Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS7675
2005-11-09 16:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAN: REMAIN FIRM, DON'T

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV IR FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007675 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAN: REMAIN FIRM, DON'T
ISOLATE, AND KEEP DOOR TO DIALOGUE OPEN

REF: A. PARIS 7597


B. PARIS 7398

C. STATE 199225

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007675

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAN: REMAIN FIRM, DON'T
ISOLATE, AND KEEP DOOR TO DIALOGUE OPEN

REF: A. PARIS 7597


B. PARIS 7398

C. STATE 199225

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: MFA DAS-equivalent for Iran/Iraq
Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan assessed the Ahmadi-Nejad
government as weakened by internal debate within Iran and
lacking competence and experience, during a recent discussion
with us. Sivan speculated that Ahmadi-Nejad's recent
statements on Israel were intended to curry domestic support,
and had attracted criticism from within the Iranian
government, in addition to international condemnation. While
Sivan affirmed the need for the international community to
remain firm and vigilant with respect to Iran, he warned that
further isolation of Iran could galvanize Iranian public
support for hard-liners, as well as result in a dangerous GOI
backlash. Although Sivan expressed personal doubts over
immediate referral of Iran to the UNSC, we do not see him as
a player on the Iran EU-3 issue. In response to our raising
a long list of Iranian government transgressions, Sivan
asserted that the GoF regularly and firmly raised human
rights cases with the Iranian government. We see Sivan's
comments as indicative of the MFA's general cautionary
approach and similar to MFA arguments against further
isolation of Syria. End summary and comment.


2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Antoine Sivan briefly addressed
Iran developments with poloff during a November 4,
Iraq-focused discussion (ref a). Asked to assess the
increasingly extremist policy line taken by the Ahmadi-Nejad
government, Sivan described the Ahmadi-Nejad government as
incompetent in many respects and lacking governing
experience. In Sivan's view, "no one" had expected
Ahmadi-Nejad's election, which he viewed as the result of
populist dissatisfaction with the ruling class and hard-line
support for the former Tehran mayor's candidacy. Sivan added
that there appeared to be a great internal debate and
shifting political alliances within Iran, which, while not
yet at the level of an internal crisis, had weakened the

Ahmadi-Nejad government, resulting in its "feverish"
behavior. Commenting on the recent global recall of Iranian
ambassadors, including Ambassador to France Sadegh Kharazi,
Sivan cited Kharazi as emblematic of the debate going on
within Iran, noting that the Iranian ambassador had, in
recent encounters with the GoF, hinted at his lack of
enthusiasm for the points his capital had instructed him to
deliver.


3. (C) Sivan dismissed Ahmadi-Nejad's recent statements on
Israel as "stupid" and worthy of international condemnation.
At the same time, he speculated that the Iranian president's
remarks were largely for domestic Iranian consumption, in
order to play to his ultra-nationalist base and attract
greater public support, particularly from conservative
students hostile toward Israel. Sivan added that many within
Iran, including figures within the government (NFI),had
denounced Ahmadi-Nejad's remarks for further isolating Iran.
By concentrating all power in the hands of the
ultra-religious, the Iranian government was being confronted
by its own contradictions and showing that it was ill-suited
to adapt to current realities. In Sivan's view, we should
let this internal Iranian debate run its course and let
Iranians seek changes from inside.


4. (C) Sivan concluded that the international community,
while remaining firm and vigilant with respect to Iranian
behavior, should not seek increased isolation of Iran, which
he described as the worst solution and likely to galvanize
support for Ahmadi-Nejad and his ultra-nationalist base. The
more Iran became isolated, the more dangerous it would
become; for this reason, he reasoned, the international
community must keep the door of dialogue open to Tehran. In
this context, Sivan said he was personally unsure whether
immediate referral to the Security Council on the nuclear
issue was a good idea, as it could further rally domestic
support for the GoI.


5. (C) Poloff questioned Sivan's reasoning, and asserted that
Iran's behavior across the board -- on the nuclear file,
supporting terrorism, threatening Israel's existence, and
suppressing its people -- was isolating it from the
international community, not the other way around. Poloff
cited President Chirac's public condemnation of
Ahmadi-Nejad's Israel remarks, in which the French president
described Iran as at risk of "banishing" itself from the
international community (ref b). Sivan conceded these
points, and said that there were ultra-conservatives within
Iran who wanted a confrontation with the West to boost their
own domestic standing, though most Iranians didn't want this
option. For this reason, the EU-3 would work to keep the
door to dialogue open, without losing face, and would seek to
bring Iran back in compliance with the Paris agreement, in
close cooperation with the U.S., Russia and others. He
asserted further that the GoF was remaining firm with Iran on
human rights, and had delivered periodic, tough messages to
the GOI on prisoner cases, including Akbar Ganji. He added
that the GoF had received appeals from Iranian human rights
activists, including Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, urging
France and other European governments not to let Iranian
prisoners of conscience be forgotten by the West.


6. (C) Comment: We note that Sivan is not a leading player on
the Iran EU-3 issue, which is handled by the MFA Strategic
Affairs Directorate and MFA Political Director Laboulaye.
His warnings of not isolating Iran are typical of the French
MFA's cautionary mindset in general, and are similar to MFA
arguments against further isolation of Syria. We also note
that the GoF has continued to publicly condemn the
Ahmadi-Nejad Israel remarks, most recently during a November
3 National Assembly appearance by FM Douste-Blazy, in which
he also reaffirmed that Iran must suspend its nuclear
activities or face referral to the UNSC. End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton