Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS8029
2005-11-25 14:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

NATO - FRENCH STILL RETICENT ON USE OF NAC-R

Tags:  PREL MARR FR NATO EUN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008029 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR FR NATO EUN
SUBJECT: NATO - FRENCH STILL RETICENT ON USE OF NAC-R

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 B/D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008029

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR FR NATO EUN
SUBJECT: NATO - FRENCH STILL RETICENT ON USE OF NAC-R

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: On November 21, MOD Strategic Affairs officer
Colonel Creux provided a very positive readout of Strategic
Affairs Director Jean Ponton d'Amecourt's October 31 meetings
at the Pentagon, the NSC, and the Department. While
outstanding issues remain with the Pentagon, most notably the
French request for more frequent senior-level contacts and
for the signing of a Declaration of Principles, Ponton
d'Amecourt left with a sense that progress was possible. In
discussing the extension of the Afghanistan Oplan at NATO and
French resistance to discussions on the Middle East at a
reinforced NAC (NAC-R),Creux volunteered that France did not
believe the Middle East, Korea and other such "political"
issues should be raised at the NAC-R. While holding informal
discussions at NATO on such issues was acceptable, NAC-R
meetings risked leading to new NATO initiatives for which the
alliance had neither sufficient resources nor the funds. End
Summary.

MOD Alliot-Marie to the U.S. in 2006
--------------


2. (C) Colonel Creux, responsible for NATO/ESDP, provided
pol/miloff with a brief readout of MOD's Strategic Affairs
Director's Ponton d'Amecourt's October 31-November 1
consultations at DOD, State and the NSC. He said Ponton
d'Amecourt was very satisfied with his introductory calls in
Washington, especially with the level of access he enjoyed
and the warm welcome extended by all. At the Pentagon, he
met with U/S for Policy Eric Edelman and Principal Director
for Europe and NATO James Townsend. Ponton d'Amecourt
welcomed the improved ties with the Pentagon, which had
suffered as a result of differences over Iraq, but have since
been improving. Ponton d'Amecourt would welcome reciprocal
DOD visits to Paris, Creux added. Ponton d'Amecourt observed
that differences on certain issues still remained, especially
with regard to the unfulfilled French request for the signing
of a Declarations of Principles with the U.S. Creux said the
MOD understood the U.S. position that a Declaration of
Principles was not essential to the relationship, however, it

was difficult to understand why the U.S. was prepared to sign
Declaration of Principles with other European countries, but
not with France.


3. (C) Creux stated that Ponton d'Amecourt planned to visit
the U.S. on a periodic basis. His next trip would be in
February 2006, when he planned to be in Washington, but also
would include stops at ACT command, JFCOM, and at the UN.
Ponton d'Amecourt also expected to accompany Defense Minister
Alliot-Marie later in the spring to the U.S. A potential
March 2006 date is under consideration for the Minister's
trip.

NAC-R and non-defense issues
--------------


4. (C) Turning to current issues at NATO, pol/miloff queried
Creux as to French objections to the proposed wording of the
Afghanistan Oplan under discussion at NATO, noting that it
was important not to re-open the Oplan in order to move
forward before the December NATO ministerial. Creux
confirmed that France had that very morning agreed on the
latest proposal worked out among the U.S., French, and other
PermReps. (Note: Several days earlier, Creux's counterpart
at the MFA, Francois Carrel-Billiard, stressed that France
wanted to settle this issue expeditiously, and definitely
before the December ministerial.)


5. (C) We also queried Creux on French objections to NAC-R
discussions on the Middle East and French unwillingness to
send Paris representation. Creux said the NAC-R issue was
only part of a broader problem. France, he noted, believes
that a fundamental problem at NATO is that Alliance members
are not carrying their weight in terms of force contributions
and financial commitments. This made it difficult to
understand why the U.S. sought to expand discussions to new
areas and/or operations. France, he added, did not object to
informal discussions at NATO on the Middle East, Korea or any
other issue. The problem with the NAC-R is that, in that
forum, following a presentation, pressure builds for NATO to
respond to a perceived need and/or to initiate new operations
without a corresponding assessment of resources available.
Many Alliance members are unwilling or unable to contribute,
he claimed, forcing a core group of members to bear the
increasingly heavy costs. He cited the U.S., Germany, the
U.K., Italy and France as among those countries. We need to
fix this problem at NATO, he asserted, as France values NATO
highly and does not want to see it hampered by an inability
to meet its obligations. When poloff insisted on the
importance of ensuring that NATO also remains a forum for
political dialog, Colonel Creux said France would continue to
have problems with the NAC-R as an appropriate format.

6. (C) Creux cited proposals at NATO for expanding the use of
common funding as an unsatisfactory means of addressing the
unwillingness of certain Alliance members to carry their fair
share. Additionally, Creux noted that the reluctance of some
Alliance members to speak up gave the appearance that France
was isolated in its objectives. France is not happy in this
role, but it will continue to voice its concerns at NATO, he
emphasized.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Colonel Creux echoed comments we have heard recently
at the MFA against expanding the range of topics for
discussion at the NAC-R. Creux sought to avoid framing
French objections as a "theological debate," arguing that
France is driven by a concern for NATO's stretched resources.
France's own commitments, with some 35,000 personnel
deployed overseas, are stretching its own defense budget and
fuel French objections.

8. (C) Given France's history of attempting to restrict
NATO's focus to security issues, it is difficult to accept
that that the French are driven only by a genuine wish for
reform rather than the desire to contain NATO in the interest
of building up Europe's own defense forces (ESDP). The
diminished resource argument equally applies to the EU and
NATO, given the Europeans' inadequate expenditures on
defense. It would be interesting to know whether France
expresses the same concerns about burdensharing, and attempts
to limit the range of the agenda, in EU discussions of global
security concerns and potential action under ESDP. End
Comment.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton