ASDD-01 TO VIETNAM: POINTS DELIVERED, LITTLE

S E C R E T PRAGUE 001146

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2015
TAGS: ETTC EZ KSTC PARM PREL PTER VM
SUBJECT: ASDD-01 TO VIETNAM: POINTS DELIVERED, LITTLE
PROGRESS

REF: A. STATE 140227


B. PRAGUE 106

C. PRAGUE 1104

D. STATE 131474

E. PRAGUE 892

F. 04 PRAGUE 1064

Classified By: Political-Military Officer Brian Greaney
for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (g)

1) (S/NF) Summary: The Czech MFA continues to withhold its
agreement to the transfer of an ASDD-01 passive surveillance
system to Vietnam. MFA contacts acknowledge defense
cooperation between China and Vietnam could in theory lead to
exchange of military material. It appears the MFA's
opposition will not be effective in the long run, due to
counter arguments with the GOCR that proliferation of ASDD-01
technology from Vietnam to China is a technical
impossibility. End summary.

2) (S/NF) Pol-Mil off August 2 delivered Ref A points (on
U.S. opposition to a Czech sale of an ASDD-01 to Vietnam) to
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Common Foreign and
Security Policy Petr Kaiser (strictly protect). As
intelligence information about military cooperation between
China and Vietnam was not authorized for release to the
Czechs, Pol-Mil Off provided information gleaned from Google.
Kaiser acknowledged his suspicion that the political
relationship between China and Vietnam did not preclude the
potential for proliferation of military equipment. He
mentioned a similar concern had been expressed in EU
discussions about the China arms embargo.

3) (S/NF) Kaiser said the MFA, despite deadlines for action,
continued to withhold its consent to the transfer.
Chinese-Vietnamese relations are within the Czech MFA's area
of expertise in the licensing process. However Kaiser also
predicted the MFA would be unable to hold up the deal
indefinitely because of arguments by technical experts within
the Ministry of Defense that the ASDD-01 system had adequate
protections against proliferation. He said the MFA did not
have the technical expertise to question the validity of
strong assertions by experts in favor of the deal.

4) (S/NF) Comment: We (the USG) have been unable to develop a
list of foreign policy reasons applicable to Vietnam that the
Czech MFA could use to oppose a transfer. Proponents and
opponents of the deal are now divided by a question of fact,
rather than policy. MFA concerns are being undermined by
assertions within the GOCR that proliferation to China is
almost certainly a technical impossibility (limited technical
details were reported Ref B). Neither Embassy Prague nor the
Czech MFA has the technical expertise to effectively raise
doubt about such arguments. We will be asking the USAF-led
VERA-E evaluation team currently visiting the Czech Republic
for a debrief. While we hope the team will have been able to
learn something about ERA's counterproliferation measures,
this is merely a small step in the right direction. Unless we
are willing to develop and deliver technical arguments about
anti-proliferation safeguards, it is very likely that an
ASDD-01 will go to Vietnam. The other alternative is to raise
the level at which U.S. objections are delivered. Combining
these two tactics, Post again suggests that as part of
bilateral U.S.-Czech pol-mil talks tentatively scheduled for
the Fall, we should schedule consultations between U.S.
technical and policy experts and their Czech counterparts.
CABANISS