CONGRESSMAN DELAHUNT DISCUSSES HAITI POLICE REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001087

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN DELAHUNT DISCUSSES HAITI POLICE REFORM

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: During his April 15-16 visit to
Port-au-Prince, Representative William Delahunt (D-MA) met
with CIVPOL Commissioner Dave Beer and Haitian National
Police (HNP) Director General Leon Charles to discuss the
nature of violence in Haiti and the threat insecurity poses
for the elections. Delahunt also questioned Beer and Charles
regarding cooperation between UN forces and the HNP and the
progress of HNP reform while the Embassy Police Advisor
outlined U.S. and international assistance programs for the
HNP. Septel will report Delahunt's other meetings. End
summary.


2. (C) Delahunt suggested that the labels once used to
describe the political violence in Haiti no longer accurately
explained the current security situation in Haiti. Political
forces had transformed themselves into gangs of thugs and
criminal elements were using politics to justify or cover
their violent behavior. Beer concurred that there were very
few individuals within the former chimeres and the remnants
of the ex-military who were politically committed. He said
the gangs who used to receive money from political patronage
now sought funds from crime, including extortion, drug
trafficking and kidnapping.


3. (C) Ambassador Foley explained that several notorious drug
traffickers had been arrested but that others were stepping
in to take their place and were enlisting the gangs for
protection and general disorder in order to further their
interests. He also said that some hardline pro-Aristide money
was flowing to the gangs for the purpose of disrupting
elections preparations, while other political forces sought
to fund gangs in order to dominate gang territories ahead of
the elections. Charles explained that criminal gangs were
often manipulated by drug traffickers and politicians but
that the HNP did not consider labels or motive in its effort
to fight crime: "if they are criminals, we go after them,
regardless of who they are." Charles lamented that the HNP
still lacked the resources to fight the brutal and heavily
armed gangs and pointed out that 42 police officers had been
killed since September; eight of those deaths by vicious
decapitation.


4. (C) Delahunt asked for an evaluation of the level of
cooperation between MINUSTAH and the HNP, and specifically an
explanation of the facts surrounding the February 28
demonstration in Bel Air that had led to tensions between the
two. Charles said that the demonstration had been illegal
because the demonstrators had not requested a permit. Despite
this, the UN was eager to provide oversight of the march. The
HNP observed that among the protesters were several armed
individuals who were responsible for a series of shootings
earlier in the day and sought to disperse the protesters. In
the melee, one person was shot. Charles said both the HNP and
the UN continue to investigate the incident but that a lack
of evidence was preventing the two from coming to any
conclusion.


5. (C) Regardless, Charles said that since the incident, the
HNP and MINUSTAH had come to an agreement on how to respond
to demonstrations that has been working. Beer agreed that the
HNP requirement that demonstrators receive a permit was a
standard requisite throughout the world. He said the UN now
supports that obligation and acknowledged that the HNP had
never refused a request. According to Beer, in an attempt to
provoke the UN and the HNP, demonstrators were refusing to
apply for a permit and then demanding to march in the most
provocative time and place in order to provoke a response
that might discredit the UN, the HNP and the IGOH. He said
that over the last few months, despite UN efforts,
demonstrators had shown an unwillingness to negotiate and a
resistance to cooperation. According to Beer, the cooperation
between MINUSTAH and the HNP had improved significantly and
that since February 28, they were both moving in the right
direction.


6. (C) Delahunt staff member Cliff Stammerman asked Charles
about plans to incorporate some members of the ex-FADH into
the HNP and the impact that might have on the mentality of
the force. Charles explained that to date 200 ex-soldiers had
entered the HNP and another 200 planned to join the next
training class. He said they followed the same process as
normal recruits, including a written test, a physical and
medical exam, and human rights vetting. He said that most of
the ex-FADH cadets had been assigned to small stations in
Port-au-Prince where they could be easily monitored. No
ex-FADH cadets, he said, had entered special units because,
although they were disciplined, they were older and
physically slower and not appropriate for SWAT or CIMO.


7. (C) Beer said that the process of reforming the HNP was a
long term project, but that the HNP was making good progress.
For example, he said that while it was unfortunate that Ravix
and three of his associates had been killed during a joint
MINUSTAH/HNP operation on April 9, Beer noted that 18 others
had been arrested, demonstrating that the HNP was improving
its tactics and cooperation with the UN. Beer said it was
important for CIVPOL to begin joint operations with the HNP
and to send CIVPOL out to rural areas.


8. (C) Beer also said that although the ex-FADH issue had
improved since most of them had decided to participate in the
UN Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-insertion (DDR)
program, that program was not yet ready and the ex-FADH were
quickly "getting restless." Ambassador Foley explained that
nobody expected the ex-FADH to surrender so swiftly and that
the program was scurrying to get off the ground. The U.S. has
pledged $3 million to the program. Delahunt lamented the lack
of urgency in Washington regarding Haiti and pledged to
pursue the matter upon his return. He expressed hope that the
U.S. and the rest of the international community would
dedicate the resources necessary in both the short and long
run for completing the task of reforming the HNP specifically
and Haiti's peaceful transition and development in general.


9. (C) Ambassador Foley said that the U.S. had already done
much for the HNP and would continue to support the program.
Embassy Police Advisor Collins outlined the $5 million
already spent for equipment, vetting, and training the HNP.
He also outlined plans for future spending, including the
improvement of HNP forensics and crime scene investigation
capacity and in-service training for current officers.
Collins said the emphasis was on a rigorous training program,
saying that if the HNP remained unarmed and poorly trained,
it would never improve. He said the recent weapons export
license request submitted by the IGOH would be closely tied
to training, support and monitoring before and after any new
weapons were acquired. Moreover, he said, the U.S. intended
to help fund CIVPOL administered programs for CIMO scrutiny,
human rights training, and "use of force" instruction.


10. (C) Comment: Charles and Beer's description of improved
relations between CIVPOL and HNP is accurate and reflects a
lot of hard work on both sides to come to an accord.
Short-term benefits are already evident operationally but the
longer-term impact will be even more significant once CIVPOL
truly begins joint deployment. End comment.

FOLEY