FRANCE: HSPD-6 TERRORIST LOOKOUT SHARING PROSPECTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008062

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR CA/VO/BIP-NEGAH ANGHA, INR/IC-JOSIE PAPENDICK,
NCTC/TIG-DAVID WIGMORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015
TAGS: PTER CVIS CASC PGOV PREL PINR FR EUN
SUBJECT: FRANCE: HSPD-6 TERRORIST LOOKOUT SHARING PROSPECTS

REF: A) STATE 126313 B)173539

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION KARL HOFMANN FOR REASONS 1.4 (b)
(c) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Agencies at post involved in our productive
and extensive counterterrorism dialogue with the French have
considered HSPD-6 requirements to explore obtaining terrorist
watchlist information. We consider it highly unlikely the
GOF would consent to unilateral sharing of its watchlist data
with us; any successful U.S. approach would have to be
reciprocal. Our primary dialogue with the French on
watchlist issues has been over the No-Fly list, and France,s
cooperation on No-Fly issues--vital to our interests--comes
with many strings attached. Any broader watchlist sharing
effort would need to protect that vital cooperation.
Finally, post is interested in Washington agencies, response
to the draft proposal by the TSC Director to offer the French
a sample watchlist exchange of 200 names for purposes of
comparison. Such a proposal would, we think, be
well-received by the GOF and could provide useful insight
into issues that the GOF might raise in a broader watchlist
exchange exercise. END SUMMARY


2. (S/NF) Agencies and offices active in terrorist lookout
issues at post, (including Legatt, RMAS, Econ, Pol, Consular,
TSA, and ICE),have consulted on HSPD-6 per reftels. We

SIPDIS
believe that the GOF would be open to sharing watchlist
information, subject to passage of anti-terrorist legislation
currently under consideration (expected by late-December) and
resolution of ongoing data privacy law concerns. The French
services are very circumspect about the details of how their
data is organized, but we can assume they have databases of
known or suspected terrorists that they could share with us.
It is extremely unlikely that they would agree to do so on
other than a reciprocal basis. Defining reciprocity will be
particularly challenging, since they already receive our
No-Fly list, and question both the list,s size and the
quality of information on which many entries are based.


3. (S/NF) Our primary contacts on watchlist issues have
emerged from the convoluted arrangements developed at GOF
insistence to implement the No-Fly Emergency Amendment. TSA
provides the No-Fly list to the French Border Police (PAF)
and to Air France, and notifies both GOF authorities and the
airline when APIS data detects name-matches. When necessary,
detailed intelligence on watchlist matches is passed by
either Legatt or RMAS to the Direction de la Surveillance du
Territoire (DST),an Interior Ministry office equivalent to
the FBI. Emboffs also maintain a continuing dialogue on
watchlist screening with the Secreteriat Generale de la
Defense Nationale (SGDN),the Prime Minister,s interagency
coordinating body for defense and counter-terrorism.


4. (S/NF) We expect the DST is likely to be interested in
sharing watchlist information, with an eye toward spotting
French citizens or residents who might be of concern. A
similar arrangement has already been established with the UK,
with what we understand to be positive results so far.
(Note: Post would appreciate details on how this arrangement
has worked.) However, any proposal will also have to protect
existing cooperation with the French on No-Fly
implementation, and to take GOF skepticism about the size and
inclusiveness of both the No-Fly and Selectee lists into
account.


5. (C) The GOF would probably be reluctant to share names of
French citizens or residents with us without clearly defined
and mutually agreed upon criteria for inclusion or exclusion
from our watchlists, and may argue that sharing data raises
legal or privacy protection issues. We are also concerned
that the GOF could use expanded information sharing as
leverage for requesting underlying intelligence about names
included on our lists, especially those of French citizens
and residents. Any additional information they receive could
be used to highlight the issue of why names are included or
excluded from the No-Fly and Selectee lists. We should also
expect that they will at some point propose joint-vetting of
names or development of a common watchlist.


6. (SBU) Following the visit of TSC Director Donna Bucella in
October, Legatt received a draft TSC proposal for sharing 200
names at random on a trial basis with the DST, to be used
exclusively for comparison and evaluation rather than
operational purposes. Post believes this could be a
worthwhile limited next step that has the potential to
demonstrate how watchlist sharing could help both sides plug
gaps in their knowledge, and is likely to be well-received by
the French. It could provide a much-needed opportunity to
demonstrate the effectiveness of our watchlist scrub and the
seriousness of the information underlying entries on our
list. It could also provide useful insight into how the GOF
might handle any larger watchlist sharing arrangement.


7. (SBU) Post understands that TSC is actively polling
Washington agencies on the above proposal. We would be
interested in hearing reactions, as well as any suggestions
agencies have on how such a proposal can be crafted so as to
avoid our being drawn into unproductive discussions with the
GOF on No-Fly issues.


8. (SBU) Post regrets delay in responding to reftels.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton