THE FRENCH INTEGRATION MODEL: GOING UP IN SMOKE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007682

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KISL SOCI ELAB FR
SUBJECT: THE FRENCH INTEGRATION MODEL: GOING UP IN SMOKE?

REF: A. PARIS 7599

B. PARIS 7525

C. EMBASSY PARIS SIPRNET DAILY REPORT FOR NOV 9 AND
PREVIOUS
(WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.CFM)

Classified By: POL/MC Josiah Rosenblatt, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and Comment: Continuing violent unrest in
France -- only now diminishing after thirteen intense days --
has very publicly brought to light the ugly reality of
France's persistent failure to integrate its immigrant
population. Importantly, the violence has not taken on
religious overtones, nor have mainstream (or, as far as we
can detect, underground extremist) Muslim groups sought to
manipulate the situation to their own advantage. Indeed, the
Muslim establishment has been actively trying to calm the
unrest. The government response -- to reestablish order
while exercising restraint and to promise to address the
underlying issues of unemployment, education, and family
breakdown -- seems to be working for the moment. But any
longer-term solutions will depend on successfully tackling
the underlying issue of social exclusion -- in particular,
employment discrimination. This is likely to prove a
difficult challenge for any government given France's slow
economic growth and chronic unemployment problems. Changing
deep-seated attitudes will also be a daunting challenge.
Failure could push a largely unpoliticized minority
underclass to embrace the Islamic political extremism the
French fear most. End Summary and Comment.

Where We Are Now
--------------

2. (SBU) Images of rampaging youth hurling Molotov cocktails
and defying French authorities have gripped France for the
past thirteen days. Although France is accustomed to a
certain level of violence (prior to the unrest, the country
averaged 80 car burnings daily),the numbers to date are
staggering: some 300 towns affected since the onset of
unrest, more than 6,600 cars burned, nearly 1,800 individuals
taken in for questioning, 11,500 police and gendarmes
deployed, and over 100 security agents injured. In response
to the violence, the GoF has invoked emergency measures used
only twice since their enactment fifty years ago, during the
war in Algeria. On the first night of the law's application,
curfews were implemented in parts of 25 different departments
and appear to have had some success. There were 617 cars
reported burned, 280 arrests, and violence reported in 196
towns overnight, as opposed to the 1,173 vehicles attacked,
330 people taken in for questioning, and 226 communities
reporting unrest the night before. Press reports indicate
that the suburbs ringing Paris were notably quieter November
8 in comparison with past nights.

What the Violence is Not
--------------

3. (C) The destruction of both public and private property
has been enormous and often self-defeating, as the youths
have targeted their own schools and gyms or their neighbors'
vehicles. But it has fallen short of full-scale riots. The
perpetrators have generally not sought out open
confrontations with state security agents, with the notable
exception of a birdshot attack November 6 that wounded 10
police and hospitalized two. Similarly, casualties have been
relatively limited. One youth lost a hand in a confrontation
with police. One bystander was killed after being punched by
a youth, and there have been a few instances of other
injuries, primarily during attacks on vehicles.


4. (C) Nor has the unrest taken on the tone of an intifada,
despite the fact that a large portion of those responsible
for the violence are of Muslim background. In fact, Muslim
groups have played positive roles in trying to quell the
violence. During the first weekend of unrest, a tear gas
canister landed in a mosque, sending some 700 worshipers
fleeing. While some of the perpetrators used the incident to
justify their actions, the leadership of the mosque and many
of the worshippers there have downplayed the event in French
and international media and actively circulated among the
youth to act as mediators. The fundamentalist Union for
Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF) issued a fatwa
November 6 condemning the violence as un-Islamic.


5. (C) For the moment, the unrest is not viewed as
specifically Muslim. The French media, and French commentary
generally -- and perhaps deliberately -- identify those
involved as "minority" youth, sometimes specified as Arab
(North African) or Black (Sub-Saharan). Rarely are they
classed as "Muslim." The issue is seen as a problem of
disaffected ethnic minorities, not a local playing out of a
clash of civilizations between Muslims and the West. That
said, the GoF has alluded to the potential that radical
elements may yet seek to use the unrest to try to further
nefarious aims. Some commentators see the mediating role
being played by Islamic organizations itself as a possible
cause for concern.

The French "Way" Questioned
--------------

6. (C) The recent upheaval has raised many questions within
France about its "unitary" (as opposed to multicultural)
integration model, as well as the social inequalities and
racism that exist in French society. Although many --
particularly on the left -- have been quick to blame the
current government, it is clear that the unrest playing out
throughout France today is the result of decades of neglect
by governments of both the left and right. The role that
France's generous social welfare system may have played in
fueling the discontent has also come under scrutiny. In many
of the areas most affected by the violence, there exist
scores of state-subsidized, long-term unemployed (Villepin
cited 57,000 in a nationally televised interview November 7)
who are provided enough money to survive, but no real
incentive to seek gainful employment.


7. (C) Many of the youth are products of homes where the
primary breadwinner is among the long-term unemployed. For
other young men, there has been a breakdown in the family
structure. But the real problem is the failure of white and
Christian France to view their darker, Muslim compatriots as
real citizens. The cumulative effect has been the creation
of a generation of young males lacking parental control and
unequipped to secure and hold a job, even if they could break
through the formidable barriers of prejudice faced by young
Arabs and young blacks in particular.

Possible Political Ramifications
--------------

8. (C) Nor did the French government do a good job of
managing the situation. With an eye to the 2007 presidential
elections, Prime Minister de Villepin and Interior Minister
Sarkozy initially tried to manipulate the unrest to
individual political advantage. President Chirac was
conspicuous by his unusual silence. Only belatedly did
Villepin and Sarkozy put their differences aside and present
a common front. Villepin's decision to invoke curfew powers
has been criticized by some in the opposition as an
overreaction, but an initial poll indicates that 73 percent
of those polled agree with the hard line.


9. (C) It is impossible at this time to predict with any
precision the long-term political repercussions of the
violence, including with regard to the 2007 presidential
elections. It is also too early to know what effect, if any,
the events will have on the political activism of the
disaffected immigrant population or what steps the government
is prepared to take to give minority groups more of a
political voice. At present, the immigrant community is
vastly underrepresented in all parties and barely represented
at all in official positions, from the mayoral through
parliamentary and ministerial ranks in the French political
spectrum.

Comment
--------------

10. (C) The dimensions and persistence of the unrest -- and
the depth of the frustration reflected by it -- largely
blindsided France's political class, which is generally
regarded as being far-removed from the lives and experiences
of ordinary people. That said, the government response -- to
focus on re-establishing order while scrupulously avoiding
excessive police violence, and to promise effective
engagement to better social conditions -- appears initially
to be working. The nightly violence is decreasing, both as
police enforce newly authorized curfews in selected areas and
as local government and citizens mobilize to defend their
communities.


11. (C) While this approach may prove successful in quelling
the current wave of unrest, sporadic incidents of car
burnings and clashes with police are likely to persist. The
youths perpetrating the violence and vandalism -- and the
criminal groups that in some cases are manipulating them --
are present in every poor suburb, and no amount of policing
will preventively keep them completely in check. While
responsible leaders across the political spectrum agree that
France must do more to integrate its more recent immigrants,
agreeing is not the same as doing. The recent wave of unrest
has publicly and embarrassingly exposed France's deep social
inequalities, reminding the broader public of the persistence
of France's large, probably growing underclass (estimated at
4.7 million by Social Affairs Minister Borloo).


12. (C) Once calm returns, the GoF will be expected to
follow through on promised reforms to address the underlying
issues that have fueled the unrest. But unless there is some
measurable amelioration of the structural unemployment,
societal discrimination, and widening gulf between mainstream
French society and the people of the suburban projects, the
nightly violence will continue to simmer just below the
surface and will recurrently boil over. The challenge is
enormous for the government, given France's slow economic
growth and chronic unemployment. Any job creation program is
likely to focus on inefficient public-sector programs that do
nothing to empower the private sector and provide incentives
to the unemployed. It will also be a challenge to change
deeply ingrained negative attitudes towards non-white
immigrants. However, not to make the effort would squander a
crucial opportunity to significantly enhance the well-being
and prospects of a disaffected Muslim underclass before it
becomes politically radicalized. End Comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton