HAITIAN POLICE DIRECTOR RESPONDS TO EMBASSY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001625

SIPDIS

WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA
DS/DSS/ITA
DSERCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN POLICE DIRECTOR RESPONDS TO EMBASSY
CONCERNS

REF: A. PAP 1599


B. PAP 1597

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Amid escalating violence and doubts
surrounding the ability of the IGOH to ensure stability,
Haitian National Police (HNP) Director General (DG) Leon
Charles explained that he was having difficulty complying
with Post's request to relinquish 21 long-guns to
U.S.-controlled bunker storage. In a conversation with the
DCM on June 7, Charles appealed for patience as he sought to
secure substitute weapons for the affected officers so as not
to leave them unarmed. The DCM reminded Charles that the
return of the guns was an issue of great concern and could
affect U.S. cooperation with the HNP. He also repeated Post's
unease regarding the expansion of the 17th recruiting class
and any attempts to increase the number of future recruits by
lowering standards. Ahead of the handover of $2.6 million in
U.S.-funded vehicles and other equipment for the HNP, Embassy
Police Advisor explained that the U.S. would require written
agreement regarding use, control and accountability before
any equipment would be released. Charles also provided an
update on HNP-MINUSTAH cooperation, police investigations,
and the Palace Security Unit (PSU),and agreed to accept
proposals for a new HNP field uniform. Charles' ability to
respond to Embassy requests and Haitian security needs is
eroding. It is increasingly clear that the HNP requires more
supervision and guidance. End summary.


2. (C) After a brief discussion regarding recent events and a
joint MINUSTAH-HNP raid in Bel Air on June 4 (reported
earlier as ref A),the DCM told Charles that the latter's
failure to comply with Post's request to return 21
specifically-identified long-guns and place them in
U.S.-controlled bunker storage could have severe consequences
in terms of further U.S. cooperation with the HNP. (Note:
Embassy Police Advisor noted that as of June 2 Charles had
only surrendered 14 of the 21 guns and that subsequently on
June 3 Charles gave instructions to retake 12 of those 14
guns due to the worsening security situation. End note).
Charles begged for patience and understanding, saying that in
the current climate of well-armed gang-led assassination
operations against the entire HNP, he would provoke a mutiny
in his ranks if he were to force his men to give up the few
arms they had. He said, "my men will think I am trying to get
them killed if I ask a unit of 30 guys with only 10 weapons
to give 5 of them back." Charles said that he was trying to
acquire more shotguns on the open market in order to provide
his men at least some weapons in exchange, but that it would
take time. The DCM acknowledged that the situation was dire,
but reminded Charles that Post's instructions were clear: we
must have the guns in our control and we want this to happen
soon. He asked Charles to respect U.S. control over the
bunker and to appreciate how seriously the U.S. takes its
responsibility over the weapons therein. Charles agreed to
respect the Embassy's control of the bunker.


3. (C) The DCM declared flatly that Post's cooperation with
the HNP required greater transparency and dependability from
Charles. In particular, he said persistent setbacks and
rumors surrounding the training program for new recruits
constantly aggravated the U.S. partnership with the HNP. By
placing 800 recruits into the 17th class without consulting
Post, Charles had jeopardized programs for in-service
training and compromised the quality of new cadet training.
Suggestions that the HNP was possibly trying to lower
standards or recruit special groups for the 18th promotion
scheduled to start in September were equally unacceptable,
the DCM said. Charles replied he was working closely with
CIVPOL to ensure the 17th promotion received adequate
training. He also claimed that he was running out of
applicants who passed the examination in 2004, and was
considering inviting those who scored near the pass line to
enter the 18th promotion. (Note: According to the OAS vetting
group, the pass rate used for the pool of recruits for the
15th, 16th and 17th classes was 52%. The HNP could access
roughly 2,200 potential recruits if it calls in those who
scored between 48% and 52%. End note).


4. (C) Furthermore, the DG said he wanted to admit roughly
240 people fired from the PSU into the 18th class. Because
this group received incomplete training toward the end of the
Aristide administration, they were fired following Aristide's
departure and many were now joining up with gang leaders out
of anger at their dismissal. Charles hoped to include them in
the 18th class to allow them to graduate and return to work.
The DCM explained in no uncertain terms that the HNP could
not use any special treatment to admit particular groups into
the police - whether they be ex-military or ex-police or any
other faction. He reminded Charles that the PSU was the
center of corruption and criminal behavior under Aristide and
that these individuals were not the kind of officers the HNP
should be recruiting. If there is a shortage of recruits, the
DCM offered to press CIVPOL to begin to organize a new test
to replenish the supply of eligible candidates rather than
scrounging for recruits among the dregs of previous entrants.


5. (C) The DCM pressed Charles to explain troubling reports
regarding the PSU, including attempts to grant the unit
further autonomy and a dispute over an HNP helicopter.
Charles acknowledged that the PSU was worrisome. The unit
supposedly had 700 M-14s prior to February 2004, Charles
claimed, but now had only 60. Some PSU officers were
allegedly providing ammunition to pro-Aristide gangs; five
officers were arrested at the end of May for various crimes.
Charles said he maintained very little operational and no
budgetary control over the PSU. The unit requested custody
over the one (broken) helicopter that Haiti possessed (which
was operated by the PSU under Aristide) but Charles had
instead promised the helicopter to the Haitian Coast Guard.


6. (C) Charles offered an upbeat assessment of MINUSTAH-HNP
cooperation that clashed with recent comments from CIVPOL
Commissioner Dave Beer (ref B). Unlike Beer, who claimed the
unit dysfunctional, Charles said the HNP-CIVPOL
Anti-kidnapping unit was up and running with 3 HNP officers
(led by HNP Press Spokesperson Gessy Coicou) and 4 CIVPOL
officers. The unit was working diligently on recent cases, he
said. Charles failed to mention any of the problems Beer
described regarding HNP obstructionism towards the
establishment of the Joint Command Center (JCC) as well,
giving a vague but upbeat forecast for the opening of the
CIVPOL-HNP JCC at the office of the Departmental Directorate
of Operations (DDO) and of the MINUSTAH military-HNP JCC at
Fort National. DDO Lochard has been reportedly the stumbling
block in cooperation with CIVPOL.


7. (C) Although previously reticent, the DG accepted a
proposal from the Embassy Police Advisor to change the HNP
field uniform. The all-black and typical camouflage outfits
worn by CIMO (crowd control) and SWAT units are exceptionally
easy to fake and pro-Aristide gangs have allegedly used fake
or real uniforms when committing crimes in order to tarnish
the image of the police. Charles repeated his desire to
maintain the HNP "dress uniform" for use by normal officers,
but agreed to accept proposals for a new uniform to be used
in the field by special units. Embassy Police Advisor
promised to provide several alternatives soon and pledged the
U.S. would fund the new uniforms.


8. (C) The DCM asked Charles again regarding the status of
investigations into incidents of special importance to Post.
Charles replied that the HNP had completed its investigation
regarding the killing of an AMCIT girl during the February 10
raid of Ravix's base on Route Freres, and the investigation
of the December 1 prison riot. Investigations into the
alleged shootings of protesters on February 28 and April 27
were still ongoing, he said. He promised to provide a copy of
the completed reports to Post.


9. (C) Comment: The fact that we have to continually press
Charles on very basic, fundamental issues at the core of HNP
behavior (not to mention the unrelenting deterioration in
urban security) has made it clear that Charles is unable to
deliver the kind of control and reform the HNP needs (and the
U.S. demands) at this time. The problem is that Charles is
arguably better than any of the alternative candidates.
Without appropriate authority and support, nobody in the DG
position is likely to have any better luck than Charles has.
The HNP suffers not only from a dearth of strategic planning,
but also from an inability to put any of those plans into
practice. It has become increasingly apparent that what is
needed is a new model for managing Haiti's security
apparatus, including international oversight and authority
over the HNP. We are working with our CIVPOL colleagues to
finalize such a plan. Meanwhile, we will continue to monitor
the HNP recruiting process, work with CIVPOL and the HNP to
organize a new admissions test, and pay closer scrutiny to
developments in the Palace Security Unit. End comment.

FOLEY