Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05PARIS6076
2005-09-08 08:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

EUR A/S FRIED DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH

Tags:  PREL XF SY LE KMPI KDEM IS KPAL KPAO FR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006076 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015
TAGS: PREL XF SY LE KMPI KDEM IS KPAL KPAO FR
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH
SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS AND OPINION LEADERS


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006076

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015
TAGS: PREL XF SY LE KMPI KDEM IS KPAL KPAO FR
SUBJECT: EUR A/S FRIED DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH
SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS AND OPINION LEADERS


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary and comment: EUR A/S Fried discussed U.S.
BMENA strategy, Syria/Lebanon, and Israeli-Palestinian issues
with senior French MFA and Presidency officials September
1-2. MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Thibault concurred that both the
November Forum for the Future and Barcelona Summit need to be
successful, but stressed French attachment to the Barcelona
Process. Fried explained initiatives to launch a Foundation
and Fund for the Future in November, with French officials
offering few substantive comments, beyond questioning the
advisability of involving Lebanon in the Foundation.
Thibault opined that UNSCR 1595 was producing unexpected,
accelerated results in Lebanon, and stressed the GoF desire
to consult on the planned Core Group ministerial in New York.
On possible sanctions on Syria, Thibault stressed the need
to wait for the Mehlis report. Thibault also suggested GoF
reticence on a possible arms embargo targeting Hizballah,
warning that we are entering a dangerous phase in Lebanon and
stressing the need to preserve international consensus,
especially Arab support. President Chirac will raise with
President Putin the unhelpful Russian role in recent UNSC
consultations on the Mehlis report. French officials agreed
with Fried on the need to make Gaza withdrawal a success. In
a series of successful public diplomacy events, including a
friendly public debate with former FM Hubert Vedrine, A/S
Fried made the case for a common agenda to promote freedom in
the Broader Middle East, to receptive audiences of Arab
ambassadors, academics, journalists and French opinion
leaders. End summary and comment.


2. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried met with French A/S-equivalent
for North Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault September
2 and discussed U.S. strategy on BMENA, Syria/Lebanon and
Israeli-Palestinian issues. (Fried also discussed these
issues in lesser detail September 1 with Presidential

Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne and MFA
Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye; their comments on
non-Middle East related issues are reported septel.) Fried
was accompanied during the Thibault meeting by NEA DAS Scott
Carpenter, Acting POL M/C, and poloff (notetaker).

BMENA: FORUM, FOUNDATION AND FUND INITIATIVES
--------------


3. (C) A/S Fried briefed Thibault, Gourdault-Montagne, and
Laboulaye on U.S. strategy for BMENA in coming months,
stressing that we wanted both the November Forum for the
Future and the Barcelona Process summit to be successful.
BMENA and Barcelona were not in competition, nor was the U.S.
seeking to take over EU efforts; both initiatives should be
viewed as working towards similar objectives. In this
context, the U.S. was seeking to work with a core group of
interested European governments to help BMENA stand on its
own and give a chance for all interested European government
to participate, particularly with the Russian G-8 presidency
approaching. Both Spain and Denmark appeared interested in a
greater role in the Forum. Fried observed that it was France
that had sought originally to make the Forum for the Future
the centerpiece of the BMENA, which was precisely what was
taking place.


4. (C) Thibault conceded that there was no contradiction
between Barcelona and BMENA, which had many shared values.
Nevertheless, the GoF remained focused on the
"Euro-Mediterranean dimension" of the Barcelona process,
which remained a strategic element of French foreign policy.
The Barcelona Process, though it contained democracy and
development aspects, was essentially broader in scope than
BMENA. Thibault also cited the sizable funds expended under
Barcelona and stressed that the GoF would always make sure
that the Barcelona Process was supported. In separate
comments to Fried, Laboulaye assessed that Barcelona had not
met the goals it set out in 1995, but blamed the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the lack of progress.
Laboulaye worried that BMENA could get similarly sidetracked
by the Israeli-Palestinian issue, or by Iraq or generalized
"hatred of the West." On the latter point, Laboulaye mused
that many Arab youth who professed hatred for the U.S. shared
a fascination with America and wanted to be as successful as
Arab-Americans, which gave some cause for hope.


5. (C) Fried briefed his French interlocutors on proposals to
launch a Foundation and Fund for the Future at the November
Forum for the Future, recalling recent briefings to the
French and other EU embassies in Washington. He stressed
that the proposed Foundation would be independent and not
U.S.-led, with private U.S., European, and regional
participation. The U.S. had begun quiet consultations with
Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Lebanon, with initial positive
reactions. Thibault responded by asking pointedly why and
when the U.S. had approached Lebanon on the issue. Thibault
conceded that that there was a rationale for including
Lebanon in the foundation, given its need for political and
economic reform; he questioned, however, whether it was the
right moment to put Lebanon at the forefront of Middle East
reform, given the delicacy of its current political
situation.


6. (C) On the proposed Fund for the Future, Fried noted that
we were close to concluding MOU's with Egypt and Morocco, and
Jordan wanted in as well. Fried summed up that senior U.S.
officials would visit Rome, Madrid and Brussels the following
week to explain these initiatives, and that Paris was being
consulted first. He stressed that we wanted French views,
and ideally were seeking a roll-out of the Foundation and
Fund boards by the November 11-12 Forum for the Future in
Bahrain. Thibault offered minimal response, beyond noting
that the G-8 at Gleneagles had not endorsed the foundation
initiative, cautioning against creating too many new
institutions, and seeking details on the positions of Egypt
and other key Arab countries. He added that France was
interested in the Forum for the Future process and had sent
its Education Minister to the recent ministerial in Jordan,
in addition to sending then-FM Barnier to the inaugural Forum
last December in Rabat.

CAUTION ON SYRIA/LEBANON
--------------


7. (C) Thibault observed that political developments in
Lebanon were moving at an accelerated pace and constantly
defying expectations, as seen in the recent arrests and
charges issued against the former security chiefs and
Presidential Guard Chief Mustafa Hamdan. The GOL decision to
respond to Mehlis' requests was important and showed
unexpected courage on the its part. The GoF wanted to
continue consulting with the U.S. on what might happen in the
UNSC and on planning for the expected Core Group ministerial
on the margins of UNGA in New York. At the same time,
Thibault stressed, it was too early to draw conclusions prior
to issuance of Mehlis' final report in October, and we needed
to proceed with discretion.


8. (C) Fried observed that Lebanon developments were a
vindication of Chirac's leadership and strategy in initiating
UNSCR 1559: by concentrating on Lebanon first, we would have
direct impact on Syria. While Thibault concurred, he
remained circumspect when asked how we should handle Syria,
given the accelerating developments in Lebanon. Although the
GoF was willing to consider possible sanctions on Syria,
everything depended on the Mehlis report and to what degree
it fingered Lebanese or Syrian officials. As for a possible
arms embargo limiting arms transfers to the GOL only,
Thibault was more reticent, noting that such a UNSCR had more
to do with UNSCR 1559 that UNSCR 1595, and could undermine
international consensus on Lebanon. In the French view,
Lebanon was entering a "very dangerous period;" whereas up to
now progress had been relatively easy, now we were
approaching the core of the problem, including Syria, Iran,
and Hizballah.


9. (C) A/S Fried observed that, in the context of our
bilateral cooperation on Lebanon, every time we had taken the
initiative we had succeeded, so we should keep pushing
forward. Thibault stressed the importance of UNSC consensus
and having a realistic assessment of what we can achieve in
the Council, while keeping Egypt and Saudi Arabia on board.
A/S Fried stressed the need for Russia in particular to hear
a reinforcing message from France on Lebanon. In a separate
discussion with A/S Fried, Diplomatic Advisor
Gourdault-Montagne confirmed that President Chirac would soon
speak with President Putin to raise Russia's unhelpful
actions during recent UNSC consultations on the interim
Mehlis report, in addition to the Iran nuclear issue.

AGREEMENT ON NEED TO MAKE GAZA WITHDRAWAL A SUCCESS
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Thibault commended Israel's handling of Gaza
withdrawal and noted FM Douste-Blazy's planned visit to
Israel and the Occupied Territories September 7-8. Thibault
agreed with Fried on the need to make Gaza withdrawal a
success, and reiterated French support for the mission of
Quartet Special Envoy Wolfensohn, who met with Douste-Blazy
and Chirac in Paris on September 1. Fried cautioned that we
had to be careful as the situation was fragile on both sides;
President Chirac's praise for PM Sharon had been helpful in
this context. Thibault observed that Sharon's July visit to
France had been highly successful and restored confidence
between the two governments.

FRIED SPEECH, OUTREACH EVENTS
--------------


11. (SBU) A/S Fried delivered a well-received speech on
building a common agenda to promote freedom in the broader
Middle East to a packed audience of Arab ambassadors, senior
MFA officials (including Political Director Laboulaye),
prominent academics, think tankers, and journalists September
1 at the Embassy,s Hotel Talleyrand. Following A/S Fried,s
remarks, former Foreign Minster Hubert Vedrine presented a
polite, but skeptical commentary, in which he laid out the
myriad reasons for caution regarding democratization in the
Middle East, which he cautioned was not like making
"Nescafe." The audience was very receptive to the open
exchange of views between Vedrine and Fried, who corrected
misperceptions that the U.S. was seeking to "impose its will"
on the region. Fried also underlined that we were well aware
of the challenges ahead, and were not seeking to make instant
coffee. (The only hostile questions were posed by an Irish
journalist, who asked why the U.S. hadn't imposed a solution
for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.) A later dinner hosted
by the Ambassador with key Arab League ambassadors underlined
U.S. interest in soliciting Arab views on our shared forward
strategy for freedom. Meanwhile, Arab journalists, during a
spirited, September 2 on-the-record roundtable with A/S
Fried, questioned whether the U.S. was fully committed to
pushing Middle East regimes to accept democratic reform.
Specifically, they asked if the U.S. would take a more
hardline stance on Egyptian elections and Syrian interference
in Lebanon.


12. (SBU) The DCM hosted an off-the-record lunch for A/S
Fried, NEA DAS Carpenter, and a group of French opinion
leaders September 2, stressing that the timing of the Fried
visit early in the political season signaled the importance
of the Franco-American relationship. The group of
journalists, authors, editors, and intellectuals agreed that,
whereas in recent years the problems in the transatlantic
relationship had been the issue of discussion, the situation
had improved so that today the debate had shifted to how to
address the common problems before us. Picking up from the
previous evening's speech, the lunch discussion touched on
Middle East democratization and reforms currently taking
place in the region, and the need to sustain international
efforts to support the democratic shift. Responding to a
question on reform in Eastern Europe, A/S Fried discussed the
democratic growing pains that now face Ukraine and the
challenges posed by an increasingly troublesome Belarus.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (SBU) A/S Fried,s outreach to French decisionmakers,
opinion leaders and a broader audience of Arab diplomats and
journalists successfully reinforced the image of the
Administration's interest in dialogue and coordinated action
on promoting freedom in the Broader Middle East.
Interlocutors at all events commented on the positive efforts
of this outreach and open dialogue, particularly the
September 1 speech/debate with former FM Vedrine. Although
Vedrine was not on board with all our ideas, the format of
having a public dialogue was very effective and will be a
useful model for future visitors. End comment.


14. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Fried.
STAPLETON