MFA AND ELYSEE UPBEAT ON CORE GROUP MINISTERIAL,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006580

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2015
TAGS: PREL LE SY PTER FR UNSC
SUBJECT: MFA AND ELYSEE UPBEAT ON CORE GROUP MINISTERIAL,
CAUTIOUS ON SYRIA REGIME STABILITY


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: Elysee and MFA officials
described the September 19 Lebanon Core Group ministerial as
a success, and expressed relief that consideration of a draft
UNSCR on arms transfers to Lebanon had been dropped from the
agenda. Gof officials expressed similar satisfaction that
military cooperation had been kept off the Core Group agenda
and confirmed that a third French military assessment mission
will go to Lebanon in October. Elysee officials commended PM
Siniora's performance in New York and the concurrent
isolation of President Lahoud at UNGA, and stressed that the
GoF has no preferred candidate to replace Lahoud. The GoF
maintains that any Lahoud successor should truly emanate from
the Christian community and should be acceptable to Lebanon's
Sunni community and regional countries, criteria which, in
the French view, Aoun does not meet. On Syrian regime
stability, MFA contacts remain typically more cautious than
Elysee counterparts, who speculate that direct implication of
Syria in the Mehlis report could result in fall of the Asad
regime to Alawite strongmen, a Sunni overthrow, or further
consolidation of power by President Bashar al-Asad. On the
latter point, Elysee contacts speculate that Bashar could
give up Rustom Ghazaleh and Ghazi Kanaan, but will draw the
line at family members. Elysee contacts described the visit
of Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) head Asif Shawkat to
Paris as both unfortunate and part of regular bilateral
consultations between security services; Elysee contacts
claimed that the DST (internal security service) had not
informed the Elysee in advance and that the DST chief was the
only GoF official to receive Shawkat. End summary and
comment.

LEBANON: CORE GROUP, UNSCR, LAHOUD SUCCESSOR,
--------------


2. (C) We met with Presidential Technical Advisor on Middle
East/Americas Dominique Boche September 22 and separately
with MFA DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot
September 20 to review Lebanon and Syria developments. Both
Boche and Besancenot described the September 19 Core Group
ministerial as a success, judging Arab and Russian
participation to have been particularly important. Boche
described the Siniora's effective performance at the Core
Group as an excellent complement to Lahoud's isolation at
UNGA.


3. (C) While commending the Core Group success, both Boche
and Besancenot referred to USG-GOF disagreements resolved
prior to the September 19 meeting. Boche commended the U.S.
for understanding that now was not the right moment for a
draft UNSCR limiting arms transfers to state actors in
Lebanon, noting that such a resolution would have undermined
GOL cohesion as well as international consensus on Lebanon.
Boche reiterated GoF reticence on sanctions in general, but
conceded that the GoF was not closed to discussing possible
Syria sanctions, particularly after issuance of the final
Mehlis report. Besancenot was more negative on the draft
UNSCR, noting GoF discomfort with the proposed mention of
Iraq in the draft text, and reiterating that the Core Group
should address Lebanon only. He stressed that we needed to
move sequentially and put priority on UNSCR 1595 over UNSCR
1559; implementation of the former would help pave the way
for the latter, with Hizballah gradually losing justification
for maintaining its military capacity.


4. (C) Boche and Besancenot expressed similar satisfaction
that military cooperation was kept off the Core Group agenda.
Boche noted that including military cooperation on the Core
Group agenda would have given Hizballah a pretext to accuse
the international community of interference and to separate
from the GoL. Boche confirmed that a third French military
assessment mission would visit Lebanon in October, but did
not provide a date.


5. (C) On possible candidates to replace President Lahoud,
Boche stressed that the GoF was remaining cautious and had no
preferred candidates. Rather than focusing on personalities,
the GoF had identified two criteria: 1) the candidate should
truly emanate from the Christian community (i.e., not be
picked by Sa'ad Hariri); and 2) the candidate should be
acceptable to Lebanon's Muslim community and countries of the
region. The second requirement eliminated Michel Aoun as a
valid contender, Boche concluded He said he had no
information about a possible Aoun visit to France, but
confirmed that were the Free Patriotic Movement leader to
visit, he would be received at the MFA only, as part of a
deliberate GoF policy not to receive any presidential
contenders at the Presidency. Boche expressed concern that
Sa'ad Hariri might be tempted to seek a weak, easy to manage,
elder Christian politician to replace Lahoud, which would be
a huge mistake. Lebanon needed both the PM and President to
play political roles; the President represented the
aspirations, if not the existence, of the Maronite community
and should not be reduced to a figurehead role.

SYRIA: IMPACT OF MEHLIS REPORT ON STABILITY, SHAWKAT VISIT
-------------- --------------


6. (C) On Syrian regime stability, Boche reiterated that the
content of the final Mehlis report would be decisive. If the
report established direct SARG responsibility for Hariri's
assassination, Boche speculated that Bashar may give up
second-tier officials up to the level of Interior Minister
Ghazi Kanaan and former SMI Chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazaleh,
without touching brother-in law Asif Shawkat, in-laws the
Makhlufs, or his brother Mahir. Boche added that he could
not exclude any possibilities for regime stability after the
Mehlis report; there could be a "palace coup," with other
powerful Alawis taking over; the Alawites could lose control
to the Sunnis, who lack leaders; or Bashar could seize the
moment to consolidate his authority and marginalize others,
as he has started to do since the last Ba'th party congress.
Besancenot was more cautious than Boche in reiterating to us
that the GoF did not want a "total destabilization" in Syria,
nor did the GoF want isolation of Syria to lead to it
increasing its "nuisance capacity" in the region.


7. (C) Boche stressed that Egypt and Saudi Arabia remained
essential to the international effort to maintain the
isolation of Syria. Egypt wanted to play a role and be
useful, and Mubarak had agreed to receive Terje Roed-Larsen
in direct response to a phone call from Chirac. The September
25 Bashar visit to Cairo would be another opportunity for
Egypt to deliver a tough message to the Syrian leader. The
Saudis were "a bit behind," in Boche's view, as King Abdullah
was closer personally to Syria via his tribal and family
connections. Boche described Saudi Arabia as not wanting to
be seen as plotting against the Syrian regime, and therefore
unwilling to receive Larsen in Riyadh. Boche speculated,
though, that, in the end, Saudi Arabia would not mind having
a Sunni government in Damascus "break the Shi'a arc" between
Lebanon and Iran. Saudi ties to the Hariri family were also
a positive factor; Saudi Arabia had been helpful at the time
of the Syrian blockade of its border with Lebanon, offering
use of the port of Yanbu for the transit of goods blocked at
the border.


8. (C) Boche confirmed that SMI Chief Asif Shawkat had
visited Paris and met with DST head Bosquet and no other GOF
officials, before departing France. Boche described
Shawkat's visit as part of long-standing liaison relationship
between French and Syrian security services, and noted
Shawkat usually visited France twice a year. Boche described
timing for the visit as "unfortunate," and claimed that there
was a lack of coordination within the GoF, with the Elysee
learning of the visit only after Shawkat had arrived. He
added that Shawkat has a sick child, which could have been
another reason for the visit. Boche offered no details on
the contents of Shawkat's discussions with the DST.


9. (C) COMMENT: The GoF appears satisfied with the Core Group
ministerial, not only because it provided an opportunity to
reaffirm international support for the GOL reform agenda, but
because the GoF managed to keep a draft UNSCR and military
cooperation off the agenda. While the GoF mantra remains,
"UNSCR 1595 before UNSCR 1559," it remains unclear what
happens after the Mehlis report is issued, with the MFA
expressing typically more caution than the Elysee on
prospects for SARG destabilization. End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON