U.S.-FRANCE DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000670

SIPDIS

PASS NRC; DOE FOR A/DPTY U/S FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AOKI;
DOS FOR NP/NE COMELLA; NSC FOR HARWARD; NRC FOR
FAULKNER/KANE/SHEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: ENRG FR KNNP MNUC PREL
SUBJECT: U.S.-FRANCE DISCUSSIONS ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND
NUCLEAR COUNTER-TERRORISM, JANUARY 24 - 27, 2005

REF: A. 04 PARIS 7833

B. 04 PARIS 5464

Classified By: EST COUNSELOR ROBERT W. DRY FOR REASONS 1.4 B, D


1. (U) Summary: Following up on high-level discussions held
in July 2004 (see ref B),U.S. and French delegations held
three days of meetings in Paris on physical security measures
for nuclear facilities and materials, agreeing on a path
forward to coordinate and accelerate future bilateral
cooperation in this area. The meetings were supplemented by a
visit to the MELOX fuel fabrication plant and a nuclear
reactor for briefings on the security measures currently in
place at those facilities. The French team was led by Didier
Lallemand, Senior Official for Defense in the Ministry of
Industry (Haut Fonctionnaire de Defense - HDF),who has
regulatory authority for security at all French nuclear
sites. It included active participants from all of the French
agencies with nuclear security and safety responsibilities,
as well as representatives of the state-owned nuclear fuel
cycle and electrical power generation industries. The U.S.
delegation was made up of DOE, NRC, NSC, State, and Embassy
Paris officials.


2. (U) In opening remarks and side conversations, Lallemand
emphasized the importance the French government attached to
the creation of an active bilateral channel for cooperation
on nuclear security. He said that France and the U.S. shared
a common view of the terrorist threat, and in his view, had
parallel approaches to security. He added that there was now
high-level support for closer cooperation with the U.S.,
noting that he had been invited to participate in
preparations for the upcoming visit of Secretary Rice, and
that the results of our meeting would be briefed to the Prime
Minister and the office of the President. It was apparent
that a number of difficult bureaucratic and policy issues
have been resolved on the French side, and there is now a
strong desire to seek a closer and more cooperative
relationship with the U.S. in the area of nuclear security,
including the exchange of classified and other sensitive
information.


3. (U) Both delegations provided briefings on the
organization of nuclear security and physical protection
within their governments, and on the implementation of
security at fuel cycle facilities, defense nuclear
laboratories and production plants, and nuclear power plants.
End Summary

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Threat Assessment
--------------


4. (C) During their presentations, the French made clear
that their threat assessment now focuses on the risk of
attack by a well-armed terrorist commando, as well as other
forms of suicide attack, such as an aircraft strike on a
reactor. They said that the regulatory agencies have adopted
a design basis threat based on a team composed of a specified
number of armed attackers (One of their speakers disclosed -
perhaps without authorization - that their planning is based
on a team of six to seven attackers.) They are also moving to
a denial-of-task philosophy for their protective posture, to
be achieved by a combination of on-site security forces,
physical barriers, and response forces. The reluctance of the
electric utility (Electricite de France - EdF) to arm the
protective forces at reactors is now a major issue for the
governmental authorities, who are about to force action
through new regulation. Armed security officers are already
present at fuel cycle facilities operated by COGEMA and at
Atomic Energy Commission (Commissariat a l,Energie Atomique
- CEA) defense nuclear sites, and are supported by both local
and national gendarmerie response forces. CEA has developed
an analytical methodology to evaluate the performance of
physical security measures, using computer software to
calculate the delays introduced by barriers, protective
forces, and other elements of the security scheme across all
available attack routes. An important difference between U.S.
and French approaches is the greater visibility of our armed
protective forces - the French acknowledged that there is a
deterrent benefit to stationing well-equipped security
officers at the outer perimeter of facilities, but said that
this posed public acceptance problems for them.


5. (C) In a side discussion, Lallemand expressed interest in
continuing to exchange threat assessments through
intelligence channels, and in making sure that key
intelligence judgments were also shared with those agencies
that have operational security responsibilities.

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Exercises
--------------


6. (U) The U.S. repeatedly emphasized the importance of
force-on-force exercises to evaluate the performance of
security forces and other elements of the security system.
The French described their current system of exercises, which
includes events at the national, local, and facility level.
Lallemand indicated that the French were interested in having
an exchange of observers at security force exercises at
nuclear facilities in our two countries. We agreed that this
would be a very constructive step, and committed to look at
schedules to identify an appropriate near-term time for such
a visit to the U.S., to include exercises at both
NRC-regulated and DOE sites.

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Transportation
--------------


7. (U) Both delegations made presentations on the security
measures employed for shipments of Category I nuclear
materials, and we were taken to see the control center
operated by IRSN for real-time monitoring of shipments. The
French described the capabilities of their vehicles and the
qualification process for their drivers, and said they have
recently reinforced the police escort that accompanies
nuclear material shipments.

--------------
Research and Development
--------------


8. (U) The two delegations described current R&D programs
to support physical protection, and identified a number of
areas where additional technical exchanges could be
beneficial. (See para 17, below.)

-------------- --------------
Visits to MELOX and the Tricastin Nuclear Power Plant
-------------- --------------


9. (C) The U.S. team visited the MELOX mixed oxide fuel
fabrication plant at Marcoule and an operating nuclear
reactor. At both facilities we were shown security control
rooms and received briefings on the deployment and training
of the guard force. MELOX, which is a commercial operation of
the COGEMA nuclear fuel cycle company, has its own organic
armed security detail, which can be reinforced by a much
larger force from the surrounding CEA-managed Marcoule site.
The Tricastin reactor site does not have armed guards, but
relies on hardening of its control rooms and a response from
the local Gendarmerie for security. There is a Gendarmerie
presence on-site, however, whenever fresh MOX fuel is being
received or introduced into the reactor. The reactor is quite
close to a public road, and there are concerns about the
potential vulnerability of the facility to a vehicle bomb.

-------------- --------------
Regulatory base for Regulation of Radioactive Sources
-------------- --------------


10. (U) The U.S. team met with safety regulators at the DGSN
(Directorate Generale pour la Surete Nucleaire),who in
addition to providing safety oversight for nuclear
facilities, maintain controls over the use of radioactive
sources. They told us they are seeking additional legal
authority to vet source users; in some instances they have
refused licenses to applicants where they believed there to
be a security issue, but are not certain this would withstand
legal challenge.

--------------
Bilateral Agreements
--------------


11. (U) As preparation for this meeting, the French
researched existing bilateral agreements to identify
authorities for nuclear security-related cooperation,
including a legal basis to share classified information. They
believe there is a sufficiently inclusive set of agreements
between various French agencies and both DOE and NRC to
permit near-term implementation of the cooperation we have
been discussing, but would like the U.S. to consider whether
a higher-level government-to-government agreement would be
useful as a means of simplifying and extending the existing
arrangements to ensure that all relelvant agencies can
participate in the joint activities. As an immediate step,
they would like to amend the current agreement between the
HFD and NRC to allow it to also cover exchanges with DGSN,
(Direction Generale de la Surete Nucleaire),the nuclear
safety regulator, and the CEA and to expand the scope of
possible subjects to be discussed. The U.S. delegation agreed
to consider these proposals and to review the agreements
currently in force.

--------------
Next Steps for Bilateral Cooperation
--------------


12. (U) The two delegations agreed on the need to move
quickly to develop and expand technical cooperation,
including through visits to U.S. facilities, while
maintaining periodic contact at the senior level. We are
looking to hold the next senior-level meeting in the U.S.
sometime in the September-October time frame. Lallemand
suggested that this should be a smaller group of about four
or five on each side, charged with steering our cooperation
rather than a large interagency setting to provide briefings.
This would also be a venue to discuss more sensitive issues,
including an exchange of threat assessments, the parameters
of cooperation to address aircraft strikes on reactors, and
issues involving third countries.

--------------
Belgium
--------------


13. (S) On the margins of the meeting, Aoki raised with
Lallemand U.S. concerns about physical security
implementation in Belgium, citing a recent Belgian press
article disclosing a May, 2004 letter on the subject by
Secretary Powell to Foreign Minister Michel. Lallemand said

SIPDIS
that the French have little or no bilateral contact on
physical protection issues with their Belgian counterparts,
and that the dialogue that takes place occurs either through
a recently-established informal group of European nuclear
safety regulators or at the IAEA. He emphasized that France
does not want to encourage other European countries or EU
institutions to intervene in French domestic decision-making
on nuclear security or safety matters, and has therefore
avoided pressing its neighbors on these matters. Nonetheless,
France understood that the U.S. had serious concerns about
security implementation in Belgium, and would consider what
it could do. Lallemand asked if we could provide any details
about the cause for our concerns; Aoki responded that a U.S.
team had recently visited Belgian facilities, but that we
were constrained by confidentiality commitments from
divulging our observations. Lallemand said he understood, but
would still be interested in any information we could provide
on a classified basis.


14. (U) A record of meeting drafted by the French delegation
and agreed by the U.S. team and an annex listing priority
areas for future collaboration are provided at para 17,
below. The French will also collect the presentations made by
both sides at the meetings and distribute them as a
classified document.

--------------
Delegation Lists
--------------


15. (U) French participants were:

Didier Lallemand, HFD, Ministry of Industry
Grard Charneau, HFD
Eric Plaisant, HFD
Frdric Joseph, HFD
Corentin Le Doare, DGNSR, Ministry of Industry
Jacques Aguilar, DGNSR
Hugues de Longevialle, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Henry-Jacques Neau, AREVA
Caroline Jorant, Areva
Pierre Sirot, Cogema
Jrome Sartre, Cogema
Pascal Jaunet, Cogema
Michel Briere, IRSN
Jean Jalouneix, IRSN
Bruno Autusson, IRSN
Jean-Louis Petitclerc, IRSN
Herv Bernard, CEA
Didier Kechemair, CEA
Pascal Durieux, EDF
Bernard Boube, SGDN
Bernard Janvier, SGDN
Alain Munier, SGDN
Philippe Joyer, SGDN


16. (U) U.S. participants were:

Steven Aoki, Acting Deputy Undersecretary for
Counterterrorism, DOE
William Kane, Deputy Executive Director, NRC
Joseph Krol, Associate Administrator for Emergency
Operations, DOE/NNSA
Robert Harward, NSC
Joseph Shea, NRC
Donald Solich, DOE
Patricia Comella, State NP/NE
Howard Faulkner, NRC
Robert Dry, Science Counselor, Embassy Paris

--------------
Summary Record
--------------


17. (U) The following was agreed to by the two delegations
to reflect the discussions held.

Begin Text of Summary Record:

In order to maintain continuity and strengthen the exchanges
concerning the security of nuclear material, sites, and
transportation, DOE and NRC on the one hand, and HFD from the
Ministry in charge of industry and the French organizations
concerned on the other intend to meet twice a year (once in
each country),in order to review the implementation of
cooperation between the two Parties, to maintain an open
informal discussion, and to exchange information.

These exchanges will be based on strict reciprocity.

The next meeting could take place in the US, during the fall
in 2005. It is being understood that these meetings will be
brief and with delegations adjusted to the topics.

Available current security Agreements mentioned during
discussions will be reassessed by each Party. In particular,
the opportunity to extend the scope of the 1984 Agreement
between US NRC and the Ministry in charge of industry by
associating CEA and DGSNR, as was decided in 2004 for IRSN
will be studied. The question of a new cooperation Agreement
between DOE and the Ministry in charge of industry (HFD) will
be studied, based on the 1977 intergovernmental Agreement,
and with which American entities and French organizations
concerned (IRSN, CEA, DGSNR) would be associated.

Information exchanges will comply with the level of
protection required by the State providing them, in
conformity with applicable Agreements, and this within strict
compliance with the protection of sensitive information,
business confidentiality, industrial secrecy, and
intellectual property.

The two Parties have identified potential topics listed in
Annex to the present summary record which, subject to further
examination, could be the object of exchanges and cooperation
efforts.

ANNEX

Design Basis Threat

-- Methodology used for creation and the validation of the
design basis threat for nuclear facilities and materials

-- Implementation of DBT at nuclear sites - Impact on
security posture

-- Modelling and assessment of security force performance

-- Methodology for treatment of internal threat

-- Sharing of responsibilities between government and nuclear
operators in prevention of acts of terrorism

Exercises

-- Discussion on philosophy, planning and objectives of
exercises

-- Design and implementation of exercise program
-- Exchange of observers for exercises at sites handling cat.
I

Research and development

-- Exchange of information on physical protection research
and development priorities and program plans

-- Demonstration of tools for physical protection
applications, including advanced concepts for threat
identification and access denial

Security of Facilities from External Attack

-- Exchange of methodologies for assessment of containment
and structure performance against e.g. aircraft strikes, high
energy attacks, other threats of interest

-- Design and evaluation of transport containers to take
account of terrorists threats

-- Assessment of the consequences of illegal intended acts
against transportation

Emergency Response Procedures

-- Continuation or acceleration of existing exchanges on
responses to a terrorist event involving nuclear or
radioactive material

-- Exchange of observers for exercises

Control of Radiological Sources and other Radioactive
Materials

-- Legal and regulatory implementation of controls and
security measures on radioactive materials

Basis for cooperation

-- Both sides will assess the currently available bilateral
agreements to determine whether a sufficient basis exists for
the desired level of cooperation, including the exchange of
sensitive and classified information. For the longer term, we
will consider drafting a new government-to-government
agreement.
Leach