FRENCH REACTION TO DEMARCHE FOR EU GAERC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007521

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014
TAGS: PREL FR EAID BO KPAL IZ SY YI EAGR MK ETRD EUN
SUBJECT: FRENCH REACTION TO DEMARCHE FOR EU GAERC

REF: A. STATE 198361


B. STATE 201513

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (SBU) Deputy Political Minister-Counselor met November 3
with MFA Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP unit deputy
director Pascal Le Deunff to receive an informed French
reaction to ref A and B demarches for the November 7 meeting
of EU foreign ministers. The points were also shared with
European Directorate DAS-equivalent Caroline Ferrari. Le
Deunff limited his remarks to foreign policy issues within
his brief.


2. (C) Balkans: Le Deunff said new UN envoy Martti
Ahtissari would join the lunch and saw general agreement
among Contact Group countries on policy guidelines toward
Kosovo, notwithstanding some remaining Russian reservations.
Noting that Ahtissari would have only a single deputy (i.e.,
no NATO or EU deputy),Le Deunff commented that EU-Ahtissari
coordination still needed to be worked out. France was in
favor of allowing him enough flexibility to negotiate; at the
same time, he would have to take note of EU positions. Given
the important incentive represented by European integration,
the EU would insist on being involved; there would be "no
repetition of Aceh," where Ahtissari acted independently.
Asked about Serbia, Le Deunff said EU integration was also an
important incentive in dealing with Belgrade; like Russia,
France also hoped to use its traditionally good relations
with Serbia to advance the final status process.


3. (C) Iran: Le Deunff said France saw a need for continued
firmness on the nuclear issue, human rights, Israel (in light
of the Iranian President's recent statements),and the Middle
East Peace Process (not further specified). The GOF still
hoped Iran would re-engage in negotiations and saw the
upcoming November 24 IAEA BOG meeting as the next milepost.
The GOF, he said, was not yet prepared to refer Iran to the
UNSC, although it believed it was important to keep up the
pressure on Iran and give Iran the sense that UNSC referral
was approaching.


4. (C) Syria-Lebanon: Le Deunff said the EU's conclusions
document on the Mehlis report and next steps was still under
discussion. France wished to maintain pressure on Syria to
cooperate in the investigation of the Hariri assassination.
Le Deunff was emphatic that France would focus in Brussels on
the Mehlis investigation and restoration of Lebanese
sovereignty, and not Syria's role with respect to terrorist
infiltration into Iraq. That said, France would not object
to a general call for Syrian cooperation with its neighbors.
(Note: UK Embassy counterparts informed us that the French EU
delegation in Brussels has objected to any mention of Iraq or
Syrian support for Palestinian rejectionists in the Syria
portion of the draft November 7 GAERC declaration. End
note.) Asked about the UK invitation to President Asad to
attend the Barcelona summit (see also para 5 on Iraq),Le
Deunff said Syrian participation was "legitimate" and that
Asad therefore could not be disinvited, even if he was not
welcome. Moreover, at this juncture there were no UN
sanctions being imposed on Syria, which should not be equated
with Burma or Zimbabwe. Chirac would not seek a meeting with
Asad, but Le Deunff conjectured that, if Asad sought contact
with him, Chirac would speak frankly.


5. (C) Iraq: Le Deunff did not expect much discussion
beyond a general welcoming of the results of the
constitutional referendum and a reiteration of EU programs to
support stabilization and reconstruction, including JUSTLEX.
Asked whether EU election monitoring for the December 15
elections was under consideration, Le Deunff said the
security situation would rule out it out (as with the
referendum). Le Deunff expressed France's extreme
displeasure over the UK Presidency's decision to invite the
Iraqi FM to attend the Barcelona Summit as an observer, given
that Iraq was not part of the Barcelona process or the
Mediterranean. France, he said, planned to take up with the
British at the GAERC.


6. (C) MEPP: Le Deunff stressed EU efforts to support
Wolfensohn and Ward and to help the Palestinians "take
control of the street," to which France favored reinforcing
the UK-led EU policing mission beginning January 1 with an
additional 30 experts. The EU hoped to assist the
Palestinians in reorganizing their security apparatus. Le
Deunff said the EU was also preparing a support mission for
the Gaza-Egypt border at Rafah, with which he said Israel
agreed in principle. He emphasized that the EU's role should
go beyond mere observation or monitoring to include a
third-party "good offices" dimension that would allow the EU
to serve as a mediator if necessary. Discussions with the
Israelis and Palestinians, he said, would begin starting
November 7.

7. (C) Belarus: Le Deunff said the EU would warn Lukashenko
against human rights abuses in advance of the 2006 elections.
He said the EU was prepared to move to additional sanctions;
nothing was specifically under consideration, but nor was
anything specifically excluded. The EU, he said, would
support an OSCE observation mission for the elections. He
expressed satisfaction that the existence of an opposition
candidate and said the EU would continue to work with the
U.S. and Russia toward finding the best possible outcome.
Asked specifically about the idea of not recognizing
Lukashenko's election, Le Deunff did not exclude the
possibility but thought such action premature; France
preferred to see how things went at the time of the elections.


8. (C) CFSP: Deputy PolCouns asked whether Le Deunff
sensed, in the wake of French and Dutch rejection of the EU
constitutional treaty, an increased EU emphasis on using CFSP
and ESDP to advance European integration. Le Deunff
responded that this was definitely the case and that the
French and Dutch had not voted against CFSP or ESDP. He
cited European polls that showed that most Europeans wanted
the EU to have a larger role on the international stage. He
cited two obstacles that needed to be overcome in the
immediate future, one institutional and the other financial.
On the first, France was interested in finding new ways to
reinforce Solana's position within the existing treaties. On
the second, CFSP currently had a budget of only 60 million
euros, which needed to be raised to about 300 million. Le
Deunff claimed that ministers at the EU informal summit at
Hampton Court had approved a larger role for Solana, and had
responded positively to Solana's call for an increased budget.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton