proposal for an alternate
status for Turkey. Continued USG engagement will be
important to keep the Czechs on board. End summary.


2. (C) Turkish MFA Undersecretary Sensoy visited Prague on
Aug 25. Turkish DCM and MFA Director for European
Institutions Ulicny both separately told Pol-Econ Chief that
the meetings went well, with the Czechs (MFA Deputy Minister
Mueller and PM Paroubek's Foreign Policy Advisor Busniak)
both stating that the Czechs will not oppose the start of
accession talks on Oct 3. Turkish DCM noted the Czechs did
express concern about the implications of the Turkish
declaration on Cyprus, but stated that Ankara is "not worried
about the Czech position." Ulicny, as he had in our previous
meeting (ref C),indicated that the GOCR continues to focus
on the practical steps that the GOT will take to implement
the Ankara Protocol, for instance, to permit Greek Cypriot
ships to call at Turkish ports. Ulicny also indicated the
Czechs were slightly taken aback by Sensoy's strident
salesmanship, but agreed that on the whole it was a positive
visit.


3. (C) However, Ulicny noted a number of potential problems.
He described a 90-minute meeting led by FM Svoboda after the
Sensoy visit in which the FM expanded on the themes he had
highlighted in his Aug 23 op-ed (ref C; Ulicny emphasized to
Pol-Econ Chief that Svoboda had penned the article himself):
that the EU can not afford any controversial expansion
debates that will distract from the critical need to focus on
EU integration and healing following the constitution
referendum defeats. Ulicny described PM Paroubek as in
accord with Svoboda's views, as demonstrated by a speech
Paroubek made to a meeting of Czech ambassadors on Aug 29 in
which he focused on EU reform issues, promoted Croatian
accession (see below),but pointedly failed to mention Turkey.


4. (C) Ulicny described FM Svoboda as very sympathetic to
Angela Merkel's position that Turkey receive a privileged
partnership rather than full membership. And he pointed out
that in the Czech Republic, as in Germany, pre-election
politics are also playing a part in the Turkey debate: the
opposition ODS is strongly in favor of Turkish accession
(although they have recently been silent on the issue);
Paroubek may be inclined to support Svoboda's views as a way
of distinguishing himself from ODS. This tendency will be
supported by a poll last week that shows 51% of Czechs oppose
Turkish EU membership, versus only 30% in favor.


5. (C) In response to remaining points on the Gymnich agenda
(refs A and B),Ulicny noted that the Czech MFA had been
traditionally supportive of the USG position on Croatian
accession: that General Gotovina's transfer to the
International Tribunal was a necessary first step. However,
Ulicny said the Prime Minister had overruled the MFA on the
issue. In that day's speech he had called for swift movement
on talks, terming "one General" insufficient to hold up the
accession process, and expressing his satisfaction that the
Croatian government is doing its best to bring Gotovina to
justice. Paroubek and his Hungarian counterpart intend to
lobby the Slovak and Polish Prime Ministers at the Aug 30
Visegrad-4 meeting in Budapest to sign a joint letter to Tony
Blair urging him to move forward on Croatia.


6. (C) Comment: Our latest discussions confirm that the
Czech position on Turkey is soft and that continued USG
engagement is important. We intend to seek meetings in the
coming weeks with FM Svoboda and PM Paroubek to discuss,
inter alia, both Turkish and Croatian accession.
MUNTER