UNGA-SC FRICTION FESTERING, FRENCH WARN A/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 007461

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO SU FR UNSC UNGA
SUBJECT: UNGA-SC FRICTION FESTERING, FRENCH WARN A/S
SILVERBERG

REF: A. PARIS 7305 B. STATE 199305

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas

ons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: A/S Silverberg, joined by DCM and
PolMinCounselor, met with IO A/S-Equivalent Ripert and a
French IO team October 25 for an exchange of views on UN
reform. Ripert urged the U.S. to stake out a more visible
position on the Peace Building Commission and to lay down
"red lines," though he thought reform would require a package
deal. Without concessions on the PBC, he worried that the
reform process was turning irremediably into an UNGA
confrontation with the Security Council. He worried that the
draft Swiss UNGA resolution to revise SC procedures, if
tabled, would close the door on SC enlargement by shifting
the debate. IO PDAS-Equivalent Lacroix believed the
stalemate on SC enlargement was eroding momentum generally on
UN reform. Lacroix said the UN Secretariat needed quickly to
pony up its proposals on management reform to galvanize the
process. Ripert defended 5th Committee efforts to register
displeasure that the Capital Master Plan would not be
financed by an interest-free loan, maintaining France, too,
shared responsibilities as a Host Country to a UN body.


2. (C) At a separate luncheon meeting, IO DAS-Equivalent for
Human Rights Le Fraper reported EU agreement that a new Human
Rights Council (HRC) should be a standing body; however, the
EU had not reached a position on election criteria. There was
a preference for "positive" criteria, though "negative"
exclusionary criteria also remained a possibility. Ripert
insisted Geneva be the seat of the HRC. Le Fraper argued
that the HRC, once launched, should make a clean break with
the Human Rights Commission. Ripert urged U.S. attendance at
a February 2006 ministerial at which France and others would
launch the International Airplane Ticket surcharge to promote
funding on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. He presented
a case for a "light" and "flexible" UN Environmental Agency
in lieu of UNEP in order to coordinate relevant UN
activities. Discussion of Syria-Lebanon in reftel. End
Summary.

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PBC Faltering, U.S. Must Speak Up
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3. (C) A/S Silverberg expressed concern that UNGA President
Eliasson's road-map for UN reform risked losing momentum on
management reform and on remaking the Human Rights Council by
suggesting that progress on those issues could happen only
after resolution on the Peace Building Commission (PBC).
While agreeing that the PBC Commission was proving a more
difficult issue than anticipated, Ripert voiced
disappointment at U.S. hesitation to engage more vocally.
Others -- for instance Pakistan but also unspecified European
Union members -- felt emboldened in their resistance on the
PBC (e.g. Security Council oversight of the PBC),Ripert
said. Without P-5 buy-in, the PBC would flounder. The U.S.
should lay out its "red lines" for a reform package, he
advised, in order to forestall the "disaster" of a vote on
the Egyptian draft resolution. IO PDAS-Equivalent Lacroix
observed that some in the African Group were anxious that
establishing the PBC through "a bad UNGA resolution" would
"lead to its irrelevance." However, Ripert speculated that
Egypt, having given up hope for a permanent SC seat, was now
set on weakening the SC, namely by setting up the PBC as an
UNGA counterweight. Some concession was necessary on the
PBC, Ripert argued, because the reform process was
deteriorating into an UNGA-SC confrontation. Could the USG
accept sequential reporting by the PBC to ECOSOC and the SC,
he asked.

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Worsening UNGA-SC Friction
--------------


4. (C) The Swiss UNGA resolution on Security Council
procedures was a further sign of the poor atmosphere in New
York, Ripert remarked (Ref B). France had had a "very frank"
exchange at senior levels with the Swiss, explicitly
requesting Switzerland refrain from tabling the resolution.
But the Swiss evidently saw challenging SC preeminence, and
specifically P-5 privileges, as a cultural and moral
obligation, reflecting the Confederation's commitment to
"pure democracy." Ripert predicted SC expansion would be
stillborn, should the Swiss table their resolution, and that
the resulting UNGA - SC collision would last a decade. Ripert
categorically rejected the draft resolution, but he offered
that, in line with the draft's objectives, France was open to
making a statement pledging to refrain from use of the veto
in cases of massive human rights abuses or genocide.


5. (C) Ripert reiterated French commitment to SC expansion,
including the G-4 resolution "if it still exists." Lacroix
opined that the deadlock was prompting "erosion" across the
board on UN reform. Ripert stated definitively that there
would be "no SC enlargement without Germany." To that end, a
Council of 21-22 members was not enough. While conceding
that the African Group had to resolve its position, Ripert
believed that, absent a consensus, individual African members
would nonetheless take part, should the G-4 force a vote.
African Group solidarity remained a factor, yet many newly
responsible African democracies were seeking a voice, Ripert
commented, and were "fed up with the UN" system and its
protections for extremist African governments.

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Reviving Management Reform
--------------


6. (C) Management reform was losing momentum, Lacroix
stated. It was vital that the UN Secretariat offer its
proposals soon, and the Secretariat should at least identify
who had the lead, whether Burnham or Malloch Brown. Upcoming
budgetary discussions were a further opportunity to launch a
"new approach." Regarding the calls for periodic review of
PKO mandates, Lacroix suggested establishment of an expert
group to conduct evaluations in advance of renewals. Ripert
suggested a three-person group drawn from ACABQ, which might
offer a collateral advantage of facilitating discussion of
assessed contributions beyond the appeals of the Geneva
Group. There would be no rise in the overall EU
contribution, Ripert insisted, adding that France was
pressing the issue with Russia, China, and Brazil; the G-4
nations in particular should assume their budgetary
responsibilities.

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Interest-Free Whinging
--------------


7. (C) Regarding funding for the Capital Master Plan, Ripert
thought it understandable that UNGA members would "express
regret" that the Host Country was not offering an
interest-free loan. The U.S. Congress, in effect, was
imposing an additional fiscal burden on the entire UNGA
membership. A/S Silverberg made clear that any language that
takes the U.S. to task constituted a gratuitous attack and
was unacceptable. 5th Committee assent was moreover not
necessary in order to accept the loan. Ripert countered that
France would not be in the fight, but believed the Host
Country had clear responsibilities, a principle France sought
to respect with regard to UNESCO. He complained about
inappropriate rhetoric on the UN by New York City Council
Members, underscoring that the UN presence was worth billions
to the local economy.

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Human Rights Council
--------------


8. (C) At the luncheon, Beatrice Le Fraper, IO
DAS-Equivalent for Human Rights, reported the EU had reached
three common positions regarding the establishment of a Human
Rights Council (HRC): 1) the HRC should be a standing body,
even if not always in session; 2) HRC should be able to
address especially urgent HR situations, as necessary; 3)
there should be NGO participation. Regarding HRC election,
Le Fraper said that the EU had shied away from any position
on election criteria, particularly the 2/3 majority
threshold, which France understand could be problematic for
the U.S. She suggested a preference for "positive" criteria,
though exclusionary criteria remained a possibility. To A/S
Silverberg's suggestion that candidates provide nomination
letters from within their own bloc, Ripert worried about
interference with the procedures of regional groups but
averred that the concept merited consideration. Ripert
insisted Geneva be the seat of the HRC. France was flexible
on the size, a considerable shift, Ripert said, since France
originally supported universal membership. Le Fraper
stressed agreement about HRC "subsidiarity" in relation to
the UNGA, prompting a caveat from Ripert on the need for a
division of labor between the HRC and the 3rd Committee. Le
Fraper argued for a clean break between the Human Rights
Commission and the future Council, recommending a wrap-up
session for the Commission and starting the Council with a
clean agenda.

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Counter Anti-Israeli Initiatives
--------------


9. (C) Le Fraper claimed France was engaging to reduce
anti-Israel UN initiatives, and had sought to exert pressure
on Lebanon in particular. France withdrew its candidacy to
the World Heritage Committee to facilitate Israel's election,
she said, and similarly supported a clean WEOG slate,
including Israel on the Biosphere Committee at UNESCO.

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CPC: A Nuisance, Live With It
--------------



10. (C) Ripert concurred that the Committee on Programs and
Coordination (CPC) had lost its value, however he urged
caution on seeking its dissolution. Contrary to the UK and
Italy, which favor withdrawal, France does not support an
"open seat policy" with regard to UN bodies. Moreover, "the
South" continues to see the CPC as a useful "organ of
expression," he claimed. Reforming UN bodies was easier than
shutting them, he opined. Lacroix suggested the CPC was
becoming irrelevant, but, again, head-on criticism would only
generate "useless friction."

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Airplane Tickets and "Innovative Financing"
--------------


11. (C) Raising the International Airplane Ticket surcharge
for development, Ripert recognized U.S. opposition, yet hoped
the U.S. would nonetheless participate in a late February
ministerial to inaugurate the initiative. He reasoned that
the international community should show solidarity on any
effort to combat HIV/AIDS, allowing partners to construct a
"free menu" of options from which to choose. He stated that
France and Chile were looking at a common fund for the
purchase of medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria; the UK, while supportive of the overall initiative,
would not participate in that fund. Christophe Guilhou, a
Cabinet adviser to FM Douste-Blazy, estimated the surcharge
would generate circa 700 million euro in its first year of
implementation.

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UNEP's Future
--------------


12. (C) Ripert made a pitch for converting UNEP into a
"light" UN agency through a gradual transformation of
scaled-down ambition that would emphasize mission
flexibility. France did not want to create a "monster" with
thousands of positions, but wanted to coordinate disparate UN
activities on the environment and bolster early warning
capabilities. "Heads of UN agencies don't know what others
are doing," he argued. Ripert noted UNEP Director Toepfer
was resigning and asked if the U.S. had a candidate a mind.
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DPKO Overstretch: Is Darfur a Poison Pill?
--------------


13. (C) Ripert noted demand for UN peacekeeping was
exceeding capability. Cost efficiency was now an important
criterion in French thinking, he added, since new
parliamentary controls, similar to U.S. Congressional
oversight, would kick in as of January 2006. Lacroix urged
working together to reduce PKO force size, when appropriate,
and he called for more consultation by the UN Secretariat in
planning and reviewing mandates. He suggested that UNMIL may
be ripe for cautious reduction. Sudan, in particular,
required a prudent approach, and Ripert said there were
internal MFA divisions on whether to expedite an AU hand-over
to the UN. U/SYG Guehenno was reluctant to see DPKO take
over AMIS, absent a peaceful settlement. Pushing a skittish
UN ahead on Darfur would lead to the launching of a massive
PKO, given UN security concerns. Ripert chided against
pushing the UN to take on missions that exceed its
capabilities. IO DAS-Equivalent Simon-Michel said the DRC
posed a similar concern; U.S. interest in expanding MONUC's
mandate to include the disarmament of eastern militia went
beyond the traditional parameters of the Brahimi Report.
(Comment: There is an AF-IO split at the MFA on Darfur, with
IO sharing Guehenno's own reticence. AF DAS-Equivalent Le
Gal indicated to Africa Watcher 10/26 that Director General
for Political Affairs Laboulaye had adjudicated the feud in
AF's favor. End Comment.)


14. (C) Probing on thinking on the SYG's successor, Ripert
commented that France was not keen on the automatic selection
of an Asian and distrusted the principle of regional
rotation. However, the next SYG should be francophone,
whether Eastern European or Asian.


15. (C) On Iraq Lacroix volunteered there was a clear
rationale for maintaining the MNF, however there was a need
to provide a context for its perpetuation, in consultation
with an Iraqi government, and not as an SC fiat. He said the
French understood from their meeting with Under Secretary
Burns that a drafting solution might be possible, and were
interested in the U.S. timeline for renewal. Discussion on
Syria-Lebanon in Ref. A.


16. (C) Comment: Ripert and company presented a familiar
French refrain that tactical concessions are necessary in
order to advance UN reform. There was considerable reference
to the fallout of the abortive campaign for SC expansion,
which, in the French view, had done collateral damage to
achieving consensus on any future HRC and PBC. Resentment of
the SC was now an entrenched fact in the UNGA; a sharp
contest for prerogatives would now color the reform process.


17. (C) Comment Cont'd: Ripert's mention of both the
International Airplane Ticket surcharge and UNEP, both Elysee
pet projects, was an obligatory exercise, since he clearly
understood U.S. opposition. However, we took his request for
U.S. presence at a February 2006 ministerial as a formal
request, warranting a USG response. It is hard to see,
however, how such a ministerial could stick to a generic call
for creative financing of development rather than proclaim a
chorus of hallelujahs for Chirac's "voluntary" aviation
taxation scheme.

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Stapleton