A CONVERSATION WITH CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 008373

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM ASEC EAID TOGO'>TO GH IV FR UNSC
SUBJECT: A CONVERSATION WITH CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER

REF: BEIJING 19704

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas
ons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: Michel de Bonnecorse, head of the "Africa
Cell" at the Elysee Palace that advises the French President,
described the 12/2-12/4 Africa-France Summit in Bamako as a
strategic, historic project, encouraged a high-level USG
presence for the January meeting of the International Working
Group on Cote d'Ivoire, reported that a Central African
nation, possibly Congo-Brazzaville, may take over the AU
presidency in 2006, and urged the USG to offer some minimal
assistance to CAR. In a follow-up phone call, Bonnecorse's
deputy conveyed the French understanding that the AU had
overturned a decision taken at the Africa-France Summit to
force a vote in New York on the AU proposal for Security
Council reform. End Summary.

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Africa-France Summit
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2. (C) In a 6 December courtesy call by Africa Watcher,
Michel de Bonnecorse, head of the "Africa Cell" at the Elysee
Palace that advises French President Chirac, downplayed the
lack of direct deliverables from the Africa-France Summit. He
termed the summit "a work in continuity," without surprises,
consonant with the overall long-term French strategy of
empowering Africans so that France could assume a less
prominent tutelary role. Bonnecorse was dismissive of French
media criticism regarding Chirac's congratulatory message to
Gabon President Bongo during the summit on his "brilliant"
reelection, remarking that the Chirac was just being polite.


3. (C) Like UK PM Blair, Chirac sought to draw attention to
the need for development for Africa, hence the Bamako appeal
for the Russian G-8 presidency to retain an African focus at
the 2006 St. Petersburg summit, Bonnecorse commented. There
was a risk for Africa of severe marginalization and of
joining economic "globalization only through the back door,"
e.g. through illicit international trafficking like
prostitution and arms deals. Bonnecorse observed that France
and the U.S. do not share common views on how to augment
development aid. Free-market ("liberal") economies tended to
diminish their foreign assistance over time, he argued, hence
the need for creative financing initiatives. When Africa
Watcher commented on the unfavorable reception by the USG and
others to Chirac's proposed one-to-forty euro development tax
on international airline tickets, Bonnecorse remarked
defensively that governmental participation would be
voluntary. He suggested, however, that a tobacco tax might
fare better.

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Cote d'Ivoire: How We Can Help
--------------


4. (C) Bonnecorse hoped the USG would continue to be helpful
in addressing the Cote d'Ivoire crisis. In particular, he
hoped that i) the USG should dispatch a high level
representative to the next meeting of the International
Working Group in Abidjan, which he thought would take place
10 January 2006; ii) that the USG and France would agree on a
sanctions list; iii) that the USG would support short-term
troop transfers, if needed, from UNMIL to UNOCI.


5. (C) The naming of a PM opened a new phase for Cote
d'Ivoire that, Bonnecorse hoped, would culminate in elections
within ten months. If Gbagbo emerged the victor in free and
fair elections, then France, like others, would work with
him; however, his departure from power would be preferable.
A Soro presidency was also not desirable. In the immediate
term, it was imperative to bolster newly named PM Konan Banny
and augment his authority. On paper the presidency in Cote
d'Ivoire takes precedence and "governs all," Bonnecorse
regretted. He suggested it may ultimately be necessary to
rewrite the national constitution, possibly through the
direct influence of the UNSC.

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African Union Presidency: Congo-Brazzaville in the Wings?
-------------- --------------

6. (C) Asked for his take on who would succeed Nigeria as AU
President, Bonnecorse replied he understood there was
"absolutely" no chance that Sudan would take over at the 2006
Khartoum AU Summit. Indeed, he claimed there was a tacit
understanding that the presidency should now devolve to a
Francophone state after the prolonged Nigerian tenure.
Bonnecorse expected a Central African nation, a CEMAC member,
would soon emerge, possibly Congo-Brazzaville, to take the
helm of the AU for a one-year term. In 2007 he predicted the
AU would honor Ghana with the AU presidency to mark the final
year of President Kufuor's mandate and the 60th anniversary
of Ghana's independence.

-------------- ---
AU and UNSC Reform: North Africans Stall Action
-------------- ---

7. (C) Bonnecorse admitted he was unaware of any AU decision
taken at Bamako to push for a vote on its UNGA resolution on
SC reform (reftel). Subsequently, his office called twice
with supplementary information confirming the report.
Jacques de Labriolle, Bonnecorse's deputy at the Elysee and a
former Fellow-of-Hope in Washington, first indicated on 7
December that, yes, the AU working committee on SC reform had
indeed decided, 6 against 5, on a vote in New York. But on 8
December Labriolle called back to report that the AU
committee decision had since been overruled at ministerial
level. Algeria and Egypt, leading the opposition, had
insisted that there be either consensus or at least a
two-thirds majority before any decision. Labriolle did not
know if this would entail a later vote in the committee or by
the AU in its entirety.

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Somalia: Deep Pessimism
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8. (C) While officially France heralded Somalia's attendance
at the Africa-France Summit as a watershed, a return to the
fold after more than a decade's absence, Bonnecorse admitted
he found Transitional Federal Government PM Ghedi
unimpressive and unable to answer the simplest questions.
Bonnecorse, who was the French representative to Operation
Restore Hope from 1992-1993 as well as ambassador to Kenya
from 1990-1993, said he was deeply pessimistic about
Somalia's future. The most that could be hoped for, he
thought, was the unification of Mogadishu. Somaliland was a
brighter story, he volunteered, but it would never link up to
a greater Somalia.

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TOGO: Elections in June or July
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9. (C) Bonnecorse anticipated parliamentary elections would
go forward in TOGO in June or July 2006. With TOGOlese
opposition already certain that elections would be rigged,
maximum transparency was necessary. Such parliamentary
elections were a first step, not a panacea, and would only
realign power "a l'africaine," by which he explained that
parliament would have a voice, but Faure would still hold 95%
of the cards.

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Central African Republic: Engagement Needed
--------------


10. (C) Bonnecorse made a plea for USG assistance to the
CAR. Even a little would go a long way, he urged. CAR was
desperately poor, though it does have potential mineral
wealth; indeed, the diamond trade was spawning an illicit
arms traffic. France was addressing the same plea to the
Japanese. Without greater international engagement, CAR
risked becoming a playing field of the Chinese, whose only
real rival would be Libya, Bonnecorse claimed.

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Comment: A Kinder, Gentler Africa Cell?
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11. (C) Comment: The Elysee Africa Cell has a historic
notoriety. Bonnecorse would appear a modest and subdued
successor to predecessors like Jacques Foccart and
Jean-Christophe Mitterand, the architects of a "Francafrique"
linked to the genius of Total and the genocidaires of Rwanda.
Ambassador to Morocco from 1995-2001 -- a job described at
the Quai as the consummate "position of trust" -- Bonnecorse
has been Chirac's personal Africa adviser since 2002. While
the Quai d'Orsay handles day-to-day business, the Africa
Cell, however discreetly, still appears to keep the whiphand
on situations, such as Cote d'Ivoire, of direct relevance to
French prestige or Chirac's image and network of contacts.
End Comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton