Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS6810
2005-10-04 11:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

COMBATING EXTREMISM IN FRANCE

Tags:  PREL KDEM KPAO EAID PHUM KMPI PTER FR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PARIS 006810 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958 DECL: 09/28/15
TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO EAID PHUM KMPI PTER FR
SUBJECT: COMBATING EXTREMISM IN FRANCE

REF: A) SECSTATE 159129 B) PARIS 6579 C) PARIS 5539
D) PARIS 4644 E) PARIS 2333 F) PARIS 1882 G) 04 PARIS 9159
H) 04 PARIS 5698 I) 04 PARIS 3771

CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION KARL HOFMANN, REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PARIS 006810

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958 DECL: 09/28/15
TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO EAID PHUM KMPI PTER FR
SUBJECT: COMBATING EXTREMISM IN FRANCE

REF: A) SECSTATE 159129 B) PARIS 6579 C) PARIS 5539
D) PARIS 4644 E) PARIS 2333 F) PARIS 1882 G) 04 PARIS 9159
H) 04 PARIS 5698 I) 04 PARIS 3771

CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION KARL HOFMANN, REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The U.S. and France enjoy a strong and
healthy relationship in matters related to combating violent
extremism, especially as regards the investigative side.
Intelligence, law enforcement and judicial exchanges and
cooperation are ongoing and effective, and the French
government's capabilities in combating extremism are broad,
deep and tested. Increasingly, the GOF is also expanding
its efforts to reach out to Muslim communities in
particular, through the launch of the French Council for the
Muslim Faith, the appointment of Muslim national chaplains
for prisons, and the creation of a Foundation for French
Islam to organize private financing and construction of
mosques. Our government-to-government efforts in the
investigative domain are enhanced by USG programs aimed at
complementing the GOF's own outreach efforts by reaching out
ourselves to marginalized or "at risk" populations in
France. While we have been able to engage a number of
moderate Muslim leaders and NGOs around France, our
continued success in this area requires a sustained effort,
which, in turn, will require appropriate personnel and
financial resources. End summary.

--------------
FRANCE AND EXTREMISM
--------------


2. (C) Within France's overall Muslim population of five to
six million, the RG (France's police intelligence service)
estimates that roughly 9,000 could be considered extremist,
or, just over one-tenth of one percent. The RG has also
estimated that of the roughly 1,600 mosques and prayer halls
in France, fewer than 40 could be considered extremist. The
vast majority of French Muslims are believed to be non-
practicing, with GoF officials estimating that only 10
percent of those characterized as Muslim are practicing.
The minority of French Muslims who regularly attend mosque

are more likely than not to encounter foreign imams.
According to the French Ministry of Interior, there are
approximately 1,200 imams in France, of whom 75 percent are
not French citizens and one-third does not speak French.
Among those Muslims considered practicing, there is a small
but distinct current of fundamentalist thought, which
includes strongly conservative views on the role of women.
(For an in-depth examination of Islamic extremism in France,
please see REF C.)


3. (C) Many Muslim immigrants to France have not been well
integrated. They are often concentrated in neighborhoods
outside France's main cities, where they may suffer from a
lack of educational opportunities, racism, and
discrimination. (Note. A recent INR poll indicates two-
thirds of French Muslims report being victims of racism.
End note.) As a result, subsequent generations are often
less, rather than more, integrated into French society.
They feel -- and often are seen by fellow French -- as not
belonging, breeding resentment and a lack of cultural
identity that causes a small minority to fall prey to
radical imams who frequent the tougher neighborhoods. The
INR poll notes 30 percent of French Muslims believe in
integrating fully, while another 68 percent wish to
integrate but also preserve a separate Muslim identity. The
same INR poll shows 95 percent favorable views of France
among Muslim respondents, compared to a 78 percent
unfavorable rating for the United States. Despite the
problems faced by many Muslim youth, some have achieved
success; two of the most prominent are former captain of the
French national rugby team Abdel Benazzi and football star
Zinedine Zidane. Salman Rushdie has said that Zidane "has
done more to improve France's attitude towards its Muslim
minority than a thousand political speeches."


4. (C) In 2003, the GoF launched the French Council for the
Muslim Faith (CFCM) to serve as an official interlocutor on
Islamic religious issues, such as building mosques, and to
help foster a more moderate, "French Islam." The GoF has
leaned on the CFCM to ensure a prominent place for
moderates, with Paris Grand Mosque rector Dalil Boubakeur --
an outspoken moderate with considerable GoF and Algerian
government support but questionable popular appeal --
serving as CFCM president since its inception. The two main
rivals to the Paris Mosque in the CFCM are the conservative
National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF),linked to the
Moroccan monarchy, and the Union of Islamic Organizations in
France (UOIF),which has suspected ties to the Muslim
Brotherhood. Keeping the FMNF and UOIF within the CFCM
helps keeps fundamentalists within the fold and in dialogue
with the GoF. Though rivalries among component groups has
hampered the CFCM's effectiveness and the CFCM cannot be
considered representative of the all French Muslims, the
organization has served as a positive tool to counter
extremism. For instance, in fall 2004, CFCM leaders rallied
to support the GoF when the Islamic Army in Iraq threatened
to kill two French hostages if the GoF did not repeal its
ban on religious symbols in public schools.


5. (SBU) The French government has long sought an
appropriate interlocutor to help combat the rise in militant
Islam in French prisons, where some 50 percent of inmates
are believed to be Muslim but only 66 of 900 prison
chaplains are Muslim. In September 2005, the CFCM named a
Moroccan-born high-school math teacher, Moulay El Hassan El
Alaoui Talibi, as the first national chaplain for prisons.
Talibi, a reputed moderate, has pledged to teach French
Muslim inmates about the Koran and address issues such as
the lack of halal meat for prisoners.


6. (C) On June 21, the Conseil d'Etat, France's highest
court for administrative matters, approved the creation of
the Foundation for French Islam, to oversee private
financing and construction of mosques, as well as training
of imams in French language and civics. The training
initiative has been hampered by objections by French
universities, which view the project as contrary to French
laws on secularism. It is also unclear whether the
Foundation will be able to overcome the same internal
divisions that have plagued the CFCM, given that both
organizations have similar component groups.


7. (SBU) On March 15, 2004, the French Parliament passed a
law banning the wearing of "conspicuous" religious symbols
in public schools, citing the need to preserve the French
interpretation of the separation of church and state, while
at the same time combating increasing Muslim fundamentalism
in the classroom. Some religious groups, human rights
organizations, and foreign governments criticized the law;
however, French authorities argued that many young Muslim
girls were being forced to wear headscarves by male family
members. In the first year of its implementation, 44 Muslim
girls and three Sikh boys were expelled for violating the
law; all reportedly enrolled in private schools, distance
learning courses, or schools abroad. A report issued by the
Ministry of Education at the beginning of the 2005 academic
year declared the implementation of the law a success.


8. (SBU) Another GoF initiative to combat extremism and
foster integration has been the creation of "Priority
Education Zones" (ZEPs). Because the law does not permit the
singling out of individuals based on their religion, race or
ethnic background, it can be difficult for the government to
implement programs that target minorities. However, since
many minorities live in low-income areas, the GOF has
focused on low-income criteria as a back-door method to
assist minorities. Private institutions have also used this
concept to diversify. The most notable example (and pioneer
in this area) is "Sciences-Po", a prestigious political
science university in Paris, which has put together a
program to bring in promising students from ZEP high schools
in the Paris suburbs.

--------------
THE ROLE OF NGOS
--------------


9. (SBU) A number of French NGOs work in under-privileged
areas on issues such as education, women's rights, equal
access to services, discrimination, health, employment, etc.
They provide an additional safety net and act as a resource
for many of the immigrants and first and second-generation
minorities seeking counsel, assistance, or equal treatment
but unable or unwilling to access government services when
they exist. One such NGO, "SOS Racisme", is behind one of
the most successful programs to provide a channel for higher
education to minorities.


10. (SBU) While they rely on the work of volunteers, these
NGOs most often receive financing from the government in
order to implement their programs. For many of these NGOs,
financing is made available not through formal application
procedures, but through the "patronage" of a particular
political group or government official with access to a
budget (though an organization must be declared "in the
public interest" to be permitted to receive government
funds.) When budgets are tight, or when political interest
shifts, the crucial financing can disappear. Unfortunately,
the past several years have been extremely difficult for
these NGOs - tighter government budgets, decentralization of
the government and loss of interest have had a severely
negative effect on NGOs, and many have disappeared.

--------------
THE MISSION'S RESPONSE
--------------


11. (C) After 9/11/01, Mission France immediately engaged
the GoF to strengthen its partnership in combating
terrorism. All sections and agencies analyzed the extent to
which they could contribute towards that goal, and set in
motion a coordinated Mission plan to ensure intelligence,
law enforcement, reporting, consular and public diplomacy
efforts were focused and productive. Post has reported on
the success of these programs and the strong partnership
with the French government via cable and through successive
MPP exercises. In the wake of our intervention in Iraq and
the backlash of negative opinion that ensued, a new
dimension to the problem facing us was made apparent, and a
new strategy for engaging Muslim and Arab minorities in
France was set into motion.


12. (C) Public Diplomacy programs were also adjusted to
focus on the problem while at the same time deal with France
specific sensibilities about minorities. We thus expanded
regular programs to reach out to those neighborhoods and
institutions where there are large immigrant populations as
well as second or third generation French citizens from
North and West African extractions, whether or not they
practice the Muslim faith. We have recently created and
assigned a "Civil Society/Diversity Outreach" portfolio to
one of our Cultural Section FSNs with excellent knowledge of
these issues in France. We have found that focusing on
issues such as discrimination, equal access to justice,
housing, health services, women's rights, violence in
schools, etc., we have a better avenue for approaching our
target audience and winning their trust.


13. (C) The Embassy's PD and Political sections have formed
a working group to discuss and analyze specific issues and
work closely to broaden embassy outreach to the French
Muslim community, particularly the vast majority of moderate
or non-practicing Muslim who reject extremism and who can
influence others to do the same. This outreach effort
includes visits to the "banlieus" (suburbs containing low-
income, minority neighborhoods) to establish contacts with
local officials, schools and associations, and contact with
NGOs dealing with civil society issues that will tend to
principally affect at risk communities. Discussions with
them continue to help us formulate and adapt our outreach
strategy. We are also deepening our longstanding
relationship with the Paris Mosque Rector/CFCM President
Boubakeur, who is an outspoken opponent of extremism and
advocates and Islam in line with modernity and French
secular values. In a recent meeting with the Ambassador,
Boubakeur stressed the need for Muslims to take back their
religion from extremists and reject fundamentalism and
terrorism at every turn. We have also sought to increase
dialogue with the more conservative elements within the
CFCM, including the FNMF and the UOIF, to dispel
misperceptions about US policy and stress the need to reject
terrorism and extremism.


14. (C) We are also seeking to broaden outreach to
individuals and NGOs focused on French Muslim women's
issues, including the well-known organization "Ni Putes Ni
Soumises" [NPNS - literally, "Neither Whores nor
Submissives"], which has campaigned against forced marriages
and violence against women in the banlieus, while offering
strong support for GoF efforts to ban the wearing of veils
in public schools. In recent meetings with emboffs, NPNS
officials described the organization as increasingly focused
on countering the rise of extremism in French suburbs,
stating, "If we don't speak up against fundamentalists, who
will?" We have already nominated one of their vice-
presidents for an IVL program and hope to continue working
with the NGO and its membership.


15. (SBU) These efforts are mirrored and complemented by
those of our APPs and CGs in the regions. In cities such as
Marseille, Lyon and Lille, which have large Muslim
populations, successive USG officials have built strong
relationships and broad contact bases within religious and
minority communities. In addition, they participate fully in
the PD programs listed below.


16. (C) Below follows a listing of PD programs designed to
address extremism:

a) International Visitor Leadership Program/Voluntary
Visitor Program - Since 2002 we have developed a number of
single country projects to bring to the United States French-
Muslim leaders along with Jewish, Christian and
representatives from other religions to explore ethnic
diversity issues in our country. At least one project each
year has been undertaken since then, and we expect to
continue the program in future nomination cycles.
These projects do not necessarily fall within religious
lines, but focus instead on social issues of interest to the
participants: education for immigrants and minorities, equal
employment opportunities, equal access to services,
minorities in the media, etc. Post has also organized a
special IV program that provided French Muslim media an
opportunity to learn first-hand about US religious and
ethnic diversity, US foreign policy, and the depth and
richness of US society and culture.

Our Voluntary Visitor program, which has greater flexibility
(shorter stays in the U.S., on-going application cycle),is
not as useful in this context because many of our contacts
in this area do not have the financial means to pay for
their international voyage.

Success Rate: Excellent. The success rate of these IV
programs in terms of the individuals traveling is
unquestionable. Upon their return to France most of these
individuals not only have a more positive perception of the
U.S. as a whole, but also of the degree of integration,
religious freedom, and opportunities available to
minorities.

b) Speaker Programs - The Embassy continues to program
U.S. experts/speakers for presentations and/or panel
discussions about diversity and U.S. values. These speakers
have recently included American Muslims who can provide a
window on what it is like to be a Muslim living in the
United States, and can emphasize that the USG objectives and
goals are targeted against terrorism and not Islam or
Muslims.

Success rate: Excellent.

c) Education - Post continues to increase its
collaboration with the French Ministry of Education to work
on projects that would provide greater outreach to minority
youth and teachers in France, particularly in "at risk"
areas. Some past programs have included debates between
young American and French students, presentations to High
Schools with significant minority students by Mission staff
throughout France, donation of book collections to
Universities, schools and libraries with access to minority
audiences. PA is also reaching out to minority leaders to
discuss special programs in education for schools with
significant numbers of minority/disadvantaged students.
These programs will focus on learning more about U.S. values
and culture to provide a better understanding of our society
and of our policies.

We have received approval from ECA Washington to fund a new
program for student teacher exchanges between the U.S. and
France. This program was created to focus in particular on
teachers from disadvantaged communities (ZEPs),which will
lead to a major multiplier effect as the program develops.
We hope to obtain matching funds from the French government.

Working with the Fulbright Commission and the French MinEd,
we have increased funding for summer institutes. Of
particular interest are those institutes directed at
secondary school teachers, whose influences on students make
them ideal partners in the fight against negative
stereotypes about the U.S. We are exploring ways to promote
greater participation by minorities in these institutes,
including the possibility of a special France-only program.
Fulbright commissions in Europe have been tasked by
Washington to create new programs to reach out to
minorities. While the projects presented by Fulbright France
have not been approved for funding, we will continue to work
with them on outreach.

Success Rate: Excellent.

d) Publications - We have distributed to our contacts
throughout France, copies of the Arabic language magazine
"HI", with points of distribution including North African
and Middle Eastern diplomatic missions; soup kitchen with
street library; France's first private high school for
Muslims; NGOs dealing with integration, and others.

With end-of-year funds we have also purchased collections of
American classics and have distributed them to institutions
likely to appeal to minority youth.

Success Rate: Moderate. While publications are an excellent
method to show life in the U.S. and have long-term value in
terms of the original investment, there are a number of
issues that pose problems for us. Some efforts to distribute
HI magazine are met with reluctance by our interlocutors
(e.g. Arab consulates),who view their distribution as
"propaganda". Furthermore, there is a language barrier issue
(see below under "what we need to change."

e) Arts and Entertainment - Post has showcased minority
talents as part of its efforts to highlight the diversity of
our culture and dispel negative stereotypes about our
society and our attitudes about race, religion, and the
Muslim world. We have provided support to organizers of
programs and concerts that bring US musicians for workshops
and master classes in heavily minority communities outside
of Paris. This year we supported the "Blues-sur-Seine" 18-
day festival that reaches underprivileged communities in
numerous towns just outside of Paris. The American artists
deliver messages of hope and tolerance and encourage
disillusioned youth to overcome their hardships.

This year we also provided support for an Afro-Caribbean
Festival in the under-privileged and heavily minority 19th
arrondissement of Paris (where some arrests have been made
of youth suspected of traveling to Arab countries for
terrorist training.) Programming covered conferences on
topics such as solidarity, health, history and remembrance
for a community of socio-economically disadvantaged Muslim
and Arab youth who need alternative avenues of interest away
from religious extremism, crime and violence. Our support
extends to the young and multi-ethnic organizers of this
event, one of which has been selected to participate in FY06
IVLP.

Success Rate: Excellent. For individual programs supported
by the Embassy, we have received very positive feedback
about how these presentations convey a different (and more
positive) image of the United States. Our simple interaction
with the organizers and the young people involved in these
events gives them first-hand appreciation of our role and
our willingness to have an open dialogue.

Other - The Ambassador hosts an annual Iftar Dinner
providing the Embassy with a focus for outreach with
important contacts in the Arab/Muslim community in Paris.
This year, we are expanding the guest list to include non-
elite guests. Other mission officials, including Principal
Officers and CGs participate in this and other celebratory
events during the holy month of Ramadan. Arab-audience radio
message with words of encouragement at the beginning of
Ramadan holy season are also part of our outreach.

--------------
What Needs to Change
--------------


17. (C) All of the above programs are excellent tools for
outreach," but individuals who are not Muslim themselves but
who work to integrate these communities are not considered
qualified for the incentive slots.

-- We need to mix audiences. The possibility of mixing
audiences for an event gives legitimacy to the message we
seek to convey. This is as true for a "religious tolerance"
IV program, as it is for a "Jazz Ambassadors" concert.

-- We need speakers who can speak French. The majority of
young Muslims in France do not speak Arabic, and they do not
speak English. Programs that use interpretations are
extremely expensive in France and post simply does not have
the budget. In addition, the type of program that appeals to
our target audience is much more interactive and not
enhanced by interpretation.

-- We need a cadre of young American minority entertainers
who would travel to posts with their own budgets (bringing
artists from the US is prohibitive, as is in-country
travel.) Most French youth are avid fans of US hip-hop, rap
and similar art. We realize that a great deal of caution
must be used in engaging these artists (who can themselves
convey violent messages),but sending religious groups
because they are Muslim will simply not work with French
youth.

-- We need French-language material. The magazine put out by
the Department for youth ("Hi") cannot be distributed where
it could be used because it cannot be understood by the
audience we are seeking to reach. At least some of the
classics found in the collections that we present to
libraries and universities could find their way into the
hands of students and older at risk groups if they were
published in French and made available at low cost to posts.

-- We need to re-think the concept of "Western Europe" when
it comes to PD programs. While these are wealthy countries,
with solid infrastructures, poverty and disenfranchisement
exist among minorities. Training for NGOs on grants
applications, English language programs, book donations, and
other `traditional' PD programs can and should be utilized
as long as they are adapted to the European context. These
programs can provide individuals the tools they need to
improve their own lives and thus resist the call of
extremism.

-- We need to know when to "advertise". It is not always
productive for us to advertise our participation or
sponsorship of a program. This can be counterproductive and
a better strategy can be to build a solid relationship with
our interlocutor, win their trust, and reverse stereotypes
by conveying an image that is self-effacing rather than
boastful.

-- We need additional internal resources - they are crucial.
We currently do not have the personnel necessary to conduct
a sustained program of Muslim outreach. We have, for the
last two years, requested an additional Assistant Cultural
Affairs Officer who would coordinate these efforts. A
country strategy needs a country strategist who is dedicated
to that issue with at least one FSN staff to provide the
support for programs.

-- We need additional external resources. There are a number
of excellent programs that we can and should support but
which we are simply unable to (in education, arts and
entertainment, social issues, IV follow-up, etc.). As we
continue to reach out to new interlocutors, they will seek
our support of time and money. Our inability to come through
after we have reached out to them will bring disappointment
and could easily turn them away.
outreach," but individuals who are not Muslim themselves but
who work to integrate these communities are not considered
qualified for the incentive slots.
-- We need to mix audiences. The possibility of mixing
audiences for an event gives legitimacy to the message we
seek to convey. This is as true for a "religious tolerance"
IV program, as it is for a "Jazz Ambassadors" concert.

-- We need speakers who can speak French. The majority of
young Muslims in France do not speak Arabic, and they do not
speak English. Programs that use interpretations are
extremely expensive in France and post simply does not have
the budget. In addition, the type of program that appeals to
our target audience is much more interactive and not
enhanced by interpretation.

-- We need a cadre of young American minority entertainers
who would travel to posts with their own budgets (bringing
artists from the US is prohibitive, as is in-country
travel.) Most French youth are avid fans of US hip-hop, rap
and similar art. We realize that a great deal of caution
must be used in engaging these artists (who can themselves
convey violent messages),but sending religious groups
because they are Muslim will simply not work with French
youth.

-- We need French-language material. The magazine put out by
the Department for youth ("Hi") cannot be distributed where
it could be used because it cannot be understood by the
audience we are seeking to reach. At least some of the
classics found in the collections that we present to
libraries and universities could find their way into the
hands of students and older at risk groups if they were
published in French and made available at low cost to posts.

-- We need to re-think the concept of "Western Europe" when
it comes to PD programs. While these are wealthy countries,
with solid infrastructures, poverty and disenfranchisement
exist among minorities. Training for NGOs on grants
applications, English language programs, book donations, and
other `traditional' PD programs can and should be utilized
as long as they are adapted to the European context. These
programs can provide individuals the tools they need to
improve their own lives and thus resist the call of
extremism.

-- We need to know when to "advertise". It is not always
productive for us to advertise our participation or
sponsorship of a program. This can be counterproductive and
a better strategy can be to build a solid relationship with
our interlocutor, win their trust, and reverse stereotypes
by conveying an image that is self-effacing rather than
boastful.

-- We need additional internal resources - they are crucial.
We currently do not have the personnel necessary to conduct
a sustained program of Muslim outreach. We have, for the
last two years, requested an additional Assistant Cultural
Affairs Officer who would coordinate these efforts. A
country strategy needs a country strategist who is dedicated
to that issue with at least one FSN staff to provide the
support for programs.

-- We need additional external resources. There are a number
of excellent programs that we can and should support but
which we are simply unable to (in education, arts and
entertainment, social issues, IV follow-up, etc.). As we
continue to reach out to new interlocutors, they will seek
our support of time and money. Our inability to come through
after we have reached out to them will bring disappointment
and could easily turn them away.