SARKOZY'S SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSSES RECENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008088

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PTER FR PGOV
SUBJECT: SARKOZY'S SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSSES RECENT
UNREST, TERRORISM

REF: 11/18/2005 PARIS POINTS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, FOR REAS
ONS 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy's security
advisor, a 20-year plus veteran of the French National
Police, said the recent unrest had taken the security
establishment by surprise, but that the massive yet moderate
response of the police prevented a major crisis of public
order. Although he said the unrest had no direct link to
Islamic fundamentalism or terrorism, the security advisor,
Jean-Marc Berlioz, said that the GOF separately had stepped
up its surveillance and intelligence gathering presence in
mosques, prayer halls, halal butchers, North African tea
cafes, and prisons. End summary.

--------------
RECENT UNREST
--------------


2. (C) Inspector General of the National Police Jean-Marc
Berlioz told Poloff November 28 that many factors contributed
to the recent social unrest in Paris' suburbs and across
France, but that in general, integration and socio-economic
problems were the root causes. These issues were familiar to
the GOF, said Berlioz, although this specific unrest did come
as a surprise. He confirmed that orders had been given to
the more than 11,000 police dealing with the unrest not to
use lethal force, even if they were under attack. Berlioz
praised the restraint of the police. Cognizant of the need
to show moderation and firmness, police officials frequently
rotated and rested the forces on the street. Still, Berlioz
said "we were lucky" in that one shot by a policeman could
have provoked an aggravation of the unrest. Despite the fact
that more than 250 police were wounded, some very seriously,
the police exclusively used nonlethal force, said Berlioz.
In doing this, he said the police gave politicians room to
maneuver and respond.


3. (C) Police officials were also aware, said Berlioz, of the
need to demonstrate absolute control of the situation, not
only in order to dampen the violence but also to prevent the
emergence of vigilante groups. A massive police presence was
the primary way to demonstrate this control, said Berlioz.
When asked why a major city like Marseilles was spared the
unrest, Berlioz replied saying that it was by far the best
integrated of French cities. It was a port city, open to the
world, and despite persistent poverty, opportunity existed
there that did not in other cities.

--------------
GOF COUNTERTERRORISM
--------------


4. (C) The GOF's draft counterterrorism law was approved by
the National Assembly last week, with approval by the Senate
expected by the end of the year. Berlioz said political
fighting about the law was almost nonexistent. All sides
recognized that it was essential to reform certain aspects of
France's fight against terrorism. Primary reforms, said
Berlioz, include adding police capabilities to track
internet, cell phone and flight information. In addition, in
the aftermath of the June bombings in London, GOF officials
realized that France needed to vastly upgrade its video
surveillance of public areas. This necessitated changing
French privacy legislation. Berlioz would not rule out
additional legislation in coming months if the need arose.


5. (C) France has focused on improving its ability to target
and trace potential terrorists, said Berlioz, and the draft
legislation would help. In addition, French domestic
intelligence - primarily the DST and RG (both under the
control of the Ministry of Interior) - had stepped up its
surveillance of mosques, prayer halls, halal butchers (who
are seen as particularly linked to extremism),and North
African tea/waterpipe cafes. Another primary focus for the
GOF is the French prison system, which has served as a place
to recruit petty criminals into terrorist networks. Berlioz
said recent networks, including one linked to Iraq and
another led by GSPC sympathizer Safe Bourrada, had begun in
prison. Public measures to deal with this issue include
recruiting moderate imams to minister to the prison
population. Other, covert, measures include greater human
and technical surveillance of the prison population, said
Berlioz.


6. (C) Despite these new measures, the GOF remains
pessimistic regarding a possible terrorist attack, said
Berlioz. As an example, he cited the use of suicide bombers
in the London bombings. Security measures are essentially
based on a potential attacker's fear of dying, said Berlioz.
Take away that fear, and the person becomes nearly impossible
to stop. For this reason, it was essential that France
better develop its targeting and tracing capability. The
idea of when, not if, a terrorist attack would occur has also
spurred the GOF to work on increasing public awareness of
terrorist threats, said Berlioz. Traditionally, French
intelligence chiefs were never in the public eye. Interior
Minister Sarkozy changed this, said Berlioz, and told them
they needed to appear publicly and to give interviews, so
that the French public would grow accustomed to their
presence and the work of their agencies in dealing with the
terrorist threat. The GOF was impressed by the British
public's sangfroid during the July bombings, said Berlioz,
and it wanted to ensure that the French public was equally
prepared. (Note: As a demonstration of Sarkozy's decision,
in recent days Pascal Mailhos, the head of the RG, and Pierre
de Bousquet, the head of the DST, have given extensive press
interviews on the threat of terrorism. They have cited,
among other issues, the role of Iraq in global jihadism, the
threat of Islamist recruitment in French prisons, and the
threat posed by the GSPC terrorist group. End note)


7. (C) Berlioz added that Iraq has taken the place of
Afghanistan and Chechnya as a focal point for global
jihadism. One difference, said Berlioz, was that jihadists
engaged in combat in Iraq generally do not return to their
home countries. Those who went to Afghanistan were less
likely to engage in combat, preferring to attend training
camps before returning home. There was therefore a greater
potential for Afghanistan veterans to form sleeper cells in
their native countries, said Berlioz. (Note: Another
difference noted by French C/T professionals is that the time
between conversion to extremist thought and action has become
extremely short, making it more difficult for police and
intelligence services to uncover new cells formed to send
jihadists to Iraq and/or to plan attacks on French soil.
(reftel) End note.)
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton