Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PORTAUPRINCE1356
2005-05-13 18:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Port Au Prince
Cable title:  

HAITIAN POLICE CHIEF ON U.S. DONATED WEAPONS,

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC HA 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001356 

SIPDIS

WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA
DS/DSS/ITA
DSERCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN POLICE CHIEF ON U.S. DONATED WEAPONS,
INSECURITY AND THE CAP HAITIEN COAST GUARD STATION

REF: A. PAP 1279


B. PAP 1294

C. PAP 447

Classified By: Charg d'Affaires Douglas M. Griffiths, reasons 1.4 (B) a
nd (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001356

SIPDIS

WHA/EX PLEASE PASS USOAS
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT FOR DS/IP/WHA
DS/DSS/ITA
DSERCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: HAITIAN POLICE CHIEF ON U.S. DONATED WEAPONS,
INSECURITY AND THE CAP HAITIEN COAST GUARD STATION

REF: A. PAP 1279


B. PAP 1294

C. PAP 447

Classified By: Charg d'Affaires Douglas M. Griffiths, reasons 1.4 (B) a
nd (D)


1. (C) Summary: Haitian National Police (HNP) Director
General (DG) Leon Charles told Charg Griffiths on May 9 that
he was working to withdraw 21 long-guns donated by the USG in
August 2004 from use and hand them over to U.S. custody. He
requested, however, to maintain a handful of the weapons in
secure HNP storage for HNP Directorate protection. Charles
also reported that regular units were responsible for the
shooting deaths of four individuals on April 27. CIMO was not
active in the area. While encouraged by recent HNP successes
in liberating kidnap victims and arresting suspects, he
feared the insecurity would continue as long as MINUSTAH
failed to establish control in the gang strongholds of Cite
Soleil and Bel Air. Charles also agreed to an arrangement
allowing shared use of the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) base in
Cap Haitien with CIVPOL. End summary.


2. (C) Following up on a request by DAS Farrar that Charles
withdraw from use the long-guns that were distributed to the
HNP in August 2003, CDA Griffiths reiterated that it was very
important that those arms be secured in USG possession
promptly. Charles said that he had already secured 6 of the
long-guns (M-14s) and was in the process of turning them over
to the Police Academy bunker that is maintained by the USG.
Charles explained that the weapons were vital to policing
efforts and asked if it were possible to maintain 8 of the
arms (Uzis) in the DG Headquarters for personal security
purposes. CDA Griffiths acknowledged potential resistance by
operational units to hand over their weapons and pledged that
the U.S. would soon deliver two armored vehicles to the HNP
to assist the affected units. But he maintained that it was
imperative that the M-14s be quickly secured in the bunker
while the Uzis were secured personally by the DG. He asked
Charles to give a full accounting as soon as possible. (Note:
Embassy Police Liaison reported on May 12 that 12 of the 13

M-14s were in storage at the DG headquarters awaiting
transport to the bunker. The DG said he had accounted for the
8 Uzi's and was waiting for further instructions. End note).


3. (C) CDA Griffiths asked Charles about his knowledge that
CIVPOL troops had recently refurbished and occupied the
Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) base in Cap Haitien despite plans
by the USG to upgrade the station for use by the HCG. Charles
said he was told by the Departmental Director for the North
and the Coast Guard Director that CIVPOL had a prior
agreement with the U.S. Embassy to refurbish and utilize the
station for a base and that he accepted the arrangement based
on his belief that the U.S. Embassy had already agreed to the
deal. CDA Griffiths clarified that the USG had not/not given
prior approval to CIVPOL. Charles said that had he known in
advance, he would not have supported CIVPOL use of the
station, but suggested that given the fact that CIVPOL had
already invested in improvements, the important issue was
simply to ensure an appropriate work space for the HCG. He
added that co-location of CIVPOL and the HCG on the base
would have certain benefits in terms of training and
oversight. Charles also insisted that the HCG would benefit
from the much-improved facilities once the UN leaves Haiti.
The Charg said that the USG would consider using funds
allocated for base refurbishment to construct additional
space for the HCG, which would allow CIVPOL and the HCG to
co-locate on the base.


4. (SBU) Charles then gave an updated recount of the incident
on April 27 during which four people were killed in the
vicinity of a pro-Lavalas demonstration near MINUSTAH
headquarters (Note: this new account of the incident is in
line with his previous description of events to DAS Farrar on
April 29 (ref A). End note). He said that CIMO units were not
involved in the shooting. Instead, regular police officers
from the Canape Vert and Port-au-Prince stations were
pursuing two groups of bandits in the area. Police exchanged
gunfire with one group that had been attacking pedestrians
and vehicles near the demonstration, resulting in the deaths
of two suspected bandits, while simultaneously another police
unit confronted a truck carrying a group that had fired at
the Hotel Christopher, killing another two suspects. Charles
said that both incidents occurred after the demonstration had
already finished. CDA Griffiths stressed that it was
important to issue a complete report of the incident. He
noted that in the United States police officers were
generally moved to desk jobs after being involved in a
shooting, pending an investigation.


5. (SBU) In response to the recent spate of kidnappings in
Port-au-Prince, Charles highlighted the creation of a joint
MINUSTAH-HNP Anti-Kidnapping team and operations on May 7-8
by the HNP that succeeded in liberating 3 kidnapping victims
and arresting 15 suspects allegedly responsible for many
recent kidnappings (ref B). He explained that most of the
suspects arrested were ex-prisoners who escaped in the prison
break on February 19 (ref C) and were also involved in car
theft rings in the city. Charles said that of the roughly 25
kidnappings that had been reported recently to the HNP, 14 of
the victims had been held in safe houses located in the Bel
Air district of Port-au-Prince where police presence is
scarce. (Note: the HNP subsequently arrested several more
suspected kidnappers and freed two additional hostages in two
separate raids during the night of May 10. End note).


6. (C) Charles expressed his impatience, however, with
MINUSTAH operations in Cite Soleil and Bel Air. He said that
MINUSTAH was still operating on the margins of the
neighborhood and had not secured the interior sufficiently to
meet the goal of re-establishing a police presence there. The
longer MINUSTAH waits to move into the slum and directly
confront gang leaders such as Dread Wilme, he said, the worse
conditions would become for residents in the area - and for
Port-au-Prince in general since many criminals use the slum
as a hideout. Charles said that he had reports that Dread
Wilme had met with Lavalas leader Gerard Jean-Juste and he
feared that the gangs might start committing even more
violent actions unless they were captured soon. Charles added
that Jean-Juste sent a weekly food shipment to Wilme's area.
In response, he said the HNP wants to be more pro-active in
Cite Soleil and Bel Air, soliciting the cooperation of
residents to root out the bandits. Unfortunately, MINUSTAH
had not yet established sufficient stability in either zone.
Charles explained that the lack of control in these
neighborhoods endangers the entire downtown area as criminals
run out of Bel Air shooting, often in the air, then retreat
while MINUSTAH fires back from bases near the National
Palace. Charles explained that criminals would continue to
use kidnapping and armed theft to finance their movement as
long as Bel Air and Cite Soleil remain beyond MINUSTAH (and
HNP) control. CDA Griffiths promised to continue to pressure
MINUSTAH to take the necessary steps to establish control in
these areas.


7. (C) CDA Griffiths reiterated that conditions in the
prisons were unsustainable and that the incarceration of
former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune continued to be a major
problem. Charles noted that the justice system was
responsible for overcrowding at the prisons and said that
Neptune was failing to cooperate with overtures to assist
him. CDA Griffiths warned that Neptune was trying to be a
martyr and that it was imperative that the HNP prison
authorities did everything correctly while he remained
detained.


8. (C) Comment: Post will continue to monitor and enforce
compliance by the HNP in retiring the 21 long-guns from
operational use. We will also coordinate with INL and CIVPOL
on an arrangement for the Cap Haitien Coast Guard base that
accommodates the HCG and takes advantage of the benefits
co-location with MINUSTAH could bring to the HCG based there.
Finally, Charles is correct that MINUSTAH's inability to
regain the control of Bel Air it lost following the February
28 shooting incident (not to mention establish a stronger
presence in Cite Soleil) aggravates HNP efforts to confront
the growing crime and insecurity generated by thugs
supposedly operating out of these areas. End comment.

GRIFFITHS