Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PORTAUPRINCE1564
2005-06-06 17:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

HAITI: NEED HELP WITH UN AND JORDAN TO BOLSTER

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC HA MINUSTAH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001564 

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA
DSERCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC HA MINUSTAH
SUBJECT: HAITI: NEED HELP WITH UN AND JORDAN TO BOLSTER
MINUSTAH

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001564

SIPDIS

WHA/CAR
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA
DSERCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC HA MINUSTAH
SUBJECT: HAITI: NEED HELP WITH UN AND JORDAN TO BOLSTER
MINUSTAH

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary and Action Request: The performance of many
MINUSTAH troops has been feeble. We hope that the ongoing
troop rotation will bring a more robust response to the
worsening instability. The Jordanian contingent has been one
of the most ineffective forces here. Embassy requests that
the Department raise concerns about the meager performance of
the Jordanian battalion with the government of Jordan. The
Peruvians, on the other hand, have won a reputation for
strong performance. We understand, however that a proposed
reinforcement of the Peruvian troops in Haiti has been
stalled by an outstanding payment from the UN on Peru's
original MINUSTAH deployment. Embassy requests that the
Department check on the status of the payment with the UN's
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York.
End Summary.

Peruvians can Help
--------------


2. (U) The Peruvian MINUSTAH unit, a reserve force currently
stationed in the southern city of Jacmel but which has seen
duty in Cite Soleil, is one of the best-trained and most
effective military units in Haiti. With reinforcement and
redeployment to Port-au-Prince, the Peruvians could
significantly improve security in the capital.


3. (C) In a visit to Haiti last week, the Peruvian Defense
Minister said that Peru is prepared to send an additional 200
troops and move the resulting battalion of 400 to
Port-au-Prince. According to the MINUSTAH chief of staff,
the Peruvians would likely be positioned in or near the
critical Sonapi industrial zone to bolster the less effective
Jordanian and Brazilian units already operating around Cite
Soleil. The Peruvian Defense Minister said that once the
political process in Peru is started, it will take 60-90 days
for the new contingent and their equipment to be on the
ground and ready. However, the UN has reportedly not yet
paid Peru for the first contingent, and Peru does not have
the money to send additional troops without receiving payment
for the first group. Therefore, while the Peruvian Chief of
Operations in Haiti said that he has begun to prepare the
troops in Jacmel to move to the capital, their redeployment
could be delayed until the UN pays Peru for its first troop
deployment.


4. (U) Post requests that the Department raise this issue
with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New
York and urge the UN to address this issue rapidly in order
to open the way for additional Peruvian troops, and a
redeployment to Port-au-Prince.

Jordanian Performance is Poor
--------------


5. (C) The Jordanian military contingent, which has been
working in Cite Soleil for the duration of its deployment is
widely considered to be one of the least effective in Haiti.
According to a U.S.-MINUSTAH military liaison, the Jordanians
are not trained to the same standard as the best groups in
the MINUSTAH force. They are not assertive and rarely leave
their armored vehicles; we have received numerous accounts of
crimes committed within sight of Jordanian checkpoints that
fail to elicit a Jordanian response. Small unit leaders in
the Jordanian force cannot make decisions on the ground
without referring back to the Jordanian Commander, which
makes the Jordanians unable to react quickly in the volatile
Port-au-Prince environment. The former Jordanian force
commander was ineffective and risk-averse. In the last week,
MINUSTAH reduced the Jordanians' area of responsibility,
forcing other thinly stretched contingents to pick up their
slack.


6. (C) However, the replacement Jordanian force commander has
recently arrived in Haiti, and could help solve at least some
of the Jordanian force's shortcomings. MINUSTAH Force
Commander Heleno reportedly gave the Jordanians two weeks to
improve its performance or he would ask for the contingent's
withdrawal from Haiti. Embassy Port-au-Prince requests that
the Department raise this concern with the Government of
Jordan and stress the need for a more active and assertive
approach by the Jordanian military contingent.
FOLEY