FRENCH THINK TANKER ON VISIT TO IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007920

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014
TAGS: PREL FR MNUC IR PINR KNUP
SUBJECT: FRENCH THINK TANKER ON VISIT TO IRAN

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: French think-tanker Francois Gere, who
claims to have extensive ties to the local Iranian Embassy as
well as the Quai and Israeli Embassy met with us November 18
to report on his recent trip to the Isfahan nuclear facility
at the Iranian government's invitation. Gere -- who many
would say is too close to the Iranians -- is a tireless
proponent and would-be initiator of dialogue between Iran and
the U.S. Gere described a less-than-sophisticated but
sustained and enthusiastic effort by Iran to acquire a
nuclear weapons capability within the next 10-15 years, which
might or might not proceed to the actual production of
nuclear weapons. Gere viewed Iranian President
Ahmadi-Nejad's statement on Israel as a part of an internal
power struggle. He cautioned against viewing reformist
minded (at least in appearance) Iranians as "pro-American."
We see Gere as an apologist for the Iranians, but report his
observations for what they are worth. End Summary.


2. (C) In a November 18 meeting with Deputy Polcouns, Gere
had just returned from a trip to Isfahan and said he was
granted access to the site. He likened the workers -- with
their long hair, jeans, and no beards, to young Americans
between 25 and 30 years of age. He said the Iranian nuclear
program presented a huge technological challenge, and
compared it to France's own practice, when it embarked on
developing its own nuclear weapons nearly fifty years ago, to
hire young scientists. (The older ones, many of whom were
Communist sympathizers, refused to work on the program.)
Despite the young scientists' relative inexperience, Gere
said the Iranian government was providing them with the
resources they needed so that the program could forge ahead.


3. (C) Gere said it was nonetheless slow going: the Isfahan
facility is not yet completely finished, and Iran has had
difficulties, for example in acquiring the kind of
high-quality specialized steel it wanted. Germany had
refused, and the U.S. had intervened with China to the same
effect. He speculated that Iran was now manufacturing the
steel itself or perhaps acquiring it from countries like
Pakistan. Even though Iran broke the IAEA seals to resume
the production of gas from uranium cake, Gere said there were
cameras everywhere to monitor the actual production,
including in unnecessary places. Gere judged that the
Iranians would not be in a position to produce nuclear
weapons for another 10-15 years.


4. (C) Gere characterized President Ahmadi-Nejad's comments
on Israel as intended primarily for internal consumption: a
provocation reflecting internal power struggles and the
desire of a younger generation to take over from the old.
Gere maintained that, while it was clear Iran wanted to have
the capability to produce nuclear weapons should it choose to
do so, this did not necessarily mean that Iran intended to
proceed to actual production. (Deputy Polcouns took the line
that the history of Iranian deceptions provided no basis for
such a willfully benign interpretation.) He pushed for
dialogue as the only means of persuading the Iranians not to
develop a nuclear weapons capability, including "informal"
meetings initially between Iranian and U.S. think-tankers.
The departing Iranian ambassador here had told him, he
claimed, that such meetings were still possible despite the
apparent hardening of the regime. Gere conceded the point
that the emergence of a harder-line regime would seem to make
dialogue even less likely and more difficult than before, but
he insisted that such a dialogue nonetheless remained
possible.


5. (C) Asked how young Iranians were reacting to the regime,
Gere divided them into three groups: the masses people in the
country who were often illiterate and easily manipulated by
the regime; hard-liners in the cities who were the vanguard
of the Republican Guard; and those who were fed up with
clerical rule and longed for a more normal life (i.e., to
wear blue jeans and make-up). On the latter group, in
response to mention of newspaper articles suggesting that
many Iranian youth were pro-American, Gere said it would be a
mistake to equate a desire for a more universal youth
lifestyle with pro-Americanism. He nonetheless found his
reception by average Iranians, where he was hospitably
treated and invited to tea despite being an obvious
Westerner, far preferable to the harassment he said he would
likely encounter in Yemen or Saudi Arabia under similar
circumstances.


6. (C) Comment: Francois Gere, President of the Institut
Francais d'Analyse Strategique (IFAS),is well known to
Embassy and is one of many opinion leaders -- Thierry
Montbriand of IFRI, Alexander Adler of "Le Figaro," Francois
Heisbourg of the Foundation for Strategic Research -- in
regular contact with the Iranians here. Gere has insisted
that he consults regularly with the Israelis and Quai
officials on Iran; indeed, Deputy Polcouns ran into him in
the lobby of the MFA before scheduling this latest meeting.
We see Gere as an apologist for the Iranians, but report his
observations for what they are worth. One well-informed MFA
contact informally cautioned that Gere is too close to the
Iranians, does not have much credibility among GoF
disarmament specialists, and implied that we should also be
careful with Gere's information. That said, there is also
some evidence that the GoF values his insights; Gere was
recently awarded the Legion d'Honneur and now sports a natty
red bar on his lapel. End comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton