Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PRAGUE106
2005-01-21 14:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Prague
Cable title:  

ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN

Tags:  ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PINR PK EZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000106 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/ENCP, INR/SPM, PM/RSAT, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PINR PK EZ

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN
REF: A. 04 PRAGUE 1870


B. 04 SECSTATE 212634
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000106

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NP/ENCP, INR/SPM, PM/RSAT, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2015
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM PREL PINR PK EZ

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL SALE OF CZECH PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TO PAKISTAN
REF: A. 04 PRAGUE 1870


B. 04 SECSTATE 212634
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Mark Canning for reasons 1.4 (a) (b) (c)


1. (C) Reftel reported the request of the Czech government for the U.S. government's opinion on the potential sale of a passive surveillance system (PSS) to the Air Force of Pakistan. This cable offers additional technical and background information on the system. Note: ref A mistakenly made reference to a 90-day timeframe for receipt of USG views on possible VERA sales. In fact, our commitment to the GOCR (ref B) was to undertake best efforts to provide our views within 30 days. MFA officials are asking about when they can expect our views (ref A dated Dec 23, 2004). We have explained that the holiday period could delay our reply. However, given recent MFA cooperation on USG request to accelerate licenses for a number of weapons exports to Iraq, Afghanistan and the U.S., it is in our continuing interest to be as responsive as possible to the Czech request.


2. (C) Three Embassy officers (DAO, PolEc and ODC) met January 19 with four representatives from ERA, the Czech company that produces the passive surveillance system, VERA-E. The company was represented by its CEO, Miroslav Sotona, its Commercial Director Milan Bernard, and two marketing managers for ERA's military products. The company gave Embassy representatives a 20-minute briefing on the firm's short history, its civil and military products, and its recent unsuccessful attempts to sell its products in Asia. The company then openly answered all questions for more than 2 hours.


3. (C) ERA officials explained that, beginning in the late 90s, ERA initially attempted to market VERA-E to 22 NATO countries and discovered that there was no interest in its military radars. It is now convinced that most NATO countries already have or can afford better, more powerful systems and will never buy VERA. Once ERA realized this, it switched its marketing efforts to Asia, where it quickly found a number of interested buyers. Contract were signed with China and with Vietnam. The firm then discovered that Czech authorities would not approve the applications for export licenses. Altering its strategy, the company decided to do what many western arms manufacturers do: offer one version for allies and a more limited version for sale to non-allies.

This non-NATO version is the ASDD-01. Reftel mistakenly identifies the ASDD-01 as an earlier version of the VERA-E. In fact, the ASDD-01 has never been manufactured. The ASDD-01 would be an intentionally weakened version of the VERA that the company hopes it will be allowed to sell to non-NATO states. The company explained that it tried to reduce the capabilities of VERA to the point where sales to non-NATO states would be politically acceptable, but not so far that the system would no longer be attractive to potential customers


4. (C) ASDD-01 stands for Air Situation and Detection Display. The model, which again only exists in theory, would use the same principle as the VERA, time difference of arrival multilateration technique (TODA). It has roughly the same tracking and location capabilities as the VERA-E, but lacks the VERA's identification, or fingerprinting, capabilities. Both the ASDD-01 and the VERA-E are passive radar systems. Era provided the following explanation of the differences between ASDD and VERA, on paper:
ASDD belongs to the category of ELINT/ESM measures. It is based on the wideband principle of electromagnetic signal location and tracking.
The main differences between the VERA-E and the ASDD are as follows:

- The VERA-E, which in general has been designed for NATO partner countries, as developed by ERA, contains an advanced level of precise identification of electromagnetic signal emitters. The method of identifying such signal emissions is sometimes called finger printing. This identification has to be based on algorithms and hardware technologies, which make possible fine interpulse and intrapulse signal analysis.
This method can help to identify the signal emitter up to the level of a specific radar installed onboard a specific aircraft.

- The ASDD utilizes the type identification of radar emitter.
This kind of identification is based on applied software and hardware equipment. The ASDD's identification process relies in principle on just interpulse characteristics of the EM pulse signal. Based on this, it is possible to define general types of radar, which might be used on many types of aircraft.
Based on the above principles of emitter identification, it should be clear that the applied system databases are very different. The difference is in the radar parameters, which go into the database, as well the emitter identification based on the system's database. In general, there is a much simpler database in the ASDD and a more complex database in the VERA-E.


5. (C) Regarding measures to prevent reverse engineering or unauthorized copying of its products, company officials explained that 90% of the system's capacity is in the software, and that source codes would not be delivered to the customer.


6. (C) In a ironic twist on traditional marketing presentations, ERA did all it could to call attention to the shortcomings and limitations of its product. The firm pointed out that they still use previous generation analog receivers. They called attention to the fact that VERA-E requires a number of vehicles and masts and is awkward to deploy or move. They noted that VERA-E can only pick up radar emissions, not communications or other electronic signals. In answer to the question, ""what do you see if the plane turns off its radar emitter?"" they said, ""nothing."" ERA also said that it hopes the system the US has purchased and is scheduled to test this fall will produce a ""realistic"" evaluation that destroys some of the myths about the capacity of VERA-E in particular, and passive radar in general. The firm acknowledged that VERA-E had been developed on ""a Czech budget"" and that it did not have the R&D resources that competitive firms such as the Italian firm Marconi or the French firm Thales have, and admitted that one of the main attractions of VERA-E is its price, roughly 5 million US dollars.


7. (C) The company also explained that it wasn't even certain that Pakistan is still interested, but that if permission is granted to market the ASDD-01 in Pakistan, it would have to build an ASSD-01 that could be taken there for testing. If Pakistan was satisfied with the results of the test, production on its order would begin. In 2003 Pakistan expressed interest in buying six radar sets. It is unlikely that the radar sets would be ready before 2006. ERA officials said Pakistan has already signed contracts, worth roughly 1.7 billion US dollars for a more powerful airborne surveilance system ERIEYE. According to ERA officials, the Swedish system incorporates both active and passive technology. ERA officials explained that if Pakistan were to buy the ASDD-01, it would be used as the land component of an integrated air defense system.


8. (C) ERA answered all questions that were asked, at length.
The company shared information on prices and acknowledged that although it has had recent success in selling civil radar sets, its goal is to sell military sets as well, where margins are much higher. It was up front about its marketing strategies. ERA also offered to provide more information in the future, should we have additional questions.


9. COMMENT (C) If ERA assertions about Erieye's capabilities are correct, and taking into consideration ERA's willingness to dumbdown their product, post believes Washington should consider a positive response on the question of the Czech export of the ASDD to Pakistan. Otherwise, the willingness of the Czech MFA to consult with the USG on a voluntary basis could come under attack, and even be put at risk in future cases where we have a strong and direct interest in preventing an export of the more capable VERA-E system, as was the case recently with China. END COMMENT


10. (U) Post looks forward to receiving Washington's advisory opinion.
HILLAS