U.S.-RUSSIAN DISCUSSION OF U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000890

SIPDIS

DOE FOR OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY; NNSA; STATE FOR T, NP; AC;
EUR; DOD FOR OSD; DETROM; DEPT PASS NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2025
TAGS: ENRG PTER KNNP RU
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIAN DISCUSSION OF U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT
JOINT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, FEB 11, 2005, PARIS

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR LINTON BROOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 (
B) AND (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and
National Nuclear Security Administrator Linton Brooks held
fruitful meetings with Director of the Federal Agency of
Atomic Energy (Rosatom) Alexandr Rumyantsev to discuss a
possible U.S.-Russian joint statement on counter terrorism
and preventing the spread of WMD to be issued at the time of
the Presidential Summit in Bratislava. The discussion was
based on the US draft joint statement Secretary Rice gave to
Foreign Minister Lavrov in Ankara. Possible joint statement
topics discussed include expanding efforts to: secure civil
nuclear facilities, convert research reactor cores from
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU)
fuel, exchange nuclear security best practices, respond to
nuclear emergencies, combat terrorism, and complete joint
nuclear warhead and material security work by 2008. The
Russians opposed a joint statement on nuclear security, but
may be willing to include a brief statement on nuclear
security issues as a part of a larger summit document.


2. (SBU) The Secretary was accompanied by an interagency team
from the Departments of State, Energy and Defense. Director
Rumyantsev was accompanied by representatives of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and Rosatom.

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ONE-ON-ONE
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3. (SBU) Secretary Bodman and Director Rumyantsev met
separately in a private meeting prior to the main discussions
and will be reported separately SEPTEL to follow. END
SUMMARY.

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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4. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed cooperation in the
area of emergency response and consequence management.


5. (S) The Russian side felt that this was not a new
initiative because we had ongoing collaboration in this area
and stated it was not suitable for the Summit statement. They
did, however, respond positively to the idea of increasing
current cooperation in this area. In particular, they pointed
out the Rosatom transportation exercise at Sarov in the fall
of 2003 and the MoD exercise conducted in Murmansk in late
2004 as examples of successful exercises conducted by the
Russian Federation and attended by representatives of the
USG. Both sides agreed that discussing mutual problems in the
area of emergency response and consequence management was
extremely beneficial.

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NUCLEAR SECURITY AT CIVILIAN FACILITIES
--------------


6. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed increased
collaboration in the area of security at civilian nuclear
facilities through exchange of technical experts, best
practices and threat information.


7. (S) The Russian side responded positively to this
proposal. They noted that significant cooperation was
underway already, but want to increase the number of joint
table-top exercises and other exchanges. In particular, the
Russians have unilaterally begun to work on such issues.
They have conducted psychological studies, for instance, to
examine the insider threat. They conduct an exercise each
year at one of their ten nuclear power plants. Such exercises
last two to three weeks. They also noted with concern the
issue of vulnerabilities at civilian sites from aircraft
attack and would like to exchange views on this. The Russian
Duma is considering legislation to close airspace over such
plants to facilitate air defense operations. The Russian side
cautioned that information from this kind of exchange was
extremely sensitive and should be protected accordingly to
avoid revealing vulnerabilities to possible terrorists. All
agencies encouraged future work in this area. The U.S. side
said that it would provide concrete proposals in this area.

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RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL CONVERSION
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8. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed establishing a Joint
Coordinating Committee to oversee development of new LEU
fuels to replace HEU fuels currently in use in U.S. and
Russian research reactors. The U.S. also proposed
accelerating repatriation of both U.S.- and Russian-origin
HEU spent nuclear fuel.


9. (S) The Russian side agreed that it was in our mutual
interest to continue efforts to develop alternative LEU fuels
to convert existing research reactors. The Russian side did
not believe that it would be technologically possible to
develop alternative LEU fuels for all research reactors,
particularly high-flux reactors. The Russian side was
uncomfortable with describing schedules as "accelerated," and
felt that the pace of the work was adequate, adding that the
word "acceleration" had a negative connotation to the
Russians; they associate the word with the programs of
"acceleration and perestroika" of the Gorbachev era, and not
in a favorable way. On an encouraging note, when Brooks
pushed for a timetable because "we don,t have a great deal
of time left" to get this work done, Rumyantsev noted that we
both have only four years to complete all of our work.

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NUCLEAR SECURITY WORK
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10. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed establishing firm
deadlines to complete cooperative security upgrades at
Rosatom and Ministry of Defense nuclear material and warhead
storage sites by 2008. Brooks noted that the proposed dates
did not have to be made public, but that we must set a
schedule by which this work will be completed. Brooks
further noted that to complete work at Rosatom sites, the
U.S. technical teams would have to be granted access to the
last remaining sites to be secured, the serial production
enterprises (SPEs).


11. (S) The Russia side indicated that the SPEs were "pretty
secure" already and Rosatom had adequate technology and
funding for site security. Therefore, Russia no longer felt
U.S. assistance was necessary at the last two SPEs. The
Russians noted that no foreigner had ever visited the two
active SPEs but he did offer to seek authority to allow U.S.
personnel access to the "living areas" of one SPE in order to
verify that security was sufficient. When pressed, the
Russians could not guarantee access, but have already begun
working with the appropriate agencies to allow such a visit.


12. (C) With regard to MOD sites, the Russians agreed to
provide the U.S. with a list of sites that required security
upgrades by mid to late summer.


13. (C) The MOD also mentioned that they would like true
reciprocity of visits and mentioned that if, for example, we
went to see five of their sites, they would want to visit
five of ours. Because the 12th Main Directorite sites lay
outside any existing agreement, the Russians suggested the
U.S. sites must also be sites that had not previously been
subject to visits.


14. (S) It was clear that GOR had national security concerns
and intelligence concerns and requested that the two sides
conclude an information security agreement.

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EXCHANGE OF BEST PRACTICES AND NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT
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15. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed a workshop or
series of exchange on nuclear security best practices in
which experts from the Departments of Defense Energy and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission would discuss common problems
and solutions in the area of nuclear security. The U.S.
mentioned that it has had such dialogues with other countries
with advanced nuclear programs. Perhaps best practice
discussions with Russia could evolve into multilateral
discussions in the future.


16. (S) The Russian delegation, particularly Antonov of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very positive about the
prospect of exchanging best practices between the two
governments and even more enthusiastic about involving other
countries in such a dialogue. In his view, the United States
and the Russian Federation know the most about securing
nuclear material and should share that information. The
Russians said that the proposed G-8 nuclear security summit
was out of the question. They felt that it was stressful
enough to host a G-8 meeting and surviving one without
enduring a heart attack would be the ultimate in "security."
Antanov did think it was a good idea to mention the tenth
anniversary of the G-7 nuclear safety summit in Moscow and to
come out with a statement on nuclear security at that regular
G-8 meeting.

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Rumyantsev raises a new approach to plutonium disposition
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17. (SBU) In response to a request for any Russian ideas on
broadening cooperation, Rumyantsev said he had a new idea
that was actually an old idea. Several years ago Russia had
expressed interest in burning weapons plutonium in fast
reactors, but the United States had been uninterested. In
five years, nothing has happened on the mixed oxide (MOX)
program while Russia had fast reactors that had burned an
unspecified amount of weapons plutonium. Using their own
funds Russia had completed 20% of the BN-800 fast breeder
reactor. Russian plutonium disposition should be recast to
focus on fast reactors. Brooks promised to study the
proposal and respond at a later date.


18. (C) In the same context, Rumyantsev said that his biggest
concern of all was the absense of an agreement on Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy.

SIDE DISCUSSIONS:

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MAYAK FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE FACILITY
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19. (C) In a side conversation with Rumyantsev, Dr. Dale
Klein of the U.S. Department of Defense brought up the issue
of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility. The
facility, built with DoD funds, remains empty of fissile
material. Rumyantsev stated that the reason the facility has
not become operational is inherently bureaucratic in nature.
He promised that a letter would be provided to DoD in the
near future stating that the DoD had fulfilled its
obligations and turned over a functioning facility. It would
then go on to say that the onus is on Rosatom to address the
problem of moving material into the facility and lays out a
schedule for doing so.


Antonov on plutonium disposition liability
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20. (C) In a side discussion with Brooks, Antonov said that
the recent U.S. proposal on plutonium disposition liability
would not form a basis for an agreement. Antonov said U.S.
draft was essentially the previous U.S. position with the
right for the Russians to request an exception if they had
proof about a specific individual. Putin had personally
approved the Russian position on liability and the Russians
could not go far beyond it. Russia already was being
pressured by Europeans that if the United States were to get
new liability provisions the Europeans would expect the same.
Finally, Russia already had several different sets of
liability provisions, including CTR, MNPR and the soon to be
ratified Vienna Convention.

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Talking points passed to Antonov
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21. (SBU) At the conclusion of the meeting Brooks told
Antonov that the need for the Russians to depart for the
aircraft had left no time for a closing statement. Brooks
passed over the text of draft closing remarks he would have
made, noting that they did not fully reflect the discussions
that had taken place.

BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS:

The United States still believes that there should be a joint
statement issued at Bratislava that notes that the two
Presidents renewed their commitment to cooperative work in
nuclear security. It is certain, at least for our President,
that this topic will be discussed extensively. We know that
you will be preparing your President for these discussions as
well. This exchange between our Presidents should be
reflected in a public document. Both Presidents have made
nuclear security a priority and the world will not understand
their failure to note that fact.

We believe that the best statement to issue would be the text
provided you by Secretary Rice. We understand, however, that
some of our suggestions will require additional analysis by
our Russian colleagues. We hope the clarifications provided
today will help with that analysis.

Given this need, the United States suggests that Joint
Statement containing the first three paragraphs of the draft
provided by Secretary Rice and a commitment to accelerate our
joint work with Rosatom and the Ministry of Defense on
warhead and nuclear material security might be a suitable
outcome at Bratislava. A fact sheet alone, as some have
suggested, appears to us not to capture the personal
involvement of the two Presidents. Naturally, were we to
agree on a joint statement, the United State would also be
prepared to work on a fact sheet. We hope you take this
suggestion back to Moscow and consider it carefully.

We also believe that the Presidential checklist should commit
the two sides to follow up on the agreement to accelerate our
joint work, and to reach agreement on a broader nuclear
security initiative, based on the suggestions we have
discussed today and any other proposals the Russian side
might make. The checklist should commit us to a deadline to
agree on the content of a new nuclear security initiative
that the two Presidents can approve when they meet in Moscow
in May of this year.

END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS.
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