S/CRS DIRECTOR PASCUAL MEETS WITH CEP DG BERNARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 002786

SIPDIS

SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
WHA ALSO FOR USOAS
S/CRS FOR MICHELLE SCHIMP
TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL HA
SUBJECT: S/CRS DIRECTOR PASCUAL MEETS WITH CEP DG BERNARD


Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Timothy M. Carney for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary. S/CRS Director Ambassador Carlos Pascual met
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) Director General Jacques
Bernard on November 3 in Port-au-Prince to assess progress
toward organizing elections. Bernard reaffirmed that a first
round on December 18 was still possible, though he allows for
a first round as late as December 21. He warned that the
electoral budget deficit was in the range of $10 million.
Ambassador Pascual stressed that Core Group members would
need a detailed budget by mid-November in order to consider
further funding. Bernard said Prime Minister Latortue had
assured him that the State Commission on the Nationality of
Candidates (CENC) would release information to the CEP
allowing it to publish a final list of presidential
candidates, excluding dual-nationals Dumarsais Simeus and
Samir Mourra, by November 4. In a later with Ambassador
Pascual, however, the PM backed away from that commitment.
(Note: The PM finally informed Charge d,Affairs Carney on
November 6 that the IGOH would take the necessary steps to
allow the CEP to publish the final Presidential list by
November 8. Post will report fully septel. End Note.)
Ambassador Pascual pledged to Bernard full USG support for
his efforts
End Summary.


2. (C) CEP DG Jacques Bernard admitted to Ambassador Pascual
that he faced an enormous task and still encountered
resistance and inefficiency within the CEP. However, he
still believed he would be able to organize the first round
of elections within a window of December 18-21. The Prime
Minister had finally agreed to force the CENC to publish its
findings that Dumarsais Simeus, Samir Mourra, and Joel
Borgella were not qualified candidates, as they had not even
bothered to submit their eligibility questionnaires to the
CENC. As a result, Bernard hoped to issue the final list of
presidential candidates by November 4. (Note: The PM later
told Ambassador Pascual that because of reservations
expressed by the Minister of Justice, he could not yet make
good on his commitment to Bernard. The PM finally reported
to Charge Carney on November 6 that the CENC would submit its
findings to the CEP, allowing it to issue the final
presidential list. He insisted that exclusions would be made
on the basis of proven dual-nationality, not failure to
submit the questionnaire. (Septel) End Note.)


3. (C) Bernard clarified the status of his own official
authority: the cabinet had formally reduced the role of the
electoral support committee from decision-making to
consultative -- though support committee chairman Danielle
Magloire denies the cabinet took this step -- but neither the
cabinet nor the CEP had yet to formally approve his increased
authority. (Note: support committee members formally
submitted their resignations on November 7, thereby
dissolving the body. End Note.) The PM had pledged to
Bernard that he would organize a meeting at which the
President presided and both the IGOH and the CEP would
formally approve new CEP by-laws that established Bernard's
authority. In the meantime, Bernard reaffirmed that he had
the support of six of the nine CEP members. He planned to
overcome some of the resistance by sending Pierre-Richard
Duchemin, the CEP member who most challenged his authority,
to Mexico to oversee the production of identification cards.


4. (C) Bernard said that his greatest concern regarding
logistics remained ballot printing. He had arranged for CEP
and OAS staff to travel to the printers in the Dominican
Republic to oversee quality control and the sorting of ballot
packages for the different departments. Bernard expressed
concern that the printing company, Digimarc, was not meeting
its contractual obligations to deliver all of the
identification cards to registered voters, and thanked
Ambassador Pascual for USG efforts to pressure the firm. He
did not believe, however, that lack of cards should delay the
elections, and had contingency plans in place to allow voters
to vote with only their registration receipt.


5. (SBU) On the positive side, Bernard detailed how he had
integrated MINUSTAH and CEP technical staff under his own
direction, and now held daily senior staff meetings. Bernard
was confident that he could move quickly to set up 835 voting
centers MINUSTAH had identified -- though he expressed
reservations about the decision to decrease the number of
urban centers in favor of rural centers -- and had in place a
system to recruit and train voting center staff.

6. (C) Asked by Ambassador Pascual what the U.S. could do to
further support the electoral process, Bernard warned that he
estimated that the electoral budget deficit now stood between
$10-$12 million. Ambassador Pascual advised Bernard that the
CEP must produce a detailed budget to have any hope of
successfully soliciting donors. Ambassador Pascual suggested
that Bernard produce a budget by mid-November so that the
Core Group could address the deficit before the Christmas
holidays. Citing his banking background, Bernard expressed
confidence he could do so, adding that budgets MINUSTAH had
prepared previously had failed to account for variables or
include contingency planning. Bernard also asked for U.S.
support in convincing the Prime Minister to offer more public
support to CEP members, and to have the PM and the cabinet
help publicize the elections as they traveled around the
country. The Prime Minister later agreed to take both steps
during his following meeting with Ambassador Pascual (septel).

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Bernard's evident professionalism, political savvy,
and managerial expertise are heartening. It is increasingly
clear that holding to first found of elections before
Christmas depends on Bernard's ability to control and direct
both Haitian and international electoral expertise and
resources. Over the past two weeks Bernard has downplayed
the importance of having by-laws in place that cement his own
authority, focusing instead on neutralizing the electoral
support committee and building personal relationships with
individual CEP members. Under pointed questions from
Ambassador Pascual, however, Bernard for the first time
admitted that he now needs his authority formally approved by
the CEP and the government. Post will, as the week
progresses, hold the PM and the IGOH to the commitments they
have made to Bernard and the international community.
CARNEY