MORE FRENCH THOUGHTS ON IAEA COMMITTEE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006133

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2015
TAGS: KNNP PARM TRGY ENRG FR IAEA
SUBJECT: MORE FRENCH THOUGHTS ON IAEA COMMITTEE ON
SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION

REF: A) STATE 159113 B) PARIS 5866

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 B/D


1. (C) MFA official covering IAEA issues Hugues de
Longevialle shared with us September 7 some additional
comments on U.S. proposals for the Committee on Safeguards
and Verification. His general assessment was that the MFA
agreed with many of our proposals. He also shared the
following thoughts with us in no specific order of importance:

-- On general points of discussion, Longevialle cautioned
that it was not in the IAEA's mandate to "enforce compliance
with nuclear nonproliferation obligations." The IAEA could
monitor, but enforcement actions were a UNSC responsibility.
Additionally, he suggested that it might be useful to review
the IAEA's "93 plus 2" program, as it might help with
verification issues.

-- Elaborating further on the question of detection of
clandestine activities, he said we need to be clear about the
respective roles of the Agency and the Secretariat. By way
of example, he said it could become a problem if the
Committee, operating under the Additional Protocol,
discovered undeclared activity, made it public, sought
referral to UNSC under 1540, and then found itself unable to
work directly with the proliferator due to the Committee's
lack of enforcement responsibilities. Longevialle opined
that the NSG might be better suited for enforcement.

-- Longevialle noted that we must take care that U.S.
proposals not duplicate the role of the Standing Advisory
Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI). Referring back
to our Non-paper (long-term actions),he said that the SAGSI
was better at evaluating and reporting compliance to the
Secretariat.

SIPDIS

-- France would also propose additional transparency measures
for the consideration of the Committee. Specifically, France
would suggest the reporting of high-enriched uranium, i.e.,
countries would communicate to the Agency information on
their stocks of high-enriched uranium.


2. (C) Additional points: France is fine with the U.S. offer
to update the Annexes to the Additional Protocol, although,
Longevialle added, care should be taken not to expand or
intrude on the NSG's responsibilities.

-- Longevialle said the MFA was unclear on the intent of our
final comments on "confidentiality," under the "longer-term
actions."

-- On format of the proposed meetings for the Committee,
Longevialle said France is reticent about the idea for four
meetings per year. He said that many delegations would find
it difficult to participate. He suggested fewer meetings,
perhaps three meetings annually of three-days length, but
obviously the length of each meeting would depend on the
issues for discussion. The French, however, would support
informal consultations in between the scheduled meetings.


3. (C) In response to our queries for French suggestions on
candidates to chair the Committee, Longevialle admitted that
the MFA had not focused on the question, although it should
be someone who represents a balance between technical staff
and political-level representation. He conjectured that the
candidate could also be chosen from outside the IAEA,
possibly a retired senior IAEA official.

-- Referring to our "medium-term action" suggestions for the
working group of technical experts, Longevialle put in a plug
for the EU's European Safeguards Association for Research and
Development (ESARDA),noting that this agency could also
provide input to the technical working group.

-- Longevialle's last comment pertained to the "medium-term
action" proposal for review of the IAEA role in investigating
and reporting weaponization activities. The MFA strongly
believe