FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES IRAQ, IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000734

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015
TAGS: PREL KPAL IZ IS FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES IRAQ, IRAN
PROLIFERATION, AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS WITH CODEL
KERRY

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Senator John Kerry (D-MA) completed a nearly
two-week trip that had taken him to Iraq, major Middle East
capitals, the Palestinian territories, Berlin and London,
with a stop in Paris and meetings with President Chirac
(septel) and Foreign Minister Barnier January 14. Barnier
shared with Kerry French thinking on Iraqi elections and
stated that France was prepared to initiate a training
program for Iraqi gendarmes outside of Iraq. He called for
full U.S. support for the European initiative to persuade
Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Barnier lauded
U.S.-French efforts to compel Syria to withdraw its troops
from Lebanon. He stated that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict contributes to instability throughout the region,
and called U.S.-European cooperation on the Middle East peace
process a "test" of our will to mend transatlantic relations.
Barnier also commented briefly on European efforts to build
a defense and security capability that complements NATO and
cooperates with the U.S. He concluded with a brief
description of the GOF's support for EU membership
negotiations with Turkey. End summary.

Iraq
--------------


2. (C) Foreign Minister Michel Barnier received Senator
Kerry January 14 for an hour-long discussion focused on Iraq,
the EU-3 agreement with Iran on nuclear weapons,
Syria/Lebanon, the Middle East peace process, the EU's
defense capability, and Turkey's membership candidacy. A
full list of meeting participants is at para. 13. Barnier
opened by noting that he had just come from a meeting with
visiting Iraqi President Ghazi al Yawer and had earlier in
the week received a delegation of Iraqi political leaders
representing all major parties. France, he said, had
consistently argued the need for broad participation in the
Iraqi political process. Given current indications, France
feared that Iraqi Sunnis might not vote in large numbers in
the January 30 elections. The single constituency electoral
law under which the elections are being organized already
gives an advantage to the more numerous Shia; if, in
addition, Sunnis do not participate, they may find themselves
excluded from the political process. Barnier said he had
raised this problem with President al Yawer, who said it
would be addressed after the elections.


3. (C) Kerry said that the period immediately following the
elections would be crucial to Iraq's future. A process of
reconciliation will have to be put in place, without which
the insurgency would only grow. A "new kind of effort" is
needed in which the Iraqi government and people unite to
improve the security situation and the provision of services.
Barnier said the election would be an important step that
could put Iraq on a more positive trajectory. Fifty or 60
percent overall turnout, even given low Sunni participation,
would be a good result -- one the international community
should stand behind and support. It will be in all our
interests to lend legitimacy to the election as a necessary
step in the political process. Barnier commented positively
on al Yawer's statement during their meeting that the Iraqi
election law would be changed after January 30, as part of
the constitutional drafting process, to define multiple
versus a single electoral district. Barnier indicated that
this change would be likely to produce more inclusive results
in future elections.


4. (C) Affirming that U.S. troops will leave Iraq by the end
of 2005 is another critical element in building support for
an Iraqi government and the political process, Barnier said.
He noted that President Chirac had told President Bush in a
telephone conversation earlier in the day that France was
prepared to conduct training for Iraqi gendarmes in a place
outside Iraq -- but would not train Iraqi soldiers. Kerry
challenged Barnier on this point, noting that it appeared
inconsistent to press for the withdrawal of U.S. forces while
declining to help train the Iraqi troops that would need to
take their place. He asked how many Iraqi troops Barnier
thought could be trained by NATO or an ad hoc effort.
Barnier appeared uncertain of how to respond to the question,
finally saying that France's attitude toward training Iraqi
soldiers was "changing a bit." He declined to speculate on
the number of troops NATO could train, but added that a large
NATO presence in Baghdad would be counterproductive.
Returning to the French offer to train gendarmes, Barnier
asserted that Paris had made the offer months ago, but that
there had been no follow-up from either the Iraqi Interim
Government or the U.S. government. Chirac had repeated the
offer to al Yawer during their meeting the previous day.

Iranian proliferation
--------------

5. (C) Barnier said he perceived "some skepticism" in
Washington regarding the EU3 initiative to persuade Iran to
halt reprocessing of enriched uranium and abandon its efforts
to acquire nuclear weapons. France, too, was not completely
trusting of the Iranians, but was convinced that negotiating
with them was the only reasonable course open. The
alternatives were not attractive: either turning a blind eye
to Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, or going to
war with Iran. "We want to pursue the negotiations," Barnier
continued, and U.S. support for the EU3 effort will be
crucial to its ultimate success. Without U.S. support, Iran
risks becoming "a third hot spot," Barnier warned, naming
Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the two others.
Kerry said he believed Iran already was a hot spot, and noted
that he had urged full U.S. engagement in EU3 efforts to
persuade Iran to renounce its nuclear weapons program. Some
would argue that the appearance of an accommodating EU3
needing to satisfy an insistent United States (a "good cop,
bad cop" ploy) had helped advance the negotiations. Kerry
said that while this may be true, it did not appear that the
Administration had intentionally set up this dynamic.


6. (C) Kerry said his conversations in the region had
convinced him that Iran remains committed to a nuclear
weapons program, but agreed that there were no good
alternatives to negotiating. Senator Kerry commented that
the military option would be difficult. Kerry said his own
intention, had he been elected president, was to pursue front
channel and back channel contacts with the Iranian regime.
He noted that eventual UN consideration of Iran's breach of
IAEA commitments could result in economic sanctions. Barnier
emphasized that the EU3 approach is to proceed in stages with
the Iranians "with checks (for compliance) along the way."
The incentive offered for a verified halt in reprocessing is
cooperation on Iran's civilian nuclear program, he went on.
Russia, said Barnier, supports this approach, partly for
their own commercial interest in selling nuclear fuel to
Iran, although they, too, are distrustful of the Iranians.
Barnier reiterated that U.S. support would be essential to
the success of the process.

Syria/Lebanon
--------------


7. (C) Barnier recalled that the U.S. and France had
successfully cooperated in crafting and winning approval of
UN Security Council Resolution 1559, mandating the withdrawal
of Syrian forces from Lebanon and the disbanding of all armed
groups in the country. The U.S. and France needed to remain
together in pressing for compliance with the resolution.
Facilitating Lebanese legislative elections this spring that
are free of Syrian interference should be our mid-term
objective.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict
--------------


8. (C) Our first priority for cooperative efforts in the
region should be helping Israelis and Palestinians come to a
just and lasting settlement of their differences, Barnier
went on. This conflict is central in the minds of many
regional leaders, and the lack of a solution feeds
instability and impedes democratic reform in countries
stretching from the Maghreb to South Asia. Barnier told
Kerry that during his recent visit, Pakistani President
Musharraf had told him that discontent over the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict increased the appeal of radical
Islamic teaching and contributed to instability in Pakistan.
U.S. efforts to promote democratic reform in the region,
efforts that France supports, Barnier said, will be made more
difficult if the perception continues that the U.S. and
others are not doing enough to resolve the conflict. In
France, too, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has the power
to inflame sentiment among the country's estimated five
million Muslims. So Europe has a stake in resolving the
conflict. The U.S. has a stake. Our cooperation will be
essential in moving the parties toward peace. It will also
be the "test" of U.S.-European will to rebuild the
transatlantic relationship, Barnier said, repeating a
statement he has made publicly on a number of occasions in
recent weeks.


9. (C) Kerry agreed. He said that the broad parameters of a
solution are already known. They are essentially what was on
the table at Taba under the Clinton administration. There
can be no final agreement without a solution for the Muslim
holy places in Jerusalem. The Palestinian state has to be
viable, not a collection of far-flung enclaves. There must
be a reasonable solution on the right of return, one that
does not pose an implicit threat to Israel's existence. To
get there, the Palestinians have to take a new turning. Abu
Mazen "cannot hold on to" Hamas and the Martyrs Brigade.
Barnier argued for renewed U.S.-European cooperation in
searching for a solution. Europe, he said, needs to speak
with one voice if it is to be respected by the U.S. and
Israel. For the moment, said Barnier, "Sharon sees the EU
basically as a supermarket that sends checks." Europe, which
has much at stake in the region, can bring more to the
process than financial support, Barnier went on. Together,
we should press Israel to implement Gaza withdrawal, but to
go further in implementing the roadmap.


10. (C) In response to Kerry's question, Barnier said he
regarded the UK-organized conference in London March 1 as a
constructive initiative. It will be an opportuntity for
donor countries to demonstrate to the Palestinians, who are
now "reorganized," that they stand behind them and
Palestinian President Abu Mazen. At the same time, the
Palestinians are concerned that the conference could produce
a list of "benchmarks" for them to achieve. Their failure to
reach any of them could then be used by the Israelis as an
excuse for halting their own moves towards peace. Kerry said
that Abu Mazen really needs to gain control of the security
situation and to rein in rejectionist groups. He recalled
the the Tenet Plan offered a way forward for the Palestinian
Authority to consolidate control over the various security
forces, and to coordinate with Israeli counterparts. Kerry
noted that Israel is concerned that Europe does not have
Israel's security concerns foremost in mind, to which Barnier
responded that Europe is not prepared "to bargain away
Israel's security."

European Security and Defense Policy
--------------


11. (C) Asked about ESDP, Barnier recalled that as a
European commissioner, he had led the drafting group on
defense and security of the Convention on the Future of
Europe that produced the draft European constitution.
France, he said, believes that the EU needs to have a strong
defense and security capability, not to compete with NATO,
but to complement that orgainization in cooperation with the
U.S. The French approach to ESDP arises principally from the
accord it reached with the UK at St. Malo in 2001. The
declaration of Europe's two most capable military powers
there essentially forms the basis for an autonomous and
cooperative European security and defense policy. From this
basis have arisen such projects as the European rapid
response force, cooperation on armaments construction and
research and development, and the creation of a small
European joint staff.

Turkey
--------------


12. (C) To Kerry's question about Turkey's EU membership
bid, Barnier recalled that President Chirac had taken a
decision to support Turkish membership, despite the
opposition of a large majority of the French public and an
even larger percentage, perhaps as much as 80 percent, of
elected French officials and political activists. Chirac's
stance entails risk. It could lead many voting in this
year's referendum on the EU constitution to reject it in
protest over the president's support for Turkey's eventual
membership, Barnier said. The foreign minister said that he,
like Chirac, believes that Turkish membership will be an
asset for the EU. But Turkey, if it enters, will do so only
after conforming with all European norms.

Participants
--------------


13. (SBU) Foreign Minister Barnier was accompanied by MFA
Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, MFA Spokesman
Herve Ladsous, Americas Director Daniel Parfait, and Cabinet
Advisors for North American Affairs Nicolas de Riviere, and
for Middle East Affairs Nicolas Galey. Senator Kerry was
accompanied by Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Professional Staff Member Nancy Stetson and Embassy Deputy
Political Counselor Paul Mailhot (notetaker).
Leach