FRANCE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000888

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR T, NP, EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2015
TAGS: KNNP PARM TRGY AORC FR IAEA
SUBJECT: FRANCE SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN
THE IAEA

REF: STATE 21700

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 B/D


1. (C) On February 10, Hugues de Longevialle, MFA disarmament
specialist responsible for IAEA issues, provided us with
initial feedback on our initiative to strengthen the IAEA
(reftel),which we had conveyed earlier in the week.
Longevialle cautioned that a more formal French reaction was
still under interagency discussion; nonetheless, he wanted to
provide us with some "preliminary" MFA comments, given our
request for comments by the upcoming G-8 Senior Group meeting
in London.


2. (C) Longevialle observed that France was in general
agreement with us on the substance of our "terms of reference
for the IAEA Special committee on Safeguards and
Verification." We are broadly in sync on the substance, he
stated. He also added that the G-8 had already agreed at Sea
Island on the formation of a Special Committee. While the
French agree with us on the importance of getting more
countries to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol,
as well on the need to reinforce verifiability and the
criteria on non-compliance, they retain some questions and
comments on the terms of reference text:

-- The issue of how best to identify emerging threats from
non-state actors and how to assist Member States to identify
sensitive nuclear equipment and material should be handled in
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG is better set up
to deal with countries that are non-members of the NSG.
Similarly, the NSG, unlike the IAEA, is better equipped to
deal with export control issues.

-- The French would refine the U.S. proposal to allow the
Special Committee to make recommendations to the IAEA Board
of Governors (BOG). The MFA suggests that the text be
revised to emphasize or make explicit the priority of the BOG
over the Special Committee in making such recommendations.
The BOG has a "wider margin of appreciation" of the issues
than would the Special Committee, Longevialle explained.

-- With respect to the references for "building on the
experience in implementing the Additional Protocol,"
Longevialle observed that we should be careful not to be seen
as adding a new additional protocol, because such a
perception might discourage non-signatory countries from
signing on to the Additional Protocol itself. He was
specifically referring to our language that suggested we
"identify new strengthening measures that may be needed to
enhance the effective enforcement of compliance with
safeguards."

-- Longevialle made the same point about not discouraging
potential signatories of the Additional Protocol when
discussing the terms of reference that suggests the potential
need "for further expansion of the IAEA's legal authority for
its verification and inspection activities to better address
the challenges now posed to the nuclear non-proliferation
regime."

-- On the recommendation for a State to recuse itself from
Special Committee decisions should it find itself under
investigation, the French agree with the concept, but
recommend we add language that would emphasize the voluntary
nature of the recusal. The idea of a State recusing itself
from decisions is a political concept because normally
decisions are taken on a consensus basis, according to
Longevialle. The likelihood of recusal is strongest when the
decision is seen as voluntary. Additionally, if the decision
for recusal is not voluntary, there might be legal issues
surrounding the question of how the BOG might make a decision
on who should remain a member of the Special Committee.


3. (C) Longevialle highlighted one area which France sees as
very problematic. He said the recommendation that a
non-nuclear weapon state "which has or is pursuing enrichment
or reprocessing activities, should expect a considerably more
intrusive inspection regime," is redundant given the IAEA's
existing mandate and could be seen as discriminatory. The
IAEA already is authorized to determine the level of
inspections based on the nature of a state's activities.
France therefore would strongly recommend deletion of this
term of reference paragraph from the draft text.


4. (C) On the plus side, Longevialle emphasized French
concurrence with our proposed language on the life span of
the Special Committee. We feel that reference to "an
indefinite duration" represents good compromise language,
which would allow the IAEA and the Special Committee to
determine when the latter has achieved its objectives, he
stated. Longevialle said the MFA was also supportive of our
language pertaining to "the modalities for special
inspections." This formulation fits well with the objectives
of the Special Committee and the IAEA's own language in
paragraph 73 of the "Model Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement
of the IAEA."

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