Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS8171
2005-12-01 17:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

NOVEMBER 28-29 VISIT OF IRAQI FM ZEBARI

Tags:  PREL EAID IZ SY IR FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008171 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015
TAGS: PREL EAID IZ SY IR FR
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 28-29 VISIT OF IRAQI FM ZEBARI


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008171

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015
TAGS: PREL EAID IZ SY IR FR
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 28-29 VISIT OF IRAQI FM ZEBARI


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: MFA contacts described the
November 28-29 visit of Iraqi FM Zebari as a success, but did
not suggest that the visit will herald an increase in modest
French assistance levels to Iraq. FM Douste-Blazy reportedly
stressed to Zebari GoF support for an inclusive political
process and Arab League-initiated Iraqi reconciliation
efforts. The French FM also called for more regular
interaction with the GOI and stressed GoF readiness to help
with reconstruction, largely in the context of existing GoF
exchange programs and the EU JUSTLEX program. The two sides
addressed the long-stalled French offer to train Iraqi police
in France, for which MFA officials said the GoF is still
awaiting an Iraqi response, while Zebari suggested publicly
that the GoF was responsible for the delay. MFA officials
were struck by the depth of Zebari's negativity on Syria, in
contrast to his more positive remarks on Iran. While FM
Douste-Blazy did not question Zebari's assessment of the
malicious Syrian role in Iraq, he stressed to the Iraqi FM
that France would not use UNSCR 1559 as a weapon against
Syria. MFA officials praised Zebari's effectiveness as an
interlocutor, which they contrasted with perceived
incompetence of other ITG ministers. End summary and comment.


2. (C) Iraqi FM Hoshyar Zebari visited Paris November 28-29,
at GoF invitation, and met with FM Douste-Blazy, French
Senate President Christian Poncelet, and members of the
French Senate and National Assembly. MFA DAS-equivalent
Antoine Sivan briefed us November 30 on the visit, describing
it as a success and long-overdue. Sivan stressed the
significant timing of Zebari's visit, coming just two weeks
before Iraqi elections and on the heels of the successful
Arab League-sponsored reconciliation meeting in Cairo. He
expressed hope that the Zebari visit would help France
establish better relations with Iraq's permanent government,
and herald more regular high-level Iraqi visits to France.

POLITICAL PROCESS
--------------


3. (C) On the November 28 meeting between Zebari and
Douste-Blazy, Sivan reported that the French FM's main

message was one of support for Iraq's political process, and
a desire for more regular, high-level interaction between
France and Iraq. The French FM commended the October 15
referendum, especially the high voter turnout, as well as the
Arab League initiative on Iraqi reconciliation, which he
hoped would help result in a new parliament "more
representative" of Iraq's population. Zebari, for his part,
briefed Douste-Blazy on the evolution in Iraq's political
process since 2004 and the crucial run-up to December
elections. According to Sivan, the Iraqi FM emphasized that
Iraq's next government would be one of "national unity,"
which would be more stable than its predecessors and maintain
the unity of the country. Sivan said Zebari sought to
emphasize his support for Iraq's unity and greater Sunni
inclusion in the political process, important points of
agreement with the GoF. Sivan reported that Zebari also
thanked the GoF for its support for Arab League efforts to
promote Iraqi reconciliation, which he described as a joint
Iraqi-Arab League initiative.

FOCUS ON EXISTING ASSISTANCE, TRAINING OFFERS, ASSETS, DEBT
-------------- --------------


4. (C) According to Sivan, Douste-Blazy also stressed to
Zebari the GoF's readiness to assist Iraq's reconstruction
within the context of existing programs, such as the EU
"JUSTLEX" program (under which 40 Iraqi police have attended
gendarme courses in France),as well as cultural exchanges
(through which some 500 Iraqi students have studied in
France, usually for two to six months). Asked about
prospects for increased or new GoF assistance to Iraq, Sivan
claimed that Zebari did not press the issue, though the Iraqi
FM did stress the need to speed up the JUSTLEX program.



5. (C) Sivan confirmed that the two sides had discussed the
long-stalled GoF offer to train up to 1,500 Iraqi police in
France, though there were no breakthroughs. Sivan stressed
that the training offer remained on the table, and that
Zebari's visit hopefully would prompt movement on the Iraqi
side. At the same time, Sivan conceded that prior to the
Zebari visit, the GoF had rebuffed a proposed visit from an
Iraqi Vice Minister for Security to discuss the offer, based
on doubts about the official's competence and GoF inability
to secure ministerial level meetings. Sivan concluded that
the GoF wanted participant names from the GOI, not another
MOI delegation visit, to finalize the training. Poloff
questioned Sivan's dismissive attitude to the MOI follow-up
visit, and stressed the need to be responsive to Iraqi
training needs and work constructively with the ITG to
implement the offer. In press remarks, FM Zebari stressed
Iraqi readiness to accept the French training offer, and
suggested that the delay was on the French side, noting that
the ITG had sent senior officials and diplomatic notes to
discuss the training and in what country it might take place.
Asked about Zebari's suggestion that the French training
could take place somewhere other than France, Sivan
emphasized that the GoF training offer was intended to take
place in France only. (Comment: When France first floated the
training proposal in 2003, it left open the possibility that
training might take place somewhere in the region, outside
Iraq; this past year, GoF officials have increasingly
suggested that the training would be possible in France only
in the near term, with prospects for training in the region,
such as Qatar, much further down the road. End comment.)


6. (C) Sivan reported that Zebari and Douste-Blazy also
discussed Iraqi assets frozen by France, for which transfer
to the Development Fund to Iraq (DFI) requires new French
legislation. Sivan explained that the French Ministry of
Finance was on the verge of finalizing the draft legislation
for submission to the National Assembly, and conceded that
the progress had been slowed by interagency coordination.
Sivan added that the GoF had hoped to sign the bilateral
accord formalizing cancellation of Iraq's debt during
Zebari's visit, but was unable to do so. According to Sivan,
the agreement was "not quite ready" to be signed at the time
of Zebari's visit, but it would be finalized shortly, with
signature taking place within a few days.

HARSH CRITICISM OF SYRIA, BUT NOT IRAN
--------------


7. (C) Sivan was struck by the vehemence of Zebari's
criticism of Syria, which the Iraqi FM described as Iraq's
number one problem and the main source of terrorist
infiltration. Zebari stressed to Douste-Blazy that the SARG
harbored malicious intent towards Iraq and that it was not a
case of lack of Syrian capacity in securing its border.
Sivan reported that Zebari made an interesting comparison
between Syria and Iran, and posited that the SARG, based on
its hard-core Ba'thist character, was seeking to demolish the
political process in Iraq; Iran, by contrast, supported
Iraq's political process to the extent that it sought to
promote its political proxies within Iraq. In the end,
Zebari concluded that Iran wanted a stable Iraq, albeit one
susceptible to its influence, while Syria did not. Asked how
Douste-Blazy responded to Zebari on Syria, Sivan affirmed
that the French FM did not disagree with Zebari's assertions.
At the same time, the French FM stressed to Zebari that the
GoF remained insistent on Syrian compliance with UNSCR 1559,
"nothing more" than that, and that it would not use UNSCR
1559 as a weapon against Syria.

PRAISE FOR ZEBARI, CRITICISM OF HIS COLLEAGUES
-------------- -


8. (C) Sivan concluded by praising Zebari's effectiveness and
shrewdness as an interlocutor, which he viewed as an
exception among ITG ministers. He observed that Zebari's
presentation to the National Assembly foreign relations
committee impressed the audience of some 40 MP's, who, while
perhaps not totally convinced of his arguments, deferred to
his views on prospects for the political process and the need
for U.S. troop reductions to be conditions-based. Sivan
asserted that, in contrast, other ITG ministers who had
visited France in the past year, including the Ministers of
Culture and Education, had done a "disservice" to Iraq by the
ineptitude with which they handled meetings with the GoF. He
ascribed the situation to an overwhelming lack of capacity
within the ITG, where he asserted, with the exception of
Zebari, most ministries operated as personal fiefdoms of
incompetent ministers. Sivan expressed hope that formation
of Iraq's permanent government would herald a more competent
administrative corps, to which poloff stressed the need for
France to offer more help, on the ground, in building Iraqi
capacity.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton