Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS879
2005-02-11 12:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN SECSTATE MEETINGS WITH

Tags:  PREL FR IR IZ SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000879 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: PREL FR IR IZ SY
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN SECSTATE MEETINGS WITH
FRENCH GOVERNMENT

REF: KIEV 576

Classified By: DCM Alex Wolff for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000879

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: PREL FR IR IZ SY
SUBJECT: REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN SECSTATE MEETINGS WITH
FRENCH GOVERNMENT

REF: KIEV 576

Classified By: DCM Alex Wolff for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) In a February 10 meeting with MFA Cabinet Director
Vimont (protect),DCM discussed follow up to issues raised
during Secretary's meetings in Paris February 8. Vimont said
the French side had been pleased by the visit and the level
of discussion with the Secretary. Review of specific issues
follows:

China Arms Embargo
--------------


2. (C) Vimont characterized the exchange between the
Secretary and FM Barnier as not revealing anything new by

SIPDIS
either side. Vimont said the French side understood better
the vehemence of Congressional feeling on the matter. DCM
reiterated USG concerns, which he said were also strongly
felt. He noted that while the EU side seemed to be listening
to our concerns, there was no indication they were doing much
to address them. Indeed, the decision to lift seemed to be
on autopilot, with only the timing in question. This was no
way for an ally to deal with an issue of strategic and
political concern to another. Vimont acknowledged that
European sensitivities to the strategic dangers were
mitigated by the geographic distance between China and
Europe. He argued that the French had resisted pressure by
the Chinese to obtain dangerous technologies, and would
continue to do so. He thought there was still an opportunity
to discuss ways to assuage U.S. concerns, although he offered
no details.

ICC/Darfur
--------------


3. (C) Vimont said the French side understands the U.S. view
on the ICC, but noted that France had its own domestic
constituency to worry about in how it handles ICC issues. He
thought a way around our differences could be found if each
side respected the position of the other. DCM described U.S.
approach as fully respectful of ICC member governments. He
noted that our effort to obtain Article 98 agreements with
European governments reflected that respect since these
agreements were consistent with the Rome Statute -- and had
been suggested by the French earlier as a means for dealing
with our concerns. It was European resistance to such
agreements that suggested lack of respect for the U.S.
position. Asked if France was prepared to discuss an Article

98 agreement with the U.S., Vimont reiterated that the French
were not opposed in principle, but offered no sign that the
French position had changed. He suggested that we take up
the matter with the incoming MFA legal advisor.


4. (C) Asked if France had any thoughts on how to address our
differences over the Darfur/ICC issue, Vimont speculated one
possibility could be to incorporate into any resolution a
statement exempting U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction in
this one case. DCM noted that if France was prepared to do
so on an ad hoc basis for Darfur, we did not understand why a
blanket arrangement through Article 98 agreements with France
and others that resolve the broader issue was proving so
difficult.

Iraq
--------------


5. (C) DCM noted signs of internal French debate on the
merits of announcing a deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal as
a necessary element to help stabilize Iraq. Vimont said the
French position still favored such an announcement, although
it need not be a fixed or firm commitment. He reiterated
familiar arguments about the need for a clearer sense of a
departure timetable to promote greater participation by as
many Iraqi elements, particularly Sunni, in the political
process. DCM reviewed arguments against announcing a
timeline for withdrawal, emphasizing the boost this would
give to terrorist and rejectionist groups. Vimont accepted
the point, but said the French view was that some sort of
signal in this direction would be helpful. DCM said U.S.
statements indicating an intention to depart as soon as the
conditions allowed were already pretty clear. In this
regard, DCM raised report that suggested FM Barnier was
pleased by the decision by Kiev to withdraw Ukranian troops
from Iraq (reftel) and asked if there was an explanation for
such an impression being left. Vimont expressed surprise at
the characterization of Barnier's reaction. He said the
French position was that a staged orderly withdrawal of
foreign forces was a good thing for all concerned, but this
did not mean an uncoordinated, precipitate departure that
endangered efforts to stabilize the country. Vimont argued
that, contrary to the allegations expressed by some in the
U.S., France believes a U.S. defeat in Iraq would be a
disaster for everyone. He concluded that despite our
difference over the war, U.S. and French expressed objectives
for Iraq now generally coincide.

Iran/IAEA
--------------


6. (C) DCM described tenor of the Secretary's discussion on
Iran with French opinion leaders. Asked if President
Chirac's assessment of Iranian nuclear objectives and
skepticism of success by the EU-3 were shared by the Foreign
Ministry, Vimont acknowledged that Chirac's anti-Shia bias
was deep-rooted. Vimont also confirmed that the French were
prepared to support referral of the Iranian case to the
Security Council -- albeit in conformity with a formal
process which would follow a report by the IAEA denoting
non-compliance.


7. (C) Vimont asked about U.S. views on El Baradei's
succession. He said the French did not want any conflict
with the U.S. over the issue, but there was still no credible
alternative candidate, and if taken to a vote, El Baradei
would be re-elected by a large margin. DCM suggested that
Political Director Laboulaye discuss the issue with U/S
Bolton next week in London.

Syria/Lebanon/Hizbollah
--------------


8. (C) Recalling President Chirac's suggestion that we begin
speaking about UN sanctions against Syria if Damascus did not
comply with UNSCR 1599, DCM asked if the Foreign Ministry
shared that approach. Vimont confirmed that President Chirac
was determined to put as much pressure on Syria as necessary
to ensure its compliance, but admitted candidly that the
MFA's traditional approach was to consider the effect of such
a step on Syria's capacity to be an irritant in other areas.
He concluded, however, that President Chirac's views would,
again, determine the French approach, even if the MFA was not
as enthusiastic.


9. (C) DCM raised the unhelpful role of Hizbollah as another
concern, asking whether French attitudes toward Hizbollah's
role in terrorism had evolved, particularly in light of
Palestinian President Abu Mazen's reference to support by
Hizbollah for Palestinian terrorists. Vimont confirmed that
Abu Mazen had mentioned this to FM Barnier as well. He said
that President Chirac viewed Hizbollah primarily in
connection with Lebanon, and until he was convinced that
Hizbollah's activities threatened directly French interests
in Lebanon, he doubted that Paris would be swayed even by Abu
Mazen's statement.

Afghanistan/PRT's
--------------


10. (C) Noting growing interest on the part of the French
defense establishment to consider French participation in a
PRT or in a forward support base for PRT's, DCM asked if the
French were ready to take such a decision well in advance of
the Afghan elections this summer. Vimont acknowledged signs
of evolution in French thinking on PRT's but said a decision
to participate would require an interagency decision to raise
the matter again with President Chirac, but did not indicate
any such decision was imminent.


Guantanamo Detainees
--------------


11. (C) Vimont said the French response to our diplomatic
note proposing the return of the three remaining French
detainees in Guantanamo would include "quite similar"
undertakings to those for the previously returned detainees.
He said the response was still being cleared interagency and
he anticipated no problems.


12. (U) Bagdad minimize considered.

Leach