U.S. TROOPS NEEDED IN HAITI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001516

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR FOLEY
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS HA
SUBJECT: U.S. TROOPS NEEDED IN HAITI

REF: PAP 1483 (EXDIS)

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: The situation in Haiti has deteriorated to
the point that elections, the central element of the
transition process, are in jeopardy. MINUSTAH has failed to
establish security and stability here. As much as we may
pressure the UN and the Brazilians to take the more forceful
approach that is needed, I do not believe ultimately they
will be up to the task. As I stated in reftel, a temporary
deployment of U.S. forces is the only way to secure the
elections and a successful transition and to prevent the kind
of sustained instability that would provoke a much longer and
costlier U.S. military intervention. I outline below the
nature and size of mission I believe is needed and urge
relevant Washington agencies to consider positively such a
limited deployment. END SUMMARY.

Mission Justification and Definition
--------------

2. (S) The security situation in Haiti has worsened in the
past months to a degree that it is severely hampering voter
registration and will make campaigning and the actual
elections potentially impossible to conduct. Despite the
presence of UN forces, key political players are increasingly
questioning the possibility of holding elections, and the
Fanmi Lavalas party -- whose participation will be key to the
credibility of the elections -- have not yet agreed to
participate, citing inadequate security. MINUSTAH forces
have demonstrated they are not capable of fully managing
security for the elections. In addition, deteriorating
security conditions have forced the U.S. mission to reduce
its personnel at a critical moment.


3. (S) The basic mission would be to augment the UN's
provision of security throughout the campaign period and on
election days. Adding U.S. forces would enable MINUSTAH to
more effectively use its troops and civilian police for
electoral security in low-risk places and ensure an overall
climate that permits campaigning and a legitimate and
credible election to take place. U.S. forces would be based
in Port-au-Prince, with the following specific tasks:

-- Election security in Port-au-Prince. Provide a secure
environment for election activities in Port-au-Prince
"hotspots" including Cite Soleil, BelAir, Fort National and
other areas where HNP and MINUSTAH military and police forces
are either outmatched (HNP) or ineffective (MINUSTAH). This
would involve both static security, e.g. at election sites,
and related patrolling.

-- Deployable electoral security force. On short notice, in
coordination with MINUSTAH, U.S. forces would provide
security for campaign rallies, marches, and other
election-related events in Port-au-Prince as well as in major
cities outside the capital. U.S. troops would serve
essentially as a needed, short-term surge capacity to
MINUSTAH forces.

-- Election Day security. This would include tasks such as
protection of polling places, secure transportation of
election officials, ballots and otther election materials,
and quick reaction capacity in case of trouble.


4. (S) The U.S. mission would be self-sufficient and
independent of MINUSTAH, but linked through an appropriate
coordination mechanism. It would be based on a bilateral
agreement with the Government of Haiti, which will eagerly
welcome such a mission.

Size and composition
--------------

5. (S) I leave to military experts to determine the exact
size and composition, but I envision a minimum of 500 troops
and helicopter support, which would allow for periodic
short-term deployments as needed outside the capital while
maintaining operations in the capital. Force protection and
command element/support requirements needed to make such a
force self-sustaining would be determined by DOD.
Duration
--------------

6. (S) Ideally, the U.S. mission would have a 150-day
deployment to encompass the entire campaign and election
season, which will run from approximately August 1 (the end
of voter registration) until after the December 18 second
round of parliamentary/presidential elections. If that is
not feasible, a 120-day mission beginning September 1 would
provide adequate coverage for the bulk of the campaign period
and for the actual elections.
FOLEY