A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH EUROPEAN DIRECTOR BRIATTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006033

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014
TAGS: PREL FR TU EUN NATO
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH EUROPEAN DIRECTOR BRIATTA
ON EU ENLARGEMENT AND TURKISH ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS


Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: French MFA A/S equivalent Briatta told A/S
Fried September 2 that he was "reasonably optimistic" that
the EU could work out a declaration on Turkey that would
allow accession negotiations to begin as scheduled on October
3, so long as the Greeks and Cypriots did not insist on new
concessions. But he expressed concern about growing public
sentiment against future EU enlargements, which he viewed as
the main reason for the May 29 French rejection of the EU
constitutional Treaty. While agreeing with Fried's arguments
about the strategic value of future enlargements, Briatta
stressed that EU enlargement was more properly a domestic
than a foreign policy issue, given the EU's impact on
domestic legislation. While saying France was prepared not
to close the door on future enlargements, Briatta expressed
particular concern about the impact of eventual Ukrainian
accession on the giant in the back room, Russia. He did not
believe that the current French emphasis on "concrete
actions" to demonstrate the EU's value would have a negative
impact on the NATO-ESDP relationship.


2. (C) Presidential diplomatic advisor Gordault-Montagne
separately confided to Fried on September 1 that French
maneuvering was motivated entirely by domestic political
considerations and that France would not block the beginning
of accession talks with Turkey. End Summary.


3. (C) EUR A/S Dan Fried's September 2 discussions with
French MFA European Affairs A/S-equivalent Gilles Britta
focused on French views toward EU enlargement and the
beginning of EU accession negotiations with Turkey. Fried
was accompanied by NEA DAS Scott Carpenter and Acting
Political Minister-Counselor. This message also includes
comments on Turkey from Fried's September 1 discussions with
presidential diplomatic advisor Maurice Gordault-Montagne
(septel).

EU-Turkey accession negotiations
--------------


4. (C) Fried reminded Briatta of studied U.S. discretion in
dealing with the latest round of EU-Turkey tensions and asked
whether accession talks with Turkey would begin as planned on
October 3. Briatta described himself as "reasonably
optimistic" that this would be the case. The UK had tabled a
good draft that addressed 90 percent of France's political
needs and added no new conditions. Asked about the reference
to 2006 in the EU draft declaration, Briatta described it as
no more than a periodic review, but said it had been
necessary to obtain something on Cyprus in order to make the
deal acceptable to French public opinion.


5. (C) Separately on September 1, presidential diplomatic
advisor Gordault-Montagne also assured Fried that the GOF
would not block the beginning of accession negotiations. In
an unusually frank aside, he explained the French reaction to
Turkey's declaration as motivated entirely by internal
politics, specifically PM de Villepin's need to position
himself vis-a-vis his main rival, Interior Minister and
center-right governing party leader Nicholas Sarkozy. He
argued that France had needed to do something dramatic, at
the risk even of isolating itself within the EU, in order to
satisfy French domestic constituencies. He said the French
goal did not go beyond making Turkey repeat what it had
already said in the past on eventual Cyprus recognition.


6. (C) As a next step, the Brits and the French planned to
share the text with the Turks while encouraging them not to
present a counter-declaration to the EU declaration. Briatta
said that the Turks, once they were convinced that France
would not derail the beginning of accession talks, had not
allowed themselves to be baited by French domestic political
posturing. Fried said the U.S. would do its part to reassure
Turkey.


7. (C) Briatta said the situation would nonetheless remain
dicey, given Greek interest in Turkish concessions on Aegean
issues and public opposition that threatened to break the
current consensus on Turkey in Greece between Pasok and New
Democracy. At the same time, many in Turkey were suspicious
of Erdogan's intentions. Fried argued that accession
negotiations were the best way to keep Turkey's reform
efforts on track; prospective membership had worked well with
Central and Eastern European countries. Briatta agreed, but
cautioned again that the number of problems linked to
enlargement was growing rapidly.

French fears of enlargement
--------------


8. (C) Briatta said the Turkish problem was symptomatic of
the French public's rejection of EU enlargement generally, as
reflected in the failed referendum on the EU constitutional
treaty. It was a "fairy tale" that the EU would be able to
enlarge and to deepen simultaneously. In addition, the
government had failed to understand the degree to which
"Europe" had become a domestic rather than a foreign policy
issue. President Chirac was in a tight spot, given the
breadth of opposition to Turkish membership in the parliament
and his own governing party, not to mention Germany. He also
acknowledged that the EU had broken all its own rules in
allowing Cyprus to join the EU in advance of a Cyprus
solution. If Turkey entered the EU, then it would be able to
vote on laws that would take immediate effect in France.
Briatta agreed with Fried's arguments about the strategic
value of enlargement for peace and stability in Europe, but
likened Turkish EU membership to Mexico's becoming the
fifty-first state of the U.S.


9. (C) Fried noted that a viable EU enlargement process was
important for others in addition to Turkey, in particular for
the Balkan states. It was a fact, even if left unstated,
that NATO and EU accession offered the best prospects for
fixing the Balkans. This was of strategic importance even
more for EU countries than for the U.S., since an explosion
in the region would not affect everyone equally. Fried said
it was important for the EU to continue to demand that
Croatia hand over its war criminals as a precondition for
accession talks, since not to do so would have too serious
implications for war criminals in Bosnia (Republika Srpska)
and Serbia. As for other countries such as Ukraine, it was
important to enunciate the "prospect in principle" of
membership, even if this would not be a realistic prospect
anytime soon. This was a powerful incentive for reform.

The Russian shadow behind the curtain
--------------


10. (C) Briatta said European governments would not succeed
in foisting future enlargements on their citizens without
their explicit approval. Discussion of Ukraine would
immediately raise questions as to the futures of Belarus,
Georgia, and Moldova -- and eventually, Russia. He described
relations with Russia as the EU's biggest challenge. This
was a question that would arise sooner or later, given
Russia's long de-facto role as a "European power." Fried
responded that Russia so far showed no signs of wanting to
join the EU, given its sense of its own specialness, its
temporary mood of nostalgia and its habit of trying to
dominate its neighbors. Briatta fretted that European
dependence on Russia was increasing rather than diminishing,
particularly in the energy sector.


11. (C) Fried said the EU had made an important strategic
decision to consider the area between it and Russia as part
of its "new neighborhood." He assured Briatta of the
continuing U.S. desire to work together with the EU on
Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine, where the track record
so far was very positive. He noted that it would be
appropriate for NATO to take the lead on some issues, and the
EU on others.

No Impact on EU-NATO relations
--------------


12. (C) Asked whether the calls of his ministers for more
"concrete measures" and EU visibility portended increased
difficulties for NATO-ESDP relations, Briatta responded that
this was not the case. According to Briatta, French thinking
over the short term would focus on security in the areas of
counterterrorism, health (avian flu),and air travel.
Military security, he said, was not the key issue for now;
proving the usefulness of the EU to its citizens was.


13. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried.
STAPLETON