EUR A/S FRIED'S SEPTEMBER 1 MEETINGS WITH SENIOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 006125

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM UP FR NATO EUN RU
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED'S SEPTEMBER 1 MEETINGS WITH SENIOR
MFA AND PRESIDENCY OFFICIALS ON IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH
EUROPE


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, Reasons 1.4 B and
D


1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 1, EUR A/S Daniel Fried met
separately with French MFA Political Director Stanislas de
Laboulaye, A/S-equivalent Director for Strategic Affairs
Philippe Carre, and Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne. They discussed Iran, NATO, the EU,
Russia, Ukraine and the Balkans. (Middle East issues and
Turkey/EU reported septel.) Fried said that the purpose of
his visit was to examine ways to improve the efficiency of
the French-U.S. relationship, already much improved since the
President's and the Secretary's efforts last February. The
U.S.-French relationship, he said, should be measured in
terms of what it can accomplish, especially beyond Europe.
On NATO-EU, Fried's French interlocutors agreed on early and
informal consultations in order to identify the most
appropriate institution for action, a step that would help to
mitigate institutional infighting. Laboulaye and Carre
looked forward to upcoming meetings in New York to discuss
such issues as the role of Iran, Islam, counterterrorism and
NATO-EU relations. Carre cautioned that the workings of the
EU are often not clearly understood in the U.S. and that
political symbolism is as important as action for EU
institutions. He said that the key to referring Iran to the
UNSC lies with Russia and China, a point reiterated by
Gourdault-Montagne. Laboulaye said that France has developed
a good working relationship with Russia, in which it is
possible to discuss difficult subjects at a high level.
Gourdault-Montagne stressed the importance of Franco-German
engagement with Moscow, and worried about Russian sensitivity
to an eventual Ukraine accession to NATO. On Kosovo,
Laboulaye said that France will do what it can to help the UN
Special Envoy Eide. END SUMMARY.

Iran and the EU-3: Russia and China Hold the Key
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2. (C) Laboulaye said he delivered an "impassioned speech" to
Russian Deputy FM Sergei Kislyak on August 31, urging him to
support sending the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security
Council. Kislyak maintained that it would be impossible to
do so at present given the limitations of the
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT),but Laboulaye said he
insisted, saying that it came down to whether Russia "wants
the Iranians to build the bomb or not." The NPT, Laboulaye
added, has been useful; however, it could take another ten
years to amend the NPT to make nonproliferation protections
stronger. Laboulaye admitted that while countries have
rights under the NPT, they will still need to prove that
their programs are strictly for civilian purposes. France
therefore is trying to convince the Russians of the
importance of this added piece, i.e., placing the burden of
proof on the country developing a nuclear program. Laboulaye
said that Kislyak fell back on procedural questions, while
noting that no one should conclude that the Russians are set
against taking action. Laboulaye described the Russian
perspective as "the answer is no, now what's the question?"
Kislyak will probably go back to Moscow and discuss with
Putin, only then can their answer be known, Laboulaye
observed.


3. (C) Fried said that Iran would only respond to political
pressure and that there needs to be political consequences
for Iranian actions. He said that U/S Burns was right when
he stressed to the EU-3 that there needs to be a "plan B" and
added that it is important not to whittle down the EU and
U.S. approach in an effort to placate Russia, South Africa
and others, only to be left with a UNSC Resolution that
carries no real consequences at all. Laboulaye said that
China and Russia held the key to success with Iran, a point
seconded by Gourdault-Montagne in his later discussion with
Fried. Gourdault-Montagne added that President Chirac would
soon call President Putin to remind him that we have
consensus on the NPT interpretation on the basis of the
August 11 BOG resolution, with the entire NAM on board, a
consensus that must be cherished and preserved. Chirac would
meet his PRC counterpart in New York to make a similar point
and press for P-5 unity on Iran. Gourdault-Montagne added
that he had recently had good discussions with NSA Hadley on
what to do once we get to New York, with GoF thinking leaning
towards seeking a UNSC decision, backing the goals of the
EU-3's Paris Agreement with Iran. At every point at which
Fried stressed the need for consequences for Iran,
Gourdault-Montagne revisited the issue of forging P-5
consensus, noting it would be a "disaster" if we went to New
York without it.
U.S., NATO, and Europe
--------------


4. (C) A/S Fried briefed the French on U.S. desire to
informally share views on U.S.-European relations and related
issues of mutual interest. He emphasized to Laboulaye and
MFA A/S-equivalent Director for Strategic Affairs Philippe
Carre that the U.S. wanted to work with both NATO, the
primary instrument of transatlantic security, and the EU.
Towards that end, it was important that both sides first
agree on objectives, and then sort out institutional
arrangements afterwards. Referring back to the strong
messages from the President and the Secretary last February,
he stressed that the U.S. continued to support a strong
Europe as a partner. Fried said he would like to see France
accept a NATO lead on issues where NATO is clearly the most
appropriate actor (i.e., including security issues broadly
defined) and that we would do the same when the EU is the
more appropriate agent (as was the case, for example, in
supporting democracy in Ukraine). Fried also observed that
the U.S. recognizes that the EU is the more appropriate
partner in the context of development in the broader Middle
East with NATO playing a supporting role. Determining which
institution is most relevant, he said, would perhaps best be
accomplished through informal consultations.


5. (C) Fried suggested that informal meetings on NATO and the
EU could continue in New York. Carre said France had already
consulted with the British on how best to work the informal
lunch. Fried offered that one potential topic was "engaging
Islam." Carre suggested discussion of Darfur (where the EU
and NATO were each contributing to a solution),Islam and CT
cooperation. Fried noted that the Secretary might also want
to discuss the frontiers of freedom (Ukraine, Georgia, etc).
However, there should not be a set, formal agenda.


6. (C) Laboulaye opined that NATO was the appropriate
institution to turn to when faced with crises, common threats
or joint military operations. For strategic questions, he
suggested, it would be the EU/U.S. -- perhaps in a more
limited and informal format. He cited the "quad" format as a
possible format, calling it efficient and effective. He said
that other countries could be invited as appropriate (such as
the Poles and the Italians),but that the core remained the
quad (though he suggested calling it something else, "EU-3
plus U.S."). Inventing new formats for discussion, he
suggested, could prove complicated or counterproductive.
Fried replied that the U.S. would not reinstitutionalize a
"quad" per se, but that the variable geometry of
decision-making dictated a need for coordination among the
four and additional countries depending on the issue. Carre
agreed that political discussions should precede
institutional decision, but also took the opportunity to
voice concern that many in the U.S. do not understand the EU,
how its institutions work, and how they affect
decision-making. While they are often perceived as unwieldy,
European institutions and procedures themselves constitute an
essential element of EU cohesiveness. Political symbolism is
important in the EU.


7. (C) Carre said another point to bear in mind is that
Europeans do not look at world problems immediately from a
security perspective, and hence do not turn instinctively to
NATO as the starting point for solutions. He said the U.S.
had a tendency to seek military solutions to security
problems, which could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The
French understand, however, that NATO is the conduit for the
U.S. to discuss challenges with Europe. Fried agreed that
there are problems for which NATO is not the answer, but
countered that the U.S. needs to be able to discuss strategic
issues at NATO even in instances where no action is required.
Fried cited past criticisms by some in Europe that the U.S.
had not taken NATO seriously as an institution; now that we
are showing our renewed commitment, we need French support.
When it comes to action, however, he reminded Carre that we
want to use both the EU and NATO. Carre agreed, but
cautioned that discussions do not always imply action and
that there are issues that could not be discussed in the
NATO-EU context.


8. (C) Fried apprised Carre, Laboulaye, and
Gourdault-Montagne of our thinking for the NATO summits in
2006 and 2008. The 2006 summit, he said, should focus more
on capabilities (NRF, funding, ESDP-NATO cooperation),with
possible enlargement decisions for 2008. He said we need to
see how ESDP and NATO can come together to produce a whole
package of options -- without worrying about institutional
sensitivities. The idea would be to line up the EU's and
NATO's capabilities next to each other to create a sort of
sliding scale that would enable seamless transition from one
to the other. On NATO enlargement and Georgia and Ukraine,
Fried indicated the U.S. did not have a secret plan. We have
told both countries that NATO is performance-based. Carre
agreed on the enlargement approach. He said France does not
want to risk or generate political fallout in Ukraine by
offering membership -- "we told Ukraine to just do it, create
reality, and don't ask yes or no questions." He observed
that Georgians needed to be handled more delicately as they
possess a sense of entitlement. The French have only told
them to move forward on their reforms. Carre said that
France is keen on NATO transformation discussions, but
cautioned against certain assumptions. France, Laboulaye and
Carre added, would not be able to accept a de facto common
army at the disposition of SHAPE. In response to Laboulaye's
concern about EU autonomy, Fried again explained that the
U.S. was not seeking an integration of NATO and EU forces.


9. (C) Carre said the NAC system at NATO was sometimes being
circumvented. NAC should be a place where we can make a
political compact or validate a decision sheet. He wasn't
sure whether the problem is with the NAC, but France feels
that too many policy decisions are de facto being taken
haphazardly or by technical bodies. In particular, he
complained that France was not happy with how the Military
Committee (MC) was being increasingly used as a decision
body. He pointed to the decisions on expansion of ISAF as
one such an example. Political decisions have to be cleared
at a high-level and not at the MC, which had become the
default for the NAC, Carre charged. NATO structures should
not take on a life of their own. Fried responded that the
fix is to recognize that the NAC is a proper instrument of
political discussion -- and that we need prior consultations.
Fried said the U.S. believes that NAC decisions should have
real weight. A NAC decision has to lead to 1) forces that
are capable to be brought into action, 2) and to a shortened
timeframe between political-strategic decisions and required
action.


10. (C) In parting with Carre, the latter informed Fried that
on ISAF issues, Defense Minister Alliot-Marie likely would
soon announce that France was prepared to take the lead role
in the Kabul region. Discussions on this issue were ongoing
with the Turks. On ISAF-OEF links, France believes that it
needs more clarity on what the U.S. plans to do with its
forces. He also voiced concern that there are discussions at
NATO on how to develop anti-insurgency strategies, which
could lead to a duplication at ISAF of OEF's mission.


11. (C) A/S Fried concluded discussions on NATO by reminding
Laboulaye and Carre that he would visit Brussels more
frequently and talk with counterparts at both NATO and the
EU. He also noted that U.S. Ambassador Nuland was working
hard to build a NATO-EU strategic partnership and to develop
a good working relationship with her French NATO counterpart.
Carre reciprocated French support for Amb Nuland and noted
that incoming French Ambassador Richard "Ricardo" Duque would
prove an equally flexible and agreeable partner.
Gourdault-Montagne agreed that the arrival of Duque, who had
family ties (through his wife) to the U.S. and a close
relationship with Chirac, should lead to better bilateral
consultations before decisions were taken.

EU Internal Developments
--------------


12. (C) Laboulaye said that the EU is going through a
difficult time, but that it aims to become a global actor and
a U.S. partner while maintaining its ability to make
decisions autonomously. This last element, he said,
guarantees that, from time to time, the U.S. and the EU may
not agree (he said that this may arise, though he hopes it
does not, when it comes time for China to fully emerge on the
global scene). Laboulaye said that he appreciates the new
U.S. respect for the EU. He said that, more recently, the EU
tried (and was successful) in avoiding what had happened
during the first Bush administration in Sweden when the
President was forced to listen to 15 EU countries basically
repeating the same (and negative) message. Laboulaye said
that at times the meeting might have felt "artificial," but
that with 25 member states it is a "difficult game to play."
Laboulaye observed that, in large part due to the 'no'
victory in the French constitutional referendum in May, the
EU would have to play that game for some time to come. He
said that the EU constitution would have made a common EU
foreign policy more achievable by establishing a common
diplomatic corps and leadership. He added that the people
who voted against the constitution did not do so because of
common foreign policy concerns. Momentum, he said, is still
towards an integrated foreign policy. He stressed that the
U.S. should understand that the EU is in a "building process"
and that the U.S. should avoid being perceived as an actor
that is trying to pull it apart.


13. (C) Fried said that U.S. support for any project or
institution would not be given based on the theoretical
merits of the institution, but on results. He cited U.S.-EU
cooperation in pressuring the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon
and the EU-3's willingness to undertake difficult
negotiations with Iran as concrete examples that reinforced
U.S. respect for those institutions. He said that the U.S.
would work with any partner that shows the conviction and
strength to achieve results. The U.S., he reiterated,
welcomed a Europe that aspires to be a partner and not a
counterweight, yet the U.S. will continue to foster bilateral
relationships with individual European countries. NATO,
however, remained the pivotal transatlantic link.

France - Russia and Ukraine
--------------


14. (C) Laboulaye said that France and Russia would hold
their next regular bilateral meeting on October 11,
explaining that these meetings began after former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage organized a meeting to

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discuss terrorism with the Russians three years ago. Since
then, Laboulaye stated, the Russians and the French have been
regularly holding strategic talks. He noted the talks
between the French Foreign and Defense Ministers and their
Russian counterparts were at first rigid and formal, but have
since become more relaxed and productive. The parties
discuss a range of topics from nonproliferation to terrorism,
and more recently have added regional issues such as Georgia
and Moldova. He said that France had been helped by Putin's
willingness to support the talks. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov
was difficult at first, he said, given Lavrov's traditional
hardline Russian approach to diplomacy, but the French have
broken through and have been able to discuss subjects like
Ukraine with him candidly.


15. (C) Fried noted that it is challenging to work with the
Russians. Much of the bureaucracy and leadership is
anti-Western. Putin, however, does listen to world leaders,
such as Chirac, Schroeder and the President, which, he said,
reinforces the necessity of having a consistent message.
Fried added that that Putin finds it tactically advantageous
when the U.S., Britain, France, and the UK quarrel because it
diverts attention away from Russia. He said that Russia is
not moving in a consistent direction, but admitted that
realpolitik would not work either. Fried noted that the U.S.
would work with Russia whenever it could, but was realistic
about the challenges. Laboulaye agreed that Russians are
difficult to deal with and added that they pretend to be in
line with the rest of the world as regards terrorism, but
really use their position "to cloak Chechnya." Laboulaye
also said the Russians would have to radically alter their
working and negotiating style as they prepare to assume the
G8 chair next year. He said that Russia's success in leading
the G8 is an important goal, and a special concern, given
that a number of U.S. congressmen believe Russia should be
kicked out of the G8. France is trying to help the Russians
to learn how to better negotiate with a collection of
like-minded countries. Fried assured Laboulaye that there
are no Administration plans to try to remove Russia from the
G8.


16. (C) Gourdault-Montagne stressed the urgency and
importance of Franco-German-led efforts to settle the EU's
relations with Moscow, opining that the whole world balance
could depend on this. Gourdault-Montagne described Putin as
doing what he could to bring Russia to a Western standard,
while being surrounded by a crowd seeking to serve itself.
The Russian G-8 Presidency would be a key test of Putin's
resolve, and we should take the opportunity to achieve
something. Gourdault-Montagne added that the GoF would seek
to continue with Germany the Franco-German-Russian dialogue
launched in 2003, which Angela Merkel wanted to utilize for
more direct criticism of Moscow. Gourdault-Montagne noted
that these trilateral meetings, despite their anti-Iraq war
origins, could play a useful role and were not anti-U.S. in
nature. Instead, the meetings were an opportunity for the
French and German leadership to speak frankly with Putin, who
was listening.


17. (C) Gourdault-Montagne noted that Chirac planned to go to
the Ukraine and Kazakhstan in October, and that the GoF had
developed a good rapport with Yushchenko and could speak
openly with him. Gourdault-Montagne warned that the question
of Ukrainian accession to NATO remained extremely sensitive
for Moscow, and concluded that if there remained one
potential cause for war in Europe, it was Ukraine. He added
that some in the Russian administration felt we were doing
too much in their core zone of interest, and one could wonder
whether the Russians might launch a move similar to Prague in
1968, to see what the West would do. Gourdault-Montagne
cited the example of Finland as a country which became a
prosperous democracy on the USSR's doorstep, but added he was
not suggesting that the Ukraine should become Finland. A/S
Fried responded that the biggest impediment, in his view, to
Ukrainian NATO accession was not Russia, but instead was the
lack of national consensus towards NATO in the Ukraine, in
contrast to public opinion in Poland and Romania. He
dismissed prospects for Russia intervening militarily in the
Ukraine, noting the capacity of the latter's army and
cautioned against exaggerating the split between the Eastern
and Western Ukraine. Fried summed up that we are not moving
"breathlessly" towards NATO accession for Georgia or Ukraine,
a point welcomed by Gourdault-Montagne.

Balkans
--------------


18. (C) Fried explained the U.S. position regarding the
Balkans, which includes plans to encourage Bosnia to
undertake necessary reforms in advance of the tenth
anniversary of the Dayton Accords in November. Fried said
that he would like to coordinate with the French if they plan
on commemorating the actual signing of the accords, which
took place in Paris in December. Laboulaye said that France
had great respect for UN Special envoy Kai Eide, who, he
said, has been agonizing that the "standards are not up to
standard" in Kosovo. Decentralization efforts, Laboulaye
said, have been far from adequate. He added that the GoF
would help Eide however it could, though it feels that public
statements would do little at this point. The question, he
said, is how to get Serbs to give up Kosovo without losing
face. Gourdault-Montagne agreed on the need for a continued,
international approach on the Balkans, and the need to keep
all parties involved, especially the Russians. On a separate
note, he added that the question of Croatian EU accession had
direct implications for French domestic politics, as French
public would a hard time accepting tougher conditions for
Croatia (i.e. insistence that General Gotovina be delivered
to the ICTY in the Hague) than those demanded of Turkey.
(Gourdault-Montagne's Turkey/EU comments are reported in more
detail septel).


19. (U) This message was cleared by EUR A/S Fried.
STAPLETON